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December 13, 1966 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Since the November meeting of the Co:mmission, I haT1e 
reviewed more carefully the record of the hearings before (i) 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate in 
1962, entitled 11Wiretapping- the Attorney General's Program11 
(referred to below as "1962 hearings"); and (ii) the Subcom~ 
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Conunittee of the Judiciary 
in 1961, entitled "Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Legislation" 
(referred to below as the "1961 hearings"). 
Scope of this Memorandum 
There have been other hearings on this subject which 
I have not examined. I am informed ~ ho-v;;ever ~ that the evidence 
at the 1961 and 1962 hearings is comprehensive as to wiretapping~ 
and I know of no significant new evidence. 
Accordingly~ this memorandum r.vill be limited to those 
hearings, and for the most part will be confined to selected 
verbatim excerpts of the testimony by proponents of the Depart-
ment of Justice 0 s position wit h respect to wiretapping. As 
this testimony related primarily to wiretapping, ( and not to 
2. 
other means of electronic surveillance), this memorandum will 
likewise be so limited.* 
There was~ in addition to testimony supporting wire-
tapping, a substantial number of witnesses who opposed it in 
any form and under any conditions.** Some of these (like Edward 
Bennett Williams) make eloquent arguments against it. But my 
reading of the testimony satisfies me that the concern expressed 
by opponents is supported neither by experience nor empirical 
data. The overwhelming weight of hard facts is to the contrary. 
The excerpts quoted below are severe.ly limited and 
selective in the interest of conserving space. I have not 
attempted to present a complete picture of the views of any 
witnesses. It can be said, in general, that each witness 
emphasized the importance of safeguards and limitations, and 
most witnesses favored prior court orders rather than permitting 
wiretapping upon the authority of law enforcement officials. 
There was widespread agreement that all unauthorized wire ·a.p-
ping should be forbidden with appropriate sanctions. It wa., 
agreed by many of these witnesses that court-controlled 
*My view is that the principles involved apply generally to 
s9-called "bugging" as well as to wiretapping. 
**The adverse testimony is not included in this memo. 
3. 
wiretapping, with all other wire surveillance proscribed, would 
afford greater protection to the r ight of privacy of innocent 
citizens than either the present chaotic situation or an abs olute 
ban against all wiretapping. 
The Importance of Wiretap Evidence 
The 1962 hearings were upon the "Attorney ene:ralvs 
reconnnendation for legis l ation i n r egard to wi :retapping' \ namely, 
S. 2813 and similar bills pending before the .Judi c i ary Committee. 
Set forth below are excerpts from the test i nnny of soMe of t:he 
witnesses favoring the Department of Just i ce legislation~ 
Attorney General Kennedy (1962 Hearings~ pp . 11~46 ) 
The Attorney General was the first witness in the 
1962 hearings. His testimony covered 35 pages: . In test i fying 
as to the need, he said~ 
"A new law (permitting wiretapping) is urgently I' 
needed • • • to prosecute more effec ·iv ly 
certain major crimes." (p . 11) 
* * * *' 
" .•• organized criminal syndicates engaged in 
racketeering activit i es involving millions of 
illicit dollars do a major pa:rt of their business 
over 'the network of telephones in the Un i ted 
States'. The very fact that the telephone exists 
has made law enforcement more difficult. It per-
mits criminals to conspire and carry out t heir 
activities without ever getting together , and 
therefore, without giving the police the oppor = 
tunity to use other techniques of investigation." 
(p 0 12) 
* * * * 
"I1 can name three areas now , Senator , where 
we have very strong information, onein the South , 
one in the East and one in t he West , where maj or 
political leaders and figures in those communities 
are being corrupted , and are on the payroll of 
some of our bigtime gangsters and racketeers , and 
we cannot do anything about it. 
"Now, if legislation like this is passed , we 
could move in on these areas. 
"This would give us a very s t rong weapon. 
"I think we could make a major inroad in the 
bigtime gangsters and racketeers and hoodlums in 
the United States, if we had the help and assis-
tance of this kind of legislation. 
"I think we could make a big step f orward in 
the field of bringing to justice by prosecut ion 
those involved in espionage and treason in t he 
United States." (p. 28 ) 
* * * * 
"Organized crime . . • is much stronger now than 
it was 20 years ago. It is much more powerful 
in the United States economically and politically 
than when Senator Kefauver made his investigation 
10 years ago •••• And it is growing." (p. 28) 
4. 
' . 
"Senator Keating. You are aware that there 
have been a number of major gambling and narcotics 
cases in New York which have had to be dismissed, 
and there are hundreds of other cases pending in 
New York which cannot be prosecuted because of 
this present wiretapping muddle? 
"Attorney General Kennedy. I am aware of 
that, and I am also aware that the problem in New 
York, which is potentially so serious, has been 
kept reasonably under control, largely because of 
the fact that Mr. Hogan, Mr. Silver, and the other 
district attorneys as well as the police have been 
permitted to use wiretapping in a limited fashion. 
"Many of their biggest cases, I ·would think 
almost a majority of the major cases in the New 
York City area, where this is a particular prob~ 
lem, have come to fruition because of wiretapping. 
"If wiretapping did not exist and it is not 
permitted, I think that the situation in New York 
is going to get even more serious than it is at 
the present time~ and even drastic." 
Francis Biddle, former Attorney General* (1962 hearings, pp. 
289-303) 
"Wiretapping is not only useful in most criminal 
cases but indispensable in covering what is 
loosely called organized crime." (p. 291) 
* * * * 
5. 
*At the time of his testimony, Mr. Biddle was Chairman of the 
National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union. He 
noted that the Union°s view is different from his own. 
"At present in the area of organized crime, law 
enforcement is crippled because interceptions 
are forbidden. . 11 (p. 292) 
6. 
In speaking of the harm done to juveniles by "drug 
peddling", Mr. Biddle said: 
"When it comes to a choice between protecting 
schoolchildren from narcotics and protecting 
the public who use public telephones from 
having their conversations occasionally over= 
heard by law enforcement officials~ I prefer 
to protect the children." (p. 292) 
In speaking about the British and Canadian experience, 
Mr. Biddle said~ 
"The British and, I believe~ the Canadian 
governments permit wiretaps •.•• The British 
public is as insistent on protecting individual 
rights as we are, perhaps even more so .••. 
Yet, .•• they give their officials great power, 
and if these powers are misused they demand 
appropriate action. 
"I once asked my friend~ the late Lord 
Birkett~ who was the English alternate at the 
Nuremberg trial where I was the American mem-
ber~ and who had been the leading barrister in 
his day and a very active criminal lawyer, who 
was later on the court of appeals, whether wire-
tapping by the police was permitted. He answered 
that, of course it was, nobody had questioned 
the impropriety of wiretapping. 11 (p. 295) 
In reply to a question whether specific cases were 
lost by the Department of Justice when Mr. Biddle was Attorney 
General because of the inadmissibility of wiretap evidence, 
Mr. Biddle replied~ 
"I think there probably were three or four, as 
many as three or four cases which were lost as 
a result ~ maybe more = but I am almost certain 
that one would find three, four, five cases 
that we lost as a result of the inadmissibility 
of wiretapping. Judith Coplon was an outstanding 
example. That was an espionage case, as I remem-
ber. 
"Senator Hruska. General Biddle, Frank 
Hogan, and Mr . Silver both testified that they 
had to dismiss literally hundreds of cases 
because of inadmissibility of wiretap evidence. 
"Mr. Biddle. I was only speaking of the 
cases in my career." (p. 299) 
7 . 
Mr. Biddle in defending tapping even of public tele~ 
phones testified as follows ~ 
"Now, that is balanced against the 
desirability of people having their phones 
tapped who have to use public telephones, and 
one reason we have got to tap them is that the 
crook, of course~ knows that his telephone wi.ll 
be tapped~ so he uses t he public phone. But I 
don ut - just to me it is inconce ivable with the 
two values. Democracy is after a ll the balance 
of values. 
"Now, to me it is inconceivable that the 
value of peopleus privacy being interfered with 
and public telephones is comparable to our 
protection against this vicious and constantly 
growing and corrupt organization that is getting 
into the lower grades and children are caught 
in the narcotic thing with peddlers around the 
schools, in the athletics of young boys, in 
taking examinations. That never occurred surely 
20, 25 years ago. The thing is spreading. It 
has brought new fields to conquer and I feel 
very strongly about it." (p. 300) 
Mr. Biddle concluded his testimony by stating that 
"freedom and democracy" are endangered when "the government 
and your police (are not given) . . . enough power to cope 
with their problems." (p. 302) 
Judge Ferdinand Pecora (1962 Hearing, p. 303-310)* 
"Of course wiretapping is dirty business. Any 
invasion of oneus privacy of itself is dirty 
business. Gentlemen, I donut think anybody will 
deny that crime is a much dirtier business. The 
advantages that professional criminals obtain 
over enforcement officers through the use of the 
telephone in planning their conspiracies and in 
consummating their crimes are tremendous. These 
advantages in keeping ahead of the law cannot, 
in my opinion~ be overcome except by giving law 
enforcement authorities the right~ under judicial 
supervision, to tap private telephone wires where, 
upon affidavit~ it is shown that there is probable 
cause to believe that the tapping of the wire will 
yield evidences, either of preparation for the 
commission of crime~ or of its actual commission. 
8. 
*Judge Pecora served as a member of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and on the Supreme Court of New York for many years, 
resigning in 1950 to run for Mayor of New York as the candidate 
of the Democratic and Liberal Parties. 
' . 
"To permit those who cynically flout the 
law, to use the telephone to enable them to 
accomplish their criminal purposes, and to pre~ 
vent the law enforcement authorities from making 
use of the same facil ity to apprehend the wrong-
doers , is as unreasonable as to limit our enforce-
ment authorities to using the automobile to over-
take criminals who use the jet plane as a means 
of escape." (p. 308 ) 
"I think our judic iary can be depended upon 
not to issue such orders i mpr ovidently . nor to 
grant them without probable cause." (He then 
went on to testify as to the restraint exercised 
in New York in the use of wiretapping). (p . 308) 
Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney New York County (1962 
Hearing, pp. 172=194) 
"Telephonic interception, pursuant to cour t 
order, is the single most valuable weapon 
in law enforcement 0 s fight against organized 
crime." (p. 173) 
* * * * 
"The judicially supervised system under 
which we operate has worked. It has served 
efficiently to protect the rights, liberties, 
property and general welfare of the law·=abiding 
members of our community. It has permitted us 
to undertake major investigations of organized 
crime. Wit hout it, and I confine myself to top 
figures of the underworld , my own office could 
not have convicted Charles 0 Lucky 0 Luc iano, 
Jimmy Hines, Louis 0 Lepke 0 Buchalter~ Jacob 
0 Gurrah 0 Shapiro, Joseph gSocks 0 Lanza, George 
Scalise ~ Frank Erickson, John °Dio 0 Dioguardi, 
and Frank Carbo. Joseph 0Adonis 0 Doto, was tried 
in New Jersey, was convicted and deported on 
9. 
evidence supplied by our office and obtained 
by assiduously following leads secured through 
wiretapping. 
"Over the years committees, commissions and 
individuals have investigated intensively our 
use of this constitutionally authorized priv ilege . 
There has been no evidence produced that law en-
forcement officials have abused the privilege . 
Quite the contrary. There is agreement that we 
hav e used this investigative weapon fairly , 
sparingly , and with the most selective dis -
crimination. 
"But, for several years now, we have been 
deprived of the opportunity to investigate 
organized crime. We have been paralyzed by the 
uncertainty and confusion generated by judicial 
decisions." (p. 173 , 174) 
10. 
In speaking of the limitation on the use of wiretap 
evidence imposed by the Benanti decision in 1957 ~ and the 
resulting confusion , Mr. Hogan said : 
"An imperative need exis ts to dispel this con-
fusion . We in local law en forcement need 
clarification and we need it badly . " (p . 174) 
The Attorney General's bill (S . 2813), as t hen intro-
duced, would permit interc ep t ion by state law only in t he 
crimes of 11murder, kidnapping , extortion, bribery or dealing 
with narcotic drugs or marijuana . " Mr. Hogan strongly urged 
addition of at least two other categories, namely, "larceny, 
where the telephone is an essential instrument of crime , and 
gambling" . "Wiretap evidence is probably the indispensable 
11. 
weapon in any attempt to deal with fake charity racketeers who 
operate multiphone boiler rooms ••• We have a great number of 
such cases and continue to get them." (p. 176) 
"Syndicated gambling enterprises, although 
widespread and likely to be interstate, are 
based upon operations that are essentially 
local •••• Wiretaps enabled us to break up 
an intricate conspiracy involving a ring of 
crooked policy operators . . . they were 
gangsters, not just gamblers." (p. 176). 
"Gambling of this size is big business and 
interception of telephone calls was the only 
way we could reach this three-state mob." 
(p. 176) 
In commenting upon testimony to the effect that wire-
tapping really isnvt needed by law enforcement, Mr. Hogan said: 
"I am always amazed to read testimony 
from alleged experts to the effect that wire~ 
tapping is of little or no value to law en~ 
forcement. Our files in New York County are 
loaded with evidence which should satisfy the 
most skeptical of critics." (p. 178) 
Mr. Hogan then went on to say that "without wiretaps, 
we never could have convicted" a number of notorious gangsters 
and racketeers whom he named. (p. 178, 179). 
"Wiretaps have been invaluable in exposing 
racketeering in certain union welfare funds . " 
12 . 
In testifying as to the effect of the Benanti 
decision in New York, Mr. Hogan quoted his earlier testimony 
as follows : 
"Under present conditions ~ law enforcement 
in New York is virtually crippled in the area 
of organized crime o Cases, the disposition of 
which would contribute materially to the welfare 
of our community~ will have to be dismissed for 
lack of prosecution, because we are unable to 
use evidence obtained through court-ordered 
interceptions * * * 
"In addition to cases, there are a number 
of major investigations that we are now con~ 
ducting that will collapse due to the restrictions 
presently placed on the use of intercepted 
information -.'e ')'(: *" (ppo 178, 179) 
Mro Hogan then testified that his earlier prediction 
as to being forced to dismiss cases had proved to be "no idle 
prediction" : 
"Not only have investigations collapsed ~ but 
we have been obliged to dismiss a number of 
cases because of our inability to divulge the 
contents of court=ordered wiretaps." (p. 179) 
In speaking of the dismissal of seven defendants 
characterized by Mr. Hogan as "major figures in the importa-
tion and sale of heroin . ", he said ~ 
"Without the us e of wiretaps in the courtroom, 
their guilt could not be established. The most 
diligent police work could not duplicate the 
evidence that we had obtained through the use 
of interceptions (authorized under New York law 
but inadmissible under t he cloud of Benanti ) ." 
(p. 179) 
13. 
Anthony P. Savarese, Jr., Chairman New York Joint Legislative 
Committee on Privacy of Communications (1962 Hearings, pp. 
78-83) 
Mr. Savarese was introduced by Senator Keating as 
an expert in the field, having chaired the New York Wiretap 
Committee as well as the Joint Committee on Privacy of the 
New York State Legislature. Mr. Savarese endorsed the Depart-
ment of Justice bill as follows ~ 
"As chairman of New Yorkns Joint Legis~ 
lative Committee on Privacy of Communications, 
I have often had occasion in recent years to 
assert, as emphatically as possible, the urgent 
need for Congress to enact legislation such as 
you have before you today. Only 11 months ago 
I appeared before Senator Ervinvs subcommittee 
in support of Senator Keating's eavesdropping 
bill. I then went into some detail on the 
disastrous effect o.f the Supreme Court's Benanti 
decision and the need of correcting it. I 
believe such discuss ion may be unnecessary today. 
The distinguished sponsorship of the present 
bill suggests that this committee may be more 
interested in its specific effectiveness than 
in the necessity of it. So I shall limit this 
discussion to two points . 
"This bill accepts the principle adopte.d 
by New York in its constitutional amendment of 
1938, that wiretapping may be used, by law 
enforcement officers , on reasonable grounds, 
under the authority of a court order. That was 
the first substantial control on this virtually 
universal polic e practice, but of course New 
York did not invent the procedure. That stems 
directly from the fourth amendment in our Bill 
0 • 
of Rights. Certainly in the 18th century un-
reasonable search and seizure were just as dirty 
business as wiretapping has been called in our 
modern times. But the libertarians who framed 
the fourth amendment were practical men who 
recognized that the security of the home must 
sometimes yield to the necessities of public 
security and they provided that warran~s might 
issue. That is what this bill does in modern 
times and I commend it. 11 (p. 79) 
14. 
Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Assis tant Attorney General in Charge 
of the Criminal Division, Department of Justice , (1961 Hearings, 
pp. 351-372) 
Mr. Miller stated that he was expressing "the views 
of the Department of Justice on legislation currently the 
subject of these hearings 11 (namely ~ several bills authorizing 
wiretapping pursuant to court order, bu t forbidding it other-
wise). (p. 351) 
After recognizing bar "perhaps no single issue 
generates more emotional outbursts and stronger views than 
wiretapping", Mr. Miller said: 
"I deem it of utmost importance that legis~ 
lation be enacted authorizing interception and 
disclosure of telephone conversat i ons ~ .. dth 
strict and enforceable safeguards ~ pro~ection 
the normal rights of privacy." (p. 352) 
* * * * 
" ... It is a strange anomaly which allows 
spies and professional criminals to profit 
from science by carrying on espionage and 
racketeering through conversations which would 
be impossible without modern communications, 
while it forbids the Government, even after 
proof of probable cause , to obtain and use evi-
dence ... and bring them to justice." (p. 353) 
15. 
In supporting the need for clarifying the right of 
states to wiretap (in addition to a federal statute), Mr. Miller 
said: 
"The existing state of inconsistency and con-
fusion is intolerable in the case of State law 
enforcement officials. I believe that inter~ 
state communications should be protected against 
interception and disclosure by State police and 
investigators no less than Federal officials, 
but that the State authorities have equal need 
for, a procedure by which exceptions can be 
made in special cases. 
"Insofar as S. 1495 would permit wiretapping 
by State officials , the bill lists certain crimes 
in the solution of which tapping would be per-
missible. Because of the varying State statutes, 
the problems of definition , and the delicate re-
lationship between the Federal and State Govern-
ments, it is believed that there would be sub-
stantial enforcement problems in connection with 
that portion of S. 1495 which permits wiretapping 
by State officials only for certain enumerated 
crimes. It is the position of the Department of 
Justice that S. 1086 is preferable, insofar as it 
allows a State to authorize wiretapping for what-
ever crimes it desires, thus leaving the States 
their traditional area of law enforcement subject 
only to the very important safeguard that wire-
tapping must be accomplished pursuant to a court 
order and upon a showing of probable cause." (p. 
357) 
Frank O'Connor, District Attorney of Queens County, New York 
(1961 Hearings, pp. 327-334) 
16. 
In supporting the right of law enforcement towire-
tap, Mr. O'Connor emphasized the "intolerable" situation in 
New York resulting from court decisions interpreting §605 of 
the Federal Communications Act. He said: 
"We have many, many prosecutions that are 
pending right now in which we have devoted not 
only days, but weeks and months, and I think 
frankly we have in many cases done years of 
investigation where we have presented the fruits 
of our investigation to a grand jury, where we 
have received valid indictments. Those indict-
ments have been sustained against attack on 
motions to dismiss and now, because of the 
wiretap situation, we are uncertain as to the 
legality of the prosecution. For example, in 
the county of Monroe where the city of Rochester 
is located, the district attorney recently dis~ 
missed 22 cases pending on his criminal calendar 
because the evidence in those cases had been 
gathered through wiretaps. 
"Mr. Silver has in excess of 200 cases 
pending in the county of Kings. I have at least 
10 to 15 pending in Queens, and Frank Hogan will 
testify tomorrow to the number he has pending 
in New York County, in which part, at least, of 
the evidence was uncovered through legal wiretaps. 
"Now, these are the cases involving serious 
crime. I donwt subscribe to the tendency in some 
quarters to sweep under the rug cases involving 
gambling. I feel very strongly that gambling is 
a very integral part of organized crime. 
"These cases involve not only gambling: they 
involve in my county, for example, criminal abor-
tion. It is my opinion ·we will never be able to 
prosecute cases involving this crime without 
assistance of wiretapping. 
"If we are to slough these cases off and 
not prosecute them because we canat secure the 
necessary evidence, I think it is going to put 
a dent in the moral fabric of our community." 
"We have a situation here where we are con~ 
cerned on the one side with the rights of indi-
viduals as opposed to the rights of society. I 
think there is a danger in any choice, but the 
test should be this. The protection for i.ndi~· 
vidual rights cannot be disproportionate to the 
loss of protection for our society." (p. 327, 
328) 
Goodman A. Sarachan, Chairman, Commission of Investigation, 
New York, New York (1961 Hearings, pp. 334-340) 
17. 
The New York Commission of Investigation, chaired by 
Mr. Sarachan, was described as a "crime commission". 
"For more than 20 years, law enforcement 
officers of New York State availed themselves 
of the benefits of wiretapping laws under the 
careful scrutiny of State courts. However, the 
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court as we know, 
in Benanti v. United States and other Federal 
court rulings have crea ed a serious situation 
in law enforcement in my State as District 
Attorneys Silver and OaConnor have told you." 
(p. 335) 
"Hundreds of cases - many of them very serious 
cases - are awaiting action by Congress to 
amend the Federal Communications Act and to 
bring to an end this intolerable situation." 
(p. 336) 
* * * * 
"Not to be permitted to procure wiretap 
evidence under the careful restrictions of our 
State laws would undoubtedly greatly hamper the 
effectiveness of our work." (p. 336) 
18. 
Mr. Sarachan reported on public hearings conducted by 
the New York Commission in 1960. He said "all witnesses" stressed 
that'under present conditions, the protection of our citizens, 
especially in the field of organized crime and public corruption, 
is being seriously curtailed .•• " (p. 336) 
He emphasized that "law enforcement officials must 
have the right to intercept telephone messages, with proper 
judicial restraints sufficient to safeguard personal liberties~ 
if they are to cope with the leaders of organized crime." (p. 
336) 
No Evidence of Abuse of Private Right~ 
There is deep and understandable concern that legalized 
wiretapping would not be confined to criminals but would in~ 
vade the privacy of innocent persons. But it must be remem~ 
bered that no one is suggesting uncontrolled wiretapping. 
' . 19. 
Indeed, the type of legislation under consideration would 
significantly minimize - rather than enlarge = the abuse of 
private rights through wire interceptions. This expectation 
is confirmed by the nearly 30 years of experience in New York 
State. 
Francis Biddle~ 
"There is no responsible evidence against the 
succe.ssfu1 operation of taps" and there is 
"very responsible evidence" to the contrary. 
(1962 Hearings, pp. 299-300) 
The evidence as to the experience in New York "does 
not show abuse by the District Attorney or by the police". (p. 
291). 
Judge Ferdinand Pecora~ 
In testifying as to his own experience with wiretap 
orders on the bench i.n New York from 1938 to 1950, Judge 
Pecora described the proce.dure and the care wi.th which the law 
was administered. He sai.d~ "These orders were not signed by 
the Justices of the Supreme Court in any haphazard way or as 
a matter of form. • • • I think there i.s very definite assurance 
that the District Attorney does not lightly go into court 
seeking permission to tap private telephone wires." 
' . 20. 
After saying that the Attorney Generalus bill (then 
before the Committee) provided appropriate "safeguards against 
an abuse of the rights," Judge Pecora said ~ 
"I don't think that orders permitting such 
wiretaps would be made the subject of abuse 
anymore than has been through the century 
and a half of the history of our courts the 
issuing of search warrants. I think our 
judiciary can be depended upon not to issue 
such orders improvidently, nor to grantthem 
without probable cause. • 'Ihey haven't 
done it in the State of New York ~ where per-
mission for wiretapping has existed under 
constitutional authority since 1938. 11 (1962 
Hearings, p. 308) 
Frank S. Hogan 
In his testimony in 1961 and again in 1962, Mr. Hogan 
documented the extent to which wiretapping had actually been 
used in his office. He testified ~ 
"Over the years committees, commissions and 
individuals have investigated intensively our 
use of this constitutionally authorized 
privilege. There has been no evidence pro-~ 
duced that law enforcement officials have 
abused the privilege. Quite the contrary, 
there is agreement that we have used this in~ 
vestigative weapon fairly, sparingly, and with 
the most selective discrimination." (1962 
Hearings, p. 173) 
* * * * 
' . 
"The Chairman of that New York State Legis-
lative Commission , after two years of digging, 
stated in writing as a conclusion that no 
single abuse could be attributed to a law 
enforcement officer in New York State." 
(1962 Hearings , p . 188) 
Frank OiConnor : 
"We have never received a complaint f r om a 
civilian t hat private rights have been in~ 
vaded by illegal wiretapping. If there was 
anything like the number of illegal wiretaps 
banded around in t his r oom yesterday, we 
certainly would have received many ~ many 
complaints. 11 
"Senator Keating ~ You have never had a 
complaint?" 
"Mr. o u connor~ No." (1961 Hearing , p. 
329) 
21. 
There appears t o be. no fac tual evidence !>-contradicting 
the testimony that the right to wir etap in New York , pursuant 
~ 
to court order, hasAbeen abused . There is a good deal of general 
testimony , with t he usual hypothetical cases (as to bedroom 
conversations, talks between lawyer and client , etc.), but I 
have seen no evidence to support the view that court controlled 
surveillance would in fact abuse privat e righ s in any significant 
way. 
22. 
Perhaps the leading attempt to prove the contrary has 
been made by Samuel Dash, a Philadelphia lawyer who has published 
a good deal of undocumented argument against wiretapping. For-
mer Attorney General Biddle, also a Philadelphia lawyer, 
characterized Mr. Dash 0 s writing as follows: 
"I don't think Dash 0 s evidence means a thing; 
I think it is so loose, it is all guesswork. 11 
(1962 Hearings~ p. 299) 
Position of the Bar Association in New York 
No exhaustive examination has been made of the posi~ 
tions taken by the bar associations in New York. I have, how~ 
ever, examined the testimony in the 1961 and 1962 Judiciary 
Committee hearings , as well as several of the reports of the 
various committees. In summary~ and although there has been 
vigorous dissent , I believe it is fair to say that the New 
York State Bar Association) the New York County Lawyers Associa-
tion (through its Board of Directors), and the Federal Legis-
lation Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York all have favored legislation permitting wiretapping, 
subject to court order and appropriate safeguards."/( 
*The views of the organized bar in New York seem particularly 
relevant as that state has had the greatest experience with 
this problem. 
23. 
Whitney North Seymour, Jr. testifying as Chairman of 
the Committee on Civil Rights of the New York County Lawyers 
Association, supported Attorney General Kennedy ' s bill in 1962. 
Mr. Seymour made the point that civil rights would be "much 
better protected" by the enactment of this type of legislation 
than "if no wiretapping should be permitted." He said ~ 
"Yet, speaking for our own committees , our 
zeal in protecting those civil rights has taken , 
I think, the proper practical turn of viewing 
that civil rights will be much better protected 
by the enactment of legislation such as that 
which is being considered than by taking a 
head-in-sand approach that no wiretapping should 
be permitted. We think, in fact, that that 
approach has, in part , contributed to the 
general state of confusion which we think is 
actually injuring civil rights in our own com-
munity and possibly at large in others." 
(1962 Hearings, p. 362) 
The New York County Lawyers Association report on 
the Attorney General 0 s bill~ 
"We are concious of the duty of the bar 
to guard the civil rights of all citizens as 
zealously as possible. We are persuaded , how-
ever, that a workable and enforceable wire-
tapping law which permits limited interception 
under rigid controls, and attaches strong 
sanctions against unauthorized interception , 
will tend in the long run to provide a more 
genuine protection to civil rights generally 
than a continuation of the present situation 
of confusion and unenforceability. "~\' (1962 
Hearings, p. 419) 
Edwin L. Ga~erini, Chairman of the Committee on 
24. 
Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York, presented the report of his committee in support 
of Attorney General Kennedy 0 s bill (S. 2813). 
In reviewing policy considerations, and after 
acknowledging the ant ipathy to the concept of wiretapping, the 
Committee spoke out in favor of the "civil rightsu of the "victims" 
of criminals ~ a point of view which seems rarely to be expressed. 
The report stated ~ 
11But we believe that we must also recognize 
the dangers of unchecked crime. The victims of 
criminals are, in a very real sense , deprived of 
civil rights. Law enforcement is not simply an 
affair between the criminal and the police. 
Government owes its citizens a duty to possess 
and exercise the power to enforce the laws. 
The less effective are the operations of our 
law enforcement agencies ~ the more we all tend 
to become the victims of crime. 11 (19 62 Hear ings , 
p 0 331) 
*Mr. Seymour testifi.ed tha there was a sharp division in his 
Committee on Civil Rights~ with the report being approved by a 
margin of only one vote. He testified, however , that the report 
was "subsequently adopted by the Cmmn.it· ee on Federal Legislation 
and approved by our Bard of Dire~tors. That means that our 
report has run the gamut of at least 93 committee members, and 
under our by=laws the Board of Directors can speak for our 
membership of 10,000." (1962 Hearings~ p. 362) 
follows ~ 
25. 
The final conclusion of the Committee was stated as 
"Our review of S. 2813 convinces us that 
it is a well=drafted bill, that it removes the 
anomalies and ambiguities of the present law~ 
that its general approach to the problem is 
sound in banning all private wiretapping and 
permitting carefully delimi ted wiretapping 
for purposes of law enforcement and national 
security and that Congress should enact legis-
lation closely approximating this bill . " 
(1962 Hearings~ p. 337) 
The Commit .ee on Legislation of the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York again considered wiretapping 
in its 1966 report on the McClellan bill (S. 2189 ). The Com-
mit tee reaffirmed "its previous position that wiretapping should 
be permitted under adequate safeguards and in limited situations." 
See Vol. 5 , Bulletin No. 2 of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, June 1966.* 
*The Committee on Bill of Righ s of the As sociation of the Bar 
of the City of New York~ also by a divided vote~ has consistently 
opposed wiretapping. See 1962~ Hearings, p. 348. It appears 
from the 1962 hearings ~ however~ that Mr. Gasperini was autho~ 
rized to submit the report of his Committee on Federal Legis-
lation as representing "the views of the Associati on. " 
Calendar No.1080 
DOTII CoNGRESS 
Bd Session } SENATE { REPORT No. 1097 
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT 
OF 1967 
APRIL 29, 1968.-0rdered to be printed 
Mr. McCr.ELLAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 
REPORT 
Submitted the following 
together with 
MINORITY, INDIVIDUAL, AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS 
[To accompany S. 917] 
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill 
(S. 917) to assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence 
of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination of 
law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of govern-
ment, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, 
and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass. 
AMENDMENT 
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in. lieu thereof 
the following: 
That this Act may be cited as the "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of1967". 
TITLE I-LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 
DECLARATIONS AND PURPOSE 
Congress finds that the high incidence of crime in the United States threatens 
the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and its citizens. To prevent 
crime and to insure the greater safety of the people, law enforcement efforts must 
be better coordinated, intensified, and made more effective at all levels of govern-
ment. 
Congress finds further that crime is essentially a local problem that must be 
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'1-'>' .. • ·. , '<' Ma .23 1 iitJs. 1 coNGRESSIONAL 'RECO in ·:.tsm:AT£·, ·.'r · : \~~ ; . ,,. ... • ~ , 
!;(P,·'J ~-· ' I' ' y ' ' ' I 'f " ' 1 \t'. ~ 86245 ' 
,( ~,; J 11 j ' ! , ~ 1. ' '. • ' ~ ;, :1.,; I 1 \ I 
1 
. J ), 1 .'f, ~ < f<'t . i\. .'' 
0 




··' proper and correct .. interpretation: ()t ~ wireW..:PPtng. title dh the ·. f)'n . ~from ep n with. the 5Pirit of permitting the .~; 
those cases, and ,th!il concl'Qsions I nay.e1 Al:ka.nsa.S?· •.· ··~ . . : l:. t~ f . re,s sue ac on as e eems 7' 
r· I 
•,, 
c;irawn are proper. f • • :· , ... · Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. Pre · I ask . en s 
" Drawing from those cases, I do,.not feel una.nirnou.s ,consent, without · los.tng. my _thre~~ttene~ .. I {lannot flnd any bugger in 
· it wise pubHc policy to le~~tve 8o critical right to th~ :t1po11, that ,j;he qistinguished ~he woodpile from looking at it. myself. 
an issue at!,. the discretioJ::l! C?f the courts, . Se.na11JQ:I:' frQm :Michigan JMr. HARTl may Mr. HART. l,V[r. President, &orne people 
paJ:ticularly as they are·.ex parte proceed- ~ve 5 minutes in which to explain the can take oomfol,'t, 1 · j;hl,nk, in the lan-
1ngs. .r'" , . . •. . ·· · ;. maroter he wishes to diiscl.l,tSs . ~:t:l4 nq<~; i:o):· · gua:ge ,of &ection 2511 < 3' > , and esp~ially 
' M:r. President' 'We a~e dealing,if.n a new pair my time. . . . , ' ' the s.tatement that the. President is in~ 
field here, and ~ur right to do so, under The PRESIDING OFFICER' The sen- dee<l J,imited by: t¥ Constitution in his 
;r ::. title 'Til, c-omes from· amendment Four. ato? will not lose the floor. 'I'ne Seriator· exercise of the national security power. 
·oA the qqn~titution, i~ · whicl;l a. man·.s ·from lv1icbiga~ has yiel~ed t,Q' l;li~ t~e ~ ~s why!' think i~ might be useful to 
home ·· is rendered inviolate: unlesa there right Wspeals',. " > , · · · · ,, ' . have this exchange. :, ·-.' 
is probable cause as to ;whr it should be Mr .. HART, Mr. President, I tlUtnk th!'l: ,,, (~Ve~, p.oti~e that-, tlqe; ~cltal runs this 
, , · ·searched or "bugged.'~ , '· , .. ·, · Senator from lllinois verY much, · way: · , " '·'· 1 • : · 
, .'In a search and seizure under the Mr. President, I inyite attenttQn to ' Nothlng contatne<t in thls chapter ... 
. fourth am,enctment, . we have one day, . page 56. of the bill. 6efer to soot;!n}i1iaH shaH be iieemed' ~1:9 · ltmtt the constitutional 
usually. There is a; specific time, and (3~ As l read lt, this is a,n exemption power <>f tlle President .to do whatever he 
there is a specific place., In a few min- .~SU!le thlat nothing in the re:;;triction :WE!<Ut!l ln the area Of l:>ugg!ng against any 
utes, in an hour~ or' probably; at xnost 1n on wiretapping shall lin).it the President • ot)ler clear and. present dang~r to the struc-
2 hou~ •. the search is over. / 1 • in oerta.i,n area.s !).nd under cerj;ain cQn- ··, ture,~ , !lxls~!!noe ~~tile ?ove'i ment. 
But here we . have' ah . Instrument 'ot· ditions. What does it sayi! , . · , If w~ agree ~at th~ :President does not 
surveillance: whereby . we · tap the man's:, It says that nothing. in this .~hapter- or have constitutional p.ower to put a tap 
wire or we pug his home for a 30-day in the bill shall limit the constitutional on an orga;nizatio~ _tbat ~advocating the 
period', and then we can reapply !or·an- power of the President to :ta~e ,,such withholding of in-come tax payments-to 
other 30.~day period, and tl;len · for still ' measures a.s he deems necessary to pro- cite a current, though as yet a small 
another 30-day pe:ti.<;>d. · ... , 
1 
tee~ the '(!n~ted States against tlae. ove.r~ movement;-I wowd feeL more at ease. 
Mr. President, this 1&, altogether un- throw of the Government by force or But if, in fact, we are here saying that 
reasonable and m-uch ,too l'?ng a time. I . other l.lnlawfql means. ....... . .. , . , . ·so long a.s.. the President thinks it Is an · 
think cutting down, ~ 3& days to 7 days, I.t then goes on to say that noth,lng in ~ylty that 4>nstitutes !il clear and pres.,.. · 
and the~ forcing the< ~rosecutor to go the . bill sball limit fhe power of the nt c;ia,nger tOth~ stlfuc,tUre or xisten Jl'. 
d see tfie' judge; after 7 days, and ex- President to take such measures M he o can ut a 1!-
ain why he needs e:nother 7 days, is deems ;necessary· to protect the United ou restraint. then clear y I think 
r more reasonable . . ')1 ;l~ , · · '· · · · States-and this is w,hat botheril me- ~ gmng u -~· 
I am 'certain the su,pretne Cotrrt would "agains~- other clear ant;l. J:!tesent , . The PRESID~CER. The time 
gree with thi$, as , I jirew upon Berger danger t:il'"tlfu: structure or existence Ol'""allotted to the Senato;r from Michigan 
nd Ka't:a in drawing up my amendment. tne Government." . . , has expired. ,.,. .· . · 
·I yield back the tem~.inder of my time .. , ~What 1& .it . that woUld I constitute ·a,, Mr. McCLELI.J\N'!.M:E'President, i ask 
' Mr. MaCLELLAN. ·l yield back ·the re- · clear and present danger to · the struc- unanimous cdnsenti ' that the Senator 
mainderofrny time. ·· ture or existence of the Government? As 'from Michiga;n,have'ri.n addit1onal5 IPin-
The' 'PRESIDING OFFICER. All · time t read lt-:--and thls is my fear-we are utes without being chl!lrged any time. 
having beetJ. yielded back, the question ~ saying, that tp.e President, on his motion, ·The PRESIDlNG OFFICER. Without · 
on agree1pg tQ the ,a.Imlndment of the . could declare--:-name your favo~l't!l poi~ . objection, it 1s so order~d . . · . ·I, 
~enator !rom Hawaii,~ ·. 'f ,, ,. , ~!-draft do.igers, Black Muslims, the ,, Mi' ' HOLLAND ·wfu. tb. e Senator yield? 
~~~ tb~~d:e=ri~Ji::.e~res1dent~ ;aclelil~~fdorp~~~~~g~:l=~~~~~~ ( .' Mr: HART. t yi~ld; ... , " 
1n :view of• the Sena;te's · act~on on titles structme or emt:mrc~ ~ tlle Uovetn- . 
nand In of this bill. I have had to con~ r:Ueni::: · . . · . . 
sider carefully what position to · take on =rrth$t 1s the case, · section 2511(3) 
the blll as a whole. 'In ,my opinion both ' grants unll.nlited tapping ·and . bugging 
ti~les axe clOO.rly ·~ unoonstit1,1tional. authority' tO the President. 'And that 
Further •. neither y;ill ~ve any real effect. means there will be bugg!ng in areas 
on reducj,ng ::;~eet cnme and it is doubt- that do not come.' within pur ,traditional 
ful that either will have a.ny real effect notions of nationa' secm]_tv; • .__ ~ · ... 
on reducing organized crime. New ¥ork~g of that a fair one? Is 
permitted court wiretapping for a quarter my concern a valid one? If it 1s why 
of a century priortothe Berger case, but do we not agree to ' k.nock out the last 
a look at the c_rime situation in New Y<;>rk claust:? . ,, 
proves that'\Ylref.apping is not a solution Mr. McCLELLAN;' Mr. :President. this 
and iJt is not even a very ·effective tool. language i~ la.nguage that was approved 
Despite t~tles ll a.nd . III, however, I and, in fact. drafted by the administra-
feel it vital tbat act~on. be taken on title tion, the Justice Department. I have not 
I which does hold <;>UJ' . ho~ for helping challenged it. I was perfeotly. willing to 
solve our serious CIJme problem. There- reoogmze tb.e wwer of the President in 
fore, I support final passage. this area. If he felt there was an l)rgani-
. It is m¥ hope that·. Jn the conference zation-whetbe·r black, wh1te, or mixed. 
W1i'h th~ Rouse t~t titles n and III will whatever the name and uqder whatever 
be e:Hmmated, If tb,ey a.re not ~d they .¥!tuSp1Ces-tnat was plottmg to overthrow 
should become law the severability clause the Government, I would. think we would 
. wil~ save titles I and IV when the courts . want lrtm to ha•e this xight. 
strike down titl~ n and III rela~ve to --wHat sucfi an amendment would do · 
oonfessions a.nd elootromc snoopmg. wowd be to circumscribe the powers we 
AMENDMENT No, 715 . think the President has under the Con-
Mr. D;m..KSEN. Mr. President, I call stitution. As :tar as I am concerned, I 
up my amendment No. 715. ·' 
Mr. HART. ' Mr. Presd.den:t, would the 
SeJlaltor from nlinois be!O•re calling Up his 
amendment--which would con:trol our 
time-pennit me a couple of minutes to 
86246 cor 
gull!@ a ~nstitutiona,l power. Clearly we_ 
c'Oul~.- -
Mr. McCLELLAN. Even though in-
tenrtea: weoouiQ nof do so~ 
Mr. HART. l'J. f~;'/ QiiUS a~e I ii6B..-
-$reEl waet;heF we t:ROYsat t.fteti "'e ft6fte 
thele£s 69'1118 Eie BBl'ftetaiag aeettt ~e 
Ce!lilti4i'l1ties. However, we are agreed 
thaJt this language should not be regard-
...V ed as intending to gl'al'lt any authority, 
""'f'-..1ncluding authority to put a bug on, 
\J that the ·President does not have now. In addition, Mr. President, as I think • our exchange ·makes clear, nothing in 
section 2511<3) even ,attempts to define 
the 11mits of the President's national se-
cunty power under present law, which 
I"'"fuive a:Iways found extremely vague, 
especially in domestic security threats, 
· -as oppgseQ. to tareeta ft ern f&Pei8'fl: ~~· 
81'&. -Aa I Peoall, ht bhe teeenfi Ka.te eeee, 
Mm& ef t.fte JtitJMoee ef lihe Stt1$tellre 
Cwpt Elel!Sted- t.ft!M;:Jibe::: ~1Ment ~ 
=~ :.t:;;:· ~,~ 
naUeAa:l: se~J.!t{J' Qa&&ll ~~v't a 
~ ~zweaeg;;;!tttz!· 
it<~~ exercise ~~ way a1f= bi 
tiUe III. As~hl8-eni0 e, 
ttm now sttre ne PFes!aeat tlli~ t.hat 
jU&it eeeaase some J'('Ji!tteal mevemem in 
--this cou.t>tl=3' is @'i>1ng him f,lts he ael:lld 
-!'E6d this as an a&""emen6 fpem.~a t;.flet;-
by ids 8'WR m~iteR, Re gm,Jd P,'t a t'Ail ~ft. 
-· 
' . 
REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR 
ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING 
THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR 
ORAL COMMUNICATIONS 
C~t r1o c~ . .t._, . 
lkfo. ~ bf ~t.vj_ \t_. ~  ~ 
E./<; ) 
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1969 TO 
DECEMBER 31, 1969 
a.-~~kfi/"IA.-1.-/ ~. ~ ~.& . " ~ t-.-1_/l ~~ - l/-
"3 () t(.. ( 3 0 2.- 0~ ~ : '3 > ~ -J.e.,J._ ;}~-+ ::_l.J ~ s f.&./li ~ - y 
-:::... l7/Ufo:...._ 'X.l{) 
~ 'if .-z_ 4-&._ /-u, /,l_ .j.,_f.u_~ c_~~ wJJ... M . ~ ~I 9 bt 
'1-- s- u-f j/k,-...JL-~~ .(_~ ~ Hu;.::j l ~- 3:,-
~'1 c.~- 'h4.y«.o~{71) 1 6¥~')•-{to)1 1~ (!o0 1 ~(_1~ 
~70 - ~rr ~ . . . . 
1-~..tt.. ~o-f~~ ~~&-v.e,"<t ~k. i:fo)..e.c.p. J:ul -T~ 
r~ of C:.-z..~ ;u--vu~~!4.& 110 ~~f ~ tu~- )/l/6(r~ s-J 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 
Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing 
or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral 
Communications 
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress Assembled: 
This report is submitted in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 2519(3) of Title 18 , United States Code, which 
require that in April of each year the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts transmit to the 
Congress a full and complete report concerning the number of 
applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception 
of wire or oral communications and the number of orders and 
extensions granted or denied during the preceding calendar year, 
together with a summary and analysis of the data required by 
law to be filed with the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts by Federal and State Judges and by prosecuting 
officials of Federal, State and Local Governments. 
This is the ~econd report submitted under the Wiretapping 
and Electronic Surveillance provisions of Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which was 
approved on June 19, 1968 (82 Stat. 218). This report thus 
covers the period from January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969. 
The first report was submitted to the Congress on April 30, 1969 
and covered the period June 20, 1968 to December 31, 1968. 
.. 
I. Reporting Requirements of the Statute 
In general the new law requires every State and Federal 
Judge to file a written report with the Director of the 
~ 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts on each 
application made to him in accordance with the provisions of 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2518, for an order 
authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication. 
The report is to be furnished within 30 days '~fter the expira-
tion of an order (or each extension thereof) entered under 
Section 2518, or the denial of an order ... "and must contain 
certain detailed information including the name of the applicant, 
offense specified in the application, and the duration of the 
authorized intercept. 
• 
Prosecuting officials who have authorized applications 
for intercept orders are required to file reports in January of 
each year setting forth various information concerning the 
communications that were actually intercepted, the cost of the 
intercepts in regard to the use of manpower and other resources, 
and the results of the intercepts in terms of arrests, trials, 





Regulations, including reporting forms, were first 
promulgated by the Director of the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts in November 1968, They were revised 
in December 1969 to require prosecuting officials to indicate 
definitely the number of days on which listening devices were 
actually in operation and to indicate more clearly the type 
of intercept (whether a wiretap device or a microphone). The 
revised regulations also clarified the elements of cost to be 
used in computing overall costs. The regulations were widely 
distributed and a copy was sent to every prosecuting official 
who made an application during 1969, as disclosed from reports 
filed by judges. The letter of transmittal and the revised 
regulations appear in Appendix A. 
III. Response to the Regulations 
The statute requires that orders by state judges approving 
applications for orders authorizing communication intercepts 
by state officials may be made only by judges of courts of 
competent jurisdiction and that applications can be made only 
by a prosecuting attorney, "if such attorney is authorized, 
------~--- - ----., 
by a statute of that State to make application to a State court 
- 3 -
. . 
judge of competent jurisdiction." The reports filed during 
calendar year 1969 indicate that only a few states have laws 
authorizing courts to issue orders permitting wiretapping 
or eavesdropping , although the number has increased. For 
the first time reports have been received from judges and 
prosecutors in the States of Colorado, Florida, Maryland, 
New Jersey and Rhode Island. 
IY. Summary of Reports by Judges 
In the twelve month period ending December 31, 1969 
there were 304 applications for intercept orders made to 
State and Federal judges, resulting in {302 separate authorization 
orders. Two applications were denied, including one denial by 
a Federal judge in Nevada and one by a State judge in New York. 
Of the 302 applications granted, 33 were signed by Federal 
judges and 269 were signed by State judges. The State judges 
in the State of New York signed 191 authorization orders, which 
was 71 percent of all orders signed by State judges. 
The 304 applications filed during 12 months of 1969 compare 
with 174 applications filed during approximately six months of 
1968. Thus, proportionately, there were fewer applications made 
per month in 1969 than there were made during the 1968 reporting 
- 4 -
period. This occurred even though 34 applications were 
made to Federal judges in 1969 and none was made during 1968 . 
Table 1 summarizes the number of intercepts authorized , 
by each reporting jurisdiction, the number of extensions 
granted and the average length of the authorization and 
extensions and the facilities from which or the place where 
the intercepts were to occur. The Table also shows the total 
number of days and hours intercepts were in actual operation 
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A. Grants, Denials and Authorized Length of Intercepts: 
The 304 applications made to judges , as noted above, resulted 
in two denials for permission to intercept - one Federal and 
one in Nassau County, New York. In addition, two applications 
for extensions were denied. The length of time authorized for 
conducting an intercept varied from a few hours to 30 days . 
A similar variation occurred in regard to extensions . Except 
for intercepts where no conversations were heard, the actual 
period of operation varied from three hours to 220 days. 
Of the 271 applications which resulted in an intercept 
250 involved a telephone wiretap. Fifteen intercepts used a 
listening device such as a microphone. In six requests both 
a telephone wiretap and a microphone were used for the inter-
ception. 
B. Offenses: The offenses specified in the applications 
for court orders covered a wide range from abortion to usury . 
Several applications specified two or more crimes that were 
being investigated. However, there were five broad categories 
of crime predominately listed in the applications. They were 
Drugs (including narcotics) , 71; Extortion, 10; Gambling, 102; --
Homicide , 19 · Larceny, 10; and Robbery, 24. Table 2 shows 
the offenses set forth in the applications, by reporting 
- 8 -
jurisdiction,with separate data for the Federal jurisdiction, 
for the separate counties in the State of New York and for 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C. Type of Facility: The locations of the interceptions 
authorized by the judges were reported to include 135 residences , 
68 apartments, 14 multiple dwellings, 71 business locations , 
and five business and living quarters. Also, automobiles and 
public pay telephones located on streets were reported as 
places where authorized eavesdropping was permitted. 
V. Reports by Prosecuting Officials 
The reports filed by prosecuting officials were generally 
complete. Where a report was not complete, requests were made 
for omitted information, and most of the prosecuting officials 
responded. 
Although the Act requires supplemental reports to be filed 
by prosecuting officials concerning court activity arising out 
of intercepts reported previously, no such supplemental report 
was filed by any prosecuting official in relation to intercepts 
authorized during the period June 20 to December 31, 1968. 
A. Nature of Intercepts: The wiretaps installed in 1969 
in accordance with court authorizations resulted in intercepted 
conversations ranging in frequency from one every day to 546 
per day. In one investigation the conversations of an estimated 
900 persons were intercepted and in another investigatiop 
~ 
- 12 -
5,594 out of 5,889 conversations were reported to ~e ---
incriminating. A summary of the average number of intercepts 




Summary of Interceptions of Wire or Oral Communication, 
January 1., 1969 to December 31, 1969 
Number Average Number of 
of Intercepts Per Wi~ ~ 
Reporting Wiretaps Persons ncri~inating 
Jurisdiction Author~ zed InstaJ..led Involved Intercepts e: Intercepts 
Federal ••••••••• 33 30 152 1,498 1,228 
Arizona 
Maricopa ••••••• 1 - - - -
Pima County ••••• 7 5 9 181 4 
Colorado 
Denver County ••• 2 2 3.S 950 30 
Florida 
Broward County •• 2 1 15 202 202 
Georgia 
Fulton County ••• 1: 1 467 548 84 
Henry County •••• 1 1 202 202 78 
Mar~ land 
Baltimore County. 10 10 148 139 22 
Prince Georges Co. 5 5 4 29 28 
New Jerse):: 
Essex County •••• 4 4 * 188 98 
Mercer County ••• 35 35 29 336 224 
Rhode Island 
Providence County 1 1 55 790 583 
New York 
(New York City) 
94 Bronx County ... 23 23 57 704 
Kings County 19 19 3 639 279 ... 
New York County • 19 18 54 305 95 
Queens County 51 49 49 695 25 •• 
.. 
Table 3 
Surrmary of Interceptions of Wire' or Oral Con~unication, 
January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969 - Concluded 
Nwnber Average Number of 
of Intercepts Per \Hretap 
Reporting Wiretaps Persons Incrimin 1ting 
Jur'isdiction Authorized Installed Involved' Intercepts Intercepts 
Other New York 
Counties 
Clinton ..•.•.• 5 5 3 263 None 
Columbia ...... l 1 2 200 10 
Dutchess ...... 4 4 * '* * 
Erie ........•. 4 3 22 1,551 1,286 
Nassau ..•..... 3 3 25 100 None 
Oneida .•...••• 11 11 3 971 179 
Onondaga .. •... 18 18 29 578 76 
Orange •...•.•. 2 2 * 700 330 
Suffolk ....... 6 6 ·J: * * 
Westchester ••• 15 13 4 1~373 275 
Ulster •••..... 1 1 2 70 None 
*Information not reported. 
NOTE: The information in this table is taken from reports received from 
both the judge authorizing the interception and the prosecut jng 
official. 
B. Cost of Intercepts: The total cost of an intercept 
(in terms of manpower, equipment and other costs) ranged from 
a low of $20 . 00 for one intercept to a high of $45,554.00 for another. 
Of the 262 intercepts where cost information was reported, 127 
cost less than $1,000 ; 45 cost $1,000 to $2,000 ; 54 cost $2,000 
to $5,000 24 cost $5,000 to $10,000 and 12 cost over $10 , 000. 
The average cost per wiretap, by reporting jurisdiction, appears 
in Table 4. 
C. Arrests, Trials and Convictions: Most of the cases 
in which there were interceptions reported are still under 
active investigation. A total of 625 arrests had been made 
as of December 31 , 1969. Also a few trials and convictions 
were reported. Table 5 shows the type of intercept used and 
the number of persons arrested in these cases as of the date 
of the prosecutor's report. 
- 16 -
Table 4 
Average Cost Per Intercept Installed 
January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969, 
by State and County 
Authorized 
I ntercepts 












Broward County ••... 
Georgia 
Fulton County .•.. •• 
Henry County .•... . • 
Maryland 
Baltimore County··· 
Prince Georges Co~· 
New Jers ey 
Essex County ••••• . . 












Providence County.. 1 
New York 
(New York City) 
Bronx County....... 23 
Kings County. • • • • • . 19 
New York County. • . • 18 























2 , 000.00 
2 , fi 72 .65 
720.14 
12fl .80 
1 , 037.7 5 















103 . 14 
175.00 





~8, H rl 5 . 0 7 




760 . 1'1 
217 . 80 
1,504 .25 
2, 320. 30 
5,815 . 00 
2 , 826 . 87 
2~805. 3 0 
4,034 . 72 




Average Cost Per Intercept Installed 
January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1969 
by State and County · 
Concluded 
Authorized 
Intercepts Average Cost Per Intercept 
Reporting Total. Cost 
Jurisdiction number 
lin stalled 
Reported Manpower Other Total 
~ 
Other New York 
Counties 
Clinton •..•.....•. 5 5 $ 300.00 $115.00 $ 415.00 
Columbia .....•.... 1 1 400.00 None 400.00 
Dutchess •••••••.•• 4 None - - -
Erie .............. 3 1 1,000.00 150.00 1,150.00 
Nassau •••••••••.•• 3 3 3,716.67 ** 3,716.67 Oneida ............ 11 11 190.45 93.82 284.27 
Onondaga .....•.... 18 18 177,83 111.28 289.11 
Oran.ge •••••••...•• 2 2 3.500.00 - 3,500.00 
Suffolk ••••••••••• 6 4 968.00 25.75 993.75 
Westchester ••••••• 13 13 3,117.85 127.46 3,245.31 
Ulster ............ 1 1 1,070.00 - 1,070.00 
-~ot reported. 
**Included with manpower costs. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6 summarizes for the periods June 20 - December 31 , 
1968 and January 1 , 1969- December 31 , 1969 information on 
authorized intercepts as to type of facility, intercepts 
authorized, major offense specified in applications , average 
number of persons involved and average cost per intercept. 
Detailed data on the intercepts requested and granted by 
reporting jurisdiction appear on the pages which follow. 
April 30, 1970 
Respectfully submitted, 
!u&~ f! 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A. Reports by State and Federal Judges Pursuant to Title 18, 
United States Code, Sec. 2519, on Applications for 
Court Orders to Authorize the Interception of 
Wire or Oral Communications during the 
Period January 1, 1969 through December 31, 1969, 
by Reporting Jurisdiction. 
Table B. Reports by State and Federal Prosecuting Officers, 
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sec. 
2519, Concerning Court Authorized Intercepts 
of Wire or Oral Communications during the 
Period January 1, 1969 through December 31, 1969, 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
\ of 1968 provides, in pertinent part (82 8tat. 214, 18 
U.S.C. (Supp. V) 2511(3)): 
Nothing :contained in this chapter or in sec-
ti:on 605 of the Communications A'ct of 19,34 ( 48 
Stat. 1103; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the consti-
tutional power of the President to take such 
measures as he deems necessary to protect the 
Nation against actual or potential attack or other 
hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign 
intelligence information deemed essential to the 
security of the United States, or to protect na-
tional security information against foreign in-
telligence activities. Nor shall anything contained 
in this chapter be deemed to limit the eonstitu-
tional power of the President to take such meas-
ures as he deems necessary to protect the United 
States against the overthrow of the Government 
by force or other unlawful means, or against any 
other clear and present danger to the structure 
or existence of the Government. The contents of 
any wire or oral communication intercepted by 
authority of the President in the exercise of the 
foregoing powers may be received in evidence 
in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only 
where such interception was reasonable, and shall 
not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is nec-
essary to implement that power. 
(74) 
U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEr 19?2 
._..,....., -
,, .... 
l. . J 
.~;:~'":· 
~·' 
: . . ( . ~ ' .. ' 
"'"", ·; i,; 
·' 
Mr. Erwin N. Grilwold 
,, 
•' / 
February 22. 1972 
'< ' I 
Otflce of SolicitoJ:' General 
~p&J:'tment of Justice 
Constitution Avenue .and 9th Stl'eet 
Waaht.ngton, D. C. Z0539 1.1 II 
Deal' Mr. Q,riawold: 
I received yout- no~ea ot the 17th a..t 18th and the enclosed memo. 
I";'· 
' ' ' "•· 
The flrat deal• with the duty of the 1overnment to deny ar atfirrn the 
exletence ot a. wiretap. 
'· ' 
•' ' . 
.. 
The ·••tolld 1et1 up a 1tandard for the· dlac:loauro of wbe-.p data,. wheee 
the date. •tema lrom a wiretap occurrlaa prior to June of 1968. 
The tblrcl deale with the que•tlon •hen data may be held t:.Q have ttemmed from 
a w~retap oc:c::u.rrlng prior to June of 1968. · 
·• ' Mr. Tuttle ll correct when he obae"ea that S. 30 in the Seute applied to all 
kinda of aolawlully obtained evidence and that it waa not limited in a.pplieatlon to 
a particular period ot time •. 
·Ml', Tuttle ie not correct when he deacrlb~• how the Hou•• ameGded s .. 30, 
The Ho\J.ee llmited the acope of all of Title VU to wiretaps and the impact of 
aubpa.l'agrapha (Z) and (3) to wiretapa occurring prior to .June 19, 1968. 
The laquaae of eubparagraph (1) .... which waa the aubject of my letter ..... waa 
not. changed by the action of the Ho~e • 
... l-
,: 











Conaequently, the Sena\e leglalath•e blatory. quoted 11) my letter, romaine 
relevant to the cora.atruction of Tltle VU and 1t1 relation to Title m. 
. MJ' .. Tuttle l.t correct when he obaerved that •ub~rasrapha JZ) and (3) of 
Title VU. aa •meaded, canllot be lQ confllet: with T~tle IlL since they clovetaU, 
each applying· to ,t.Uferent perioda of tbne. 
The referen.ce · ie the Senate D.eport, however, waa "e. S·. &ectioQ. ZSlO(a)." 
Tb.e poaeiblllty ot a confllct betwe4tn other provlalona of Title Ill and TU1e VU 
waa not precluded. 
The aovernrne~t'a brief ln !fl!.!• (pp. Z3-Z4}, •uaae•t• 'one euch po•i1ble 
conflict. 
lt ars~·· 11'011). the notice prcwlaloaa of Seatloo ZS18 (q) ot Title m that Iince 
no notice of a whtetap need be tiled betore a grand ju.ry proceecUng, no motloa to 
auppreaa lft tbe context of a grand JurJ proceedtns waa envleloaed by Title UL 
Thla cott.atrw=tloa of Tltle ta '' ia accord wlth tbe iraten& .of tbe dl'aftere .... 
a a far aa it goea. , , : 
' I, I '• 
It ~ontiouea,. however, to confuae the court proceeding foso clvll eootempt with •I 
the arand jury p:roceedil1s ltaelf. The <Jlvil contempt pro1:eedlng tn ootart atande 
i.Qdependent ot the grand Jury proceecUnJ. Suob a cou.rt proceedit&l mlsbt Item from 
a grand j\lry proceec:Uq n & crlmlaai trial, !!. the enfor<aement of an admlnletrative 
agehoy'• eubpeou. 
·' 
I would augse•t. therefore, that where a clvU contempt proeeedial Ia court. was 
contemplated,. Section Z518 (q) would. la fact, require that a nOUC:fe to Wte wlretap 
evidence be ee1'~ed where the p.-oeecuttoo intended to rely on aucb evidence to •ua• 
tain the cltatloo. 
The Senate Report tbu1 makes lt clear that Title VD and not Tltle U1 11 intended. 
to govern those •ituationa under subparagraph (1) ln wblch a witneea may requeet the 
government to afibm or deDy the exletenee of a wiretap ...... Ne> oega.tive implication 
from Title DI 1bould be drawn, in ebol't, wblc:h would limit the ecope of TlUe VU. 
. . 
' Parenthetically, J note that i.f the soveromen.t told the wltaee• in the &rand jury 
tha.t be wae the 1u.bject of a wiretap, the Dotice requirement of eec:Uon l.518 (q) could 
be waived by the court, •lnce no prejudice would rceult to the w1tae11 from being 
brougbt before the court on the citation ''wltbou~ notlceu., 
'· 
. . . ·~ . ',, .. •, ! '•' . 
,·'··' 










Th ulti~te rneaDlftl o.f Lann lleaYe to yoQ~ ju.dgmeu. I only .;lehed to call 
the caee ,to you atteotion, not to pre•• on you a partlcsulaf interpwetatlon of it. My 
eugseation wae that Mr. J'Witiee Stewart and the JD&jorlty seemed to feel a need to 
di•cu•• leauee relevant to ~sap. I note. too. that the minority, which lnoluded two 
preaently alttina joaUQea. felt tbatneoeeeity to disavow aepeete of the JJ¥lJority•e 
opi&lon •• the etatua of a jail as a conatituUonally protected aaoea, the atandiog ot 
a visitor to object to 8\Jrveillanee of a jaU, and the I' each o£ the J'oul'th Amendment 
"to prote~t acaiaat teetlmonial eompulaloG 1olely ae a reeult of an uncon1tltut1onal 
eearch OJ" aeizure." , (370 U.S. at 150] 
Might it not bo eusseeted that thl,e a•pec:t of ~!za has mearllna for Egan? 
May I also •uggeat that you or whoever preeeata the aovernm.eat•e araum.,nt 
take a look at CosteUo v. Unlted Statee, 365 U.S. 265 (1961), a cue that ll'eally 
should have brought to your attention when lra1•ed the poetible lmpllcatioo.a of 
Lanza. 
. . . 
' ' ·1. ... 
~ Coetell~ the 4efendaat argued that admiealont made during & arattd jury 
appeaaoance should 110t be coneldeJ>ed in a deu.turallzatlon procoedlng becauee hie 
appearance before the grand jury, the questions aakttd, and the anawere elicited 
were all the proda~t of unlawful wiretapa. 
!"'"\····' 
Mr • .Juetlce Brennan, lor the majority, dld aot hold aga.lut Mr. Costello 
because bie theory 9~ theory waa untenable •• a poaltion that tbeaovemment eeema 
to bo ar;uins aboulcJ be adopted in ~sae-. . ~etead, ho eoa.ceded that the wiretap• in 
queatlon pt-ompted the calling of Coatello. He then went on to lind, however, that 
more wae required to invoke the 11 fruit of the polaonow. tree11 doctrine. Tho Court 
waa aatiell4itd., he aalcl, that proa.,eutor ha4 baeea independent of tho wiretap to ask 
the questions anct that Costello made the admleaiona for reaeou other than the 
e.x.iatenc:e of the waeta.p. Hence, no O&U8a.l connectlon bad been abown between the 
unlawful tap and the adrnleaione, and the admissions need not be •upppe11ed in the 
denatw.-all:aation prooeeding. 
Even more 10 than Lanza, Costello would aeem to ar1u.e tbat a witne•• ln a 
proceedlq ... leglelatlve or grand jury -baa a right to re1lat unlawful queationing, 
at least in tbe contest of a subsequent COUI't proeeed.lng. Change the factu.alllndinge 
in Coatetlo and you ppocluce a situation analogous to the assumed facta 111 EaaD. 
Like L&naa, Coetello waa not cited it'l, the Esaa brle£. 
Finally~ I note that Mr. Tuttle 11 ri3be when he euggeate that l had staff reapon• 
eibility in working oo tbe leglelative hiato~y of Title VU ot the 1910 Act. laleo bad 
·· .. ~ ,,.,;. ;·,'~··"' r' ' .. ' . . ~ . 
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l would still tc.e alad to dl1cues tbe1e comment• ·wltb. you. os- any m.eQ'lber of you:r 
eta.ff be{ore the !&!! arsument. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: February 24,. 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
U.S. v. U.S. District Court (Michigan) 
No. 70-153 
Note 13 of the Solicitor General's brief (p. 30) refers to the 
sealed exhibit involved in the case, and states that it has been lodged 
with the clerk of this Coo.rt. 
I would like to examine this exhibit. If authority from the 
Chief Justice is required, or if the exhibit must be examined by the 
Court in Conference, I woo.ld appreciate being informed. Otherwise, 
U I may view it in my chambers, please set up a time for me to do 
so - probably week after next after the February hearings have been 
completed. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
Con£. 2/25/72 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued . f.~Ofllf\:J;"Y . ?~, .... , 19.?? Assigned ., ................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 . . . 
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WIRETAP CASE No. 70-153 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.S. 523 (1966) 
The ease involved prosecution of a person who refused to permit 
inspection - under the San Francisco housing code - of his apartment. The 
housing code authorized warrantless inspection in connection with fire, health 
and safety provisions of the City Code. 
Mr. Justice White, speaking for six members of the Court, held 
that the appellant could net be prosecuted for depying admission, as the 
Fourth Amendment proscribes warrantless search of private property. 
It was argued- relying upon Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 -that 
no warrants were necessary for this type of inspection, emphasizing the 
public emern over health, safety and fire. The city also argued that it 
would be impossible to obtain a specific warrant for each specific residence, 
and that its inspeetioo program would be frustrated entirely. 
The Court's answer was to suggest that validity of "area warrants". 
Ita analysis was that the Fourth Amendment prooibits only ''unreasonable" 
searches; that reasonableness is a relative standard, dppending upon the 
circumstances and the public interest and private interest involved. 
Among other things, the Court said: 
I 
"Of course, in applying any reasonableness standard, 
including one of constitutional dimension, an argument that 
the public interest demands a particular rule must receive 
careful consideration. 
••• * * 
''In assessing whether the public interest demands creation 
of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement, the question is not whether the public interest 
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the 
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which 
in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining 
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose 
behind the search." (p. 533) 
2. 
The Court emphasized that the search in question was not to obtain 
evidence with respect to a particular crime but was "aimed at securing city-
wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property." 
In commenting upon the relationship between "reasonableness" and 
"probable cause" the Court said: 
"In determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable -
and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to 
issue a warrant for that inspection - the need for the inspection 
must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code 
enforcement. " (p. 535) 
The Court then addressed the issue of allowing "area" searches: 
.. .,,~ 
"It is here that the probable cause debate is focused, for 
the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is 
unavoidabl' based on its appraisal of conditions in the 
area as a whole, not on its lmowledge of conditions in each 
particular building. Appellee contends that, if the probable 
cause standard urged by appellant is adopted, the area 
inspection will be eliminated as a means of seeking com-
pliance with code standards and the reasonable goals of 
code enforcement will be dealtha crushing blow. 
* ••• * 
"Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search 
against the invasion which the search entails. But we think 
that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the 
reasonableness of area code-enforcement inspections. First, 
such programs have a long history of judicial and public 
acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. s. at 367-371. 
Secoo.d, the public interest demands that all dangerous con-
ditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any 
other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. 
Many such coodttions - faulty wiring is an obvious example -
are not observable from outside the building and indeed may 
not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, 
because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor 
ai.ed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve 
a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. 
Both the majority and the dissent in Frank emphatically 
supported this conclusion. " (pp. 536-37) 
My Comment 
Note the holding that there must be a ''balancing (of) the need to 
3. 
search against the invasion which the search entails. " Also note that the 
Court referred toMa number of persuasive factors" which support the 
reasonableness of area inspections: (1) long history of judicial and public 
acceptance (analogous to the long history of Presidential usage of wiretap); 
(11) the public interest need in cities like San Francisco (analogous to the 
national need to preserve our government against unlawful attack or 
subversion); and (ill) the area type warrant is not directed at "discovery of 
evidence of crime" (analogous, perhaps, to the collection of intelligence). 
The Court then concluded that "area inspection is a reasonable 
search of private property within ~e meaning of the Fourth Amendment" 
and went on to say: "(Since reasonable) it is obvious that 'probable cause' 
4. 
to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied 
with respect to a particular dwelling. " (p. 538) 
My Comment: 
The foregoing is important. The Court says that once a determination 
of "reasonableness' 'is made the probable cause element "must exist if 
reasonable legislative or administrative standards" are satisfied. (In the 
wiretap case, I think we can establish the reasonableness of the need for 
this type of search. What is lacking at the present time is appropriate 
"legislative or administrative standards". 
Dissenting Opinion: 
The dissent, written by Clark and concurred in by Stewart and Harlan, 
thought that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to administrative searches 
such as this. They would have followed Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 -
which the majority opinion partially overruled. But Clark came down hard 
on his view that the "area search" approved by the majority wouia in effect 
result in "synthetic search warrants". 
Mr. Justice White met this objection in the dissenting opinion as 
follows: 
"It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause 
test from the standard applied in criminal cases would be 
to authorize a 'synthetic search warrant' and thereby to 
lessen the overall protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 373. But we do not agree. 
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a 
decision to search private property is justified by a reason-
able governmental interest. But reasonableness is still 
the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies 
the intrusion cootemplated, then there is probable cause 
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. 
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186. 
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines 
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity 
of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely 
gives full recognition to the competing public and private 
interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills 
the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy. 
see Eaton v. Price, 364 U.s. at 273-274." (Pp. 538-39) 
* * *. * 
5. 
See v. City of seattle, 387 U. S. 541 - decided the same day and with the 
same division among members of the Court- substantially followed Camara, 
a nd adds nothing presently relevant. 
' 
" 
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WIRETAP CASE 70-153 
Katz v. United states, 389 U. S. 347 
This case applied the Fourth .Amendment to the wiretapping, by the 
FBI in an interstate gambling violation case, to conversations in a public 
telephone booth. Justice stewart's emphasis, in construing the Fourth, was 
that it protected "persons" and not just things. 
This case also departed from prior law in holding that "no physical 
penetration" of premises was required to come within the Fourteenth 
Amendment, effectively overruling (eroding the scope of) Olmstead v. U.S., 
277 U.s. 438 and Goldman v. u.s., 316 u.s. 129. 
Justice stewartsstated that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and 
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the trespass 
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. " p. 353. 
He relied on Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 and Silverman v. United states, 
365 U.S. 505 as having accomplished this "eroding". 
The FBI agents had acted without any warrant or judicial authority. 
The Court noted that they had acted with restraint: 
" "The Government urges that, because its agents relied 
upon the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because 
they did no more here thin they might properly have done 
with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively 
validate their cmduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent 
that the agents in this ease acted with restraint. Yet the 
inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the 
agents themselves, not be a judicial officer. They were 
' ,, 
not required, before commencing the search, to present 
their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by 
a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during 
the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits 
established in advance by a specific court order. Nor 
were they directed, after the search had been completed, 
to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that 
had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this 
Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground 
that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a 
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities 
to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. 
Searches conducted without warrants have been held 
unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably sh\UWing 
probable cause, ' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 
33 for the Constitution requires 'thiit the deliberate, 
impartial judgment of a judicial officer . • . be interposed 
between the citizen and the police .•.. 'Wong Sun v. 
United States 371 U.s. 471, 481-482. •aver and again 
this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the 
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial 
processes,' United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 
and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are~ 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subjecl 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions. " (p. 356-87) 
Comments on the Foregoing: 
2. 
1. The "well-delineated exceptions" referred to above are not 
presently relevant. They relate to search incidental to arrest and the like. 
2. The paragraph quoted above set forth the standards which were 
incorporated into Title m, namely: 
( i) authorization by a "neutral magistrate"; 
(ii) requirement "to observe precise limits established in 
advance by a specific court order"; 
(iii) after the search, "to notify the authorizing magistrate 
in detail of all that had been seized". · 
8. 
(ive) although not expressed in the above paragraph, the opinion 
clearly shows that the magistrate's warrant will issue only after 
a showing of "probable cause". 
3. In footnote 23, the majority opinion states that the "national security" 
problem is not "presented by this case". 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: 
Douglas and Brennan concurred briefly, for the purpose of disagreeing 
with Justice White as to surveillance in national security cases. It is clear 
from their brief opinion that they would apply all of the safeguards even to 
national security cases. 
Harlan concurred, but sought to narrow the scope of the majority 
opinion. 
Justice White concurred in a brief opinion which is directly primarily 
to national security: 
"In joining the Court's opinion, I note the Court's 
aelmowledgaent that there are circumstances in which 
it is reasonable to search without a warrant. In this 
connection, in footnote 23 the Court points out that 
today's decision does not reach national security eases. 
Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nationahas 
been authorized by successive Presidents. The present 
Administration would apparently save national security 
eases from restrictions against wiretapping. See Berger 
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 112-118 (1967) (White J., 
•. ,,' 1.-
dissenting). We should not require the warrant procedure 
and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the 
United states or his chief legal officer, the Attorney 
General, has considered the requirements of national 
security and authorized electronic surveillance as 
reasonable. " (pp. 363 ... 64) 
4. 
Mr. Justice Black's dissent was based on his view that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to protect any right of privacy; that it was directed 






lfp/ss lee 2/28/72 
WIRETAP CASE No. 70-153 
Berger v. New York, 388 u.S. 41 
t. '?- .. ' ~ 
~ t, ~\ 
In this ease, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, a majority of the 
Court held the New York statute violated the Fourth Amendment, as being 
overly broad and without adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Bergt:r case is a convenient reference to the history of the 
Wiretap controversy. 
Prior eases analyzed include: (I) Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 
(Clark's opinion, p. 50); (11) Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (Clark's 
opinion, p. 51); (iii) Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Clark's 
opinion, p. 51); (iv) Wong Sun v. U.s., 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (Clark's 
opinion, p. 52;* (v) Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963) {Clark's opinion, 
p. 52). 
Basis of Court's Decision 
New York had a statute requiring a warrant and a prior court order. 
But the New York statute was weak as to "probable cause". Mr. Justice 
Clark addressed this probable cause issue as follows: 
*Wonfc Sun applied the exclusionary rule to verbal statements. It had 
there Of ore been applied to the exclusion of physical evidence and documents. 
"While New York's statute satisfies the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirement that a neutral and detached authority 
be interposed between the police and the public, Johnson 
v. United states, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), the broad sweep 
of the statute is immediately observable. It permits the 
issuance of the order, or warrant for eavesdropping, upon 
the oath of the attorney general, the district attorney or 
any police officer above the rank of sergeant stating that 
•there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of 
crime may be thus obtained .•. ' Such a requirement 
raises a serious probable-cause question under the Fourth 
Amendment. Under it warrants may only issue 'but upon 
probable cause. supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.' Probable cause under 
the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circum-
stances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he 
has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient 
unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution 
to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.s. 132, 162 (1925); 
Husty v. United SlatS& 282 U.S. 694, 700-701 (1931); 
Brinef.r v. united tes, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 (1949)." 
(pp. 5 -55) 
2. 
But the Courts decision was not predicated solely on the "probable 
cause'' issue. The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant ''particularly 
describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. " 
The New York statute was held to lack this "particularization". The opinion 
stated: 
"The Fourth Amendment commands that a warrant 
issue not only upon probable cause supported by oath 
or affirmation, but also 'particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. t New York's statute lacks this particularization. 
It merely says that a warrant may issue on reasonable 
ground to believe that the evidence of crime may be 
obtained by the eavesdrop. It lays down no requirement 
for particularity in the warrant as to what specific crime 
has been or is being committed, nor 'the place to be 
searched,' or 'the persons or things to be seized' as 
specifically required by the Fourth Amendment. The 
need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the 
showing required when judicial authorization of a search 
is sought is especially great in the case of eavesdropping. " 
(pp. 55-56). 
3. 
On pages 58 and 59 of the opinion, Mr. Justice Clark condemned the 
use of "general warrants" -leaving too much to the discretion of the officer 
executing the order. He questioned the "two months period" allowed by the 
New York statute; he spoke of the statute allowing "a roving commission to 
seize any and all conversations .. " 
Although the Clark opinion reflects a narrow and restrictive view with 
respect to electrooic surveillance (and its standards could hardly be applied 
to "intelligence' cases), it did recognize - in the concluding paragraph - that 
valid statutes could be drawn: 
"It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute authoriz· 
ing eavesdropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth 
Amendment's requirements. If that be true then the •truits' 
of eavesdropping devices are barred under the Amendment. 
On the ether hand this Court has in the past, under specific 
conditions and circumstances, sustained the use of eaves-
dropping devices. Bee Goldman v. United states, 316 U.S. 
129; On Lee v. United states, 343 U. S. 74'1; Lopes v. United 
states, supth; and Osborn v. United states, suhta. In ffie 
litter case e eavesdropping device was permi ed where the 
1c ommission of a specific offense' was charged, its use 
was 'under the most precise and discriminate circumstances' 
and the effective administration of justice in a federal court 
was at stake. The states are under no greater restrictions. 
The Fourth Amendment does not make the 'precincts of the 
home or the office . . . sanctuaries where the law can never 
reach,' Douglas J., dissenting in Warden, Maitland 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.s. 294, 321, bU tt does 
prescribe a constitutional standard that must be met before 
official invasion is permissible. Our concern with the 
statute here is whether its language permits a trespassory 
invasion of the home or office by general warrant, contrary 
to the command of the Fourth Amendment. As it is written, 
we believe that it does." (pp. 63-64) . 
• * •• * 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
I. 
·Justice Stewart e oncurred in the result because he felt that on the 
particular facts before the Court -the Fourth Amendment has been violated. 
He refused to hold, as did the Justices concurring with him, that the New 
York statute was void on its face. Justices Black, Harlan and White 
concurred with Justice Stewart as follows: 
''I fully agree with Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice 
Harlan and Mr. Justice White that this New York law is 
entirely constitutional. In short, I think that 'electronic 
eavesdropping, as such or as it is permi*d by this 
statute, is not ail unreasonable search and seizure. t 
The statute contains many provisions more stringent 
than the Fourth Amendment generally requires, as 
Mr. Justice Black has so forcefully pointed out. And 
the petitioner himself has told us that the law's 
'reasonable grounds' requirement 'is undisputedly 
equivalent to the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment. ' This is confirmed by decisions 
of the New York courts. People v. Cooen, 42 Misc. 
2d 403, 248 N.Y. s. 2d 339; People v. Beahan& 43 
Misc. 2d 521, 252 N.Y. S. 2d 110; ~eopdf v. ossman, 
45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y. s. 2d 26 . course, a 
state court's construction of a state statute is binding 
upon us. 
"In order to hold this statute unconstitutional, there-
fore, we would have to either rewtite the statute or 
rewrite the Constitution. I can only conclude that the 
Court today seems to have rewritten both. 
"The issue before us, as Mr. Justice White says, is 
'whether this search compUed with Fourth Amendment 
standards-:-'"For me that issue is an extremety close one 
tn the circumstances of this case. It certainly eann<X be 
resolved by incantation of ritual phrases like 'general 
warrant. ' Its resolution involves 'the unavoidable task 
in any search and seizure case: was the particular . 
search and seizure reasmable or not.'" (pp. 68-69) 
Important Pobtg 
5. 
Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that "reasonable grounds" have been 
held to be the equivalent to the "probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment" - under the New York statute. 
Mr. Justice Stewart then went on to hold that the affidavits fUed in 
support of the Judge's order lacked the ''particularity" required -especially 
in view of the 60-day period. 
Justice Black fUed a separate dissent holding - with obvious feeling -
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "ban the use of evidenc obtained by 
eavesdropping. " 
Justice Har 1an fUed a very strong dissent, attacking the majority 
opinion for intruding into state criminal law enforcement, for holding a state 
statute unconstitutional on its face, for allowing the particular plaintiff 
"standing" and on other grounds. 
6. 
The Harlan opinion contains a number of educational and helpful points: ·· 
(a) He points out that there are two separate clauses in the Fourth 
Amendment - one forbidding ''unreasonable" searches, and the other setting 
forth "specific constraints upon the issuance and character of warrants". 
In concluding that electronic surveUlance is not "unreasonable search and 
seizure'' .1?!!'.!!.!; Harlan makes the following helpful statement: 
"At the least, reasonableness surely implies that this 
Court must not constrain in any grudging fashion the 
development of procedures, consistent with the Amendment's 
essential purposes, by which methods of search and seizure 
unknown in 1789 may be appropriately controlled. It is 
instead obliged to permit, and indeed even to encourap, 
serious efforts to a · roach constructive! the difficul 
~ro ms crea e bye ec ronic eaves ropp g." pp. 94-95) 
emphasis added) 
Mr. Justice White's Dissenting Opinion 
His dissent, commencing on p. 107, attacks both the factual assumptions 
and the reasoning of the majority opinion. Relying heavily on the Crime Com-
mission • s Report - and quoting excerpts from it in an &ppendix to his opinion, 
Mr. Justice White strongly defends the necessity for the use of electronic 
surveillance, and finds the New York statute to be reasonable. 
Perhaps the most important point he makes (for purposes of the present 
case) is that "reasonableness" depends upon the public need and the circumstanc 
Citing two previous opinions of the Court, he said: 
''How the Court can feel itself so much better qualified than 
the Commission, which spent months an its study, to assess 
the needs of law enforcement is beyond my comprehension. 
We have only just decided that reasooableness of a search 
under the Fourth Amendment must be determined by weighing 
the invasions of Fourth Amendment interests which wiretapping 
and eavesdropping entail against the public need justifying such 
invasions. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523; See v. 
City of SeatN& 387 u.s. 541. In these terms, it would seem 
imperative t the Court at least deal with facts of the real 
world. This the Court utterly fails to do. In my view, its 
opinion is wholly unresponsive to the test of reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment. " (p. 114) 
Justice White's opinion also contains an interesting analysis of 
legislation proposed by the Johnson Administration (Ramsey Clark) which 
would have allowed "to protect the nation against actual or potential attack 
or other hostile acts of a foreign power or any other serious threat to the 
security of the United states, or to protect national security information 
against foreign intelligence activities." H. R.. 5386 and s. 928 § 3 (Note to 
myself: I should haveaaada research done as to the hearings on this bUl, 
7. 
particularly with respect to what Attorney General Clark recommended with 
respect to national security. This part of Justice White's opinion commences 
at p. 114 and carries on overtop. 116.) 
.. · ..,,.,.. 
.· 
lfp/ss lee 2/29/72 Wiretap Case - Statement of the case 
. .J'his ett•&· 1 ERJ m 'ill jqqw 8i n&jM liJ.Ii a to th e a r uull 
-{f.. j~ ,,;;tiJJ "'-~ _., e • ,.,J;;6ifi3l 
T..J:le goverRmeftt institute~ criminal proceeding in the United 
~ 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against three 
defendants, charging them with conspiracy -wx to destroy government 
~~ 
1!t property in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 371. f the defendants, 
Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of 
the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan. During 
pretrial proceedings, the defendants filed a motion for disclosure of 
certain electronic surveillance information. With its response, the 
government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General of the United 
States~cknowledging that government agents had overhead conversations 
participated in by Plafnondon. A copy of the Attorney General's 
affidavit is set forth in the margin. The logs of the surveillances were 
filed with the affidavit in t~~ a sealed exhibit for in camera 
inspection by the Court. 
2. 
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and the SRXb!ed: 
sealed exhibit, the government asserted that the surveillances were 
lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval, as a reasonable 
exercise of the President's power (exercised through the Attorney General) 
"to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the 
~ 
nation from attempts of domestic organization to attack and subvert 
1\ 
the existing structure of the government. ';1 The District Court held 
that the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment, and ordered the 
government to make full disclosure to Pla:Jmondon of his overhead 
conversations x as a necessary prelude to an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether any of the evidence upon which the indictment was 
based or which the government intended to offer at trial was "tainted" 
by the surveillance. Alderman v. United states, ~ 394 U.S. ~ 169 
(1969). 
The government then filed in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus to set aside the m.strict 
Court's order, which was stayed pending final disposition of the 
petition. 'Phe Cuutt of ~~had jurisdiction • 
r:;) ~e -u,·(.. fite. Co« .. t ot /le eds 
~ •The-Court' s risdiction was challenged '&Qhp& tke Q wnrt 9f!it~eals on 
the ground tha the District Court's order was interlocut_3I'Y j!pd not 
appealable under 28 U. S.C. § 1291. On this issue, the ~?uffheld that it 
did have jurisdiction, relying upon the All Writs Statute 28 U.S. C. §1651 
and cases cited in its opinion, __ F. 2d ___} __ . No attack is made 
in this Court as to the appropriateness of the writ of mandamus procedure. 
3. 
the Court of Appeals held that the surveillances were unlawful and that 
the District Court had properly required disclosures of the overhead 
conversations. Aeso;pdingly, aJl-OPder was-en:t~"£mytllg1he 
gO'"v·ernment's-petition ancl~ granted certiorari. * 
\. 
n 
ft-r' ; • "'' The issue, not neretofore presented in this Court, is whether 
the Attorney General, acting for the President has authority to authorize 
~Y "to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to 
protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack 
and subvert the existing structure of the government?"** 
In considering this issue, it is necessary to review X:Jce briefly 
the pertinent history relating to the use of electronic surveillance by 
the national government both with respect to ordinary crime and national 
security. *** 
*The Court of Appeals order was dated April 8, 1971; the petition for 
writ of certiorari was filed here on May 8, 1971, and was granted June 
21, 1971 ( 403 U. S. 930), this Court taking jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. 
§ 1254 (i). 
**The framing of the issue is necessary expressed in general terms in 
the interest of brevity at this point. The scope of the issue will be 
apparent from the opinion which follows. 
***The term "ordinary crime" is used imprecisely to incwde the tyt~es of 
crimes specified in Title Til of the Omnibus Crime and Safe streets Act 
of 1968. 
4. 
Until 1967, the law with respect to electronic surveillance was 
chaotic. In Olmstead v. United states, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court 
held, where the interception of a telephone line was accomplished with-
out entry upon the premises, that it was not proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Apparently in response to this ruling, the Congress enacted 
§ 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. * Section 605, 
covering both interstate and intrastate telephone calls applied to 
private persons as well as federal and state law enforcement officers. ** 
But in view of the ambiguous wording of the statute, it was construed 
by the Department of Justice as allowing interception so long as no 
disclosure was made outside of the Department of the fruits of the 
interception. Federal officers therefore felt free, both under the statute 
and Olmstead, to engage in wiretapping although the results could not 
be used in the federal courts.*** 
*48 stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S. C. §605, Ill (1958), prohibiting the 
interception and public divulgence of the contents of any wire com-
munication or its interception and use for personal benefit. 
**See Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Benati v. United states, 
355 u.s. 96 (1957)-. -
***See Nardone v. U.S., 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Nardone v. U.S., 308 
u.s. 338 (1938). - -
See, ~ _g_. , testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Committee on 
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 89th Cong. 2d session 34 (1966). 
The confusion at the federal level was compounded by that 
among the states. Most of them made no effort to regulate H 
surveillance of any kind; others had a variety of statutes of dubf ious 
meaning and merit.* In addition to the lack of harmony among 
state laws, and between the federal statute and such state laws as 
did exist, there was doubt as to the degree~ of supremacy of 
§ 605, as to who had standing to complain, and - for a time - as 
to whether the X:H fruits of an interception must be suppressed in 
state as well as federal courts. 
Not until 1942 did a "bugging" case reach the Court. In 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, it was held that a 
~ detectaphone placed against the outer wall of 
an office involved no physical trespass and therefore did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. ** 
**See also On Lee v. United states, 343 U.S. 747 ~ (1953). 
~ 
*The most notable exception to the inadequacy of state law ~~~-~ .... ew 
York, where a court order system had been employed with e 
success for many years. "Wiretapping was the mainstay of the 
5. 
New York attack against organized crime until federal court decisions 
intervened." The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 201 
(1967). The New York~ statute was held invalid as being overly 
broad,x and violative of 4th Amendment~ rights in Burger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
6. 
In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) the Court 
found a Fourth Amendment violation wre re "the eavesdropping was 
a cc omplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into 
the premises occupied by petitioners. And in Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court for the first time specifically 
held that the Fourth Amendment protects "against the overhearing 
of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure 
of papers and effects". * 
It was this state of the law, both statutory and that derived 
from the cases, that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration found to be "intolerable": 
"It serves the interest~ neither of privacy 
nor of law enforcement. One way or the other, the 
present controversy with respect to electronic 
surveillance must be resolved." 
*Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 485. The exclusionary 
rule was applied where the evidence was obtained through "an 
unlawful invasion" of a private area, as contrasted with the absence 
of physical invasion in Goldman. Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 
u. s. 427 ( 1963) 
**The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra, 203. 
7. 
A long step toward clarification was taken a few months later 
in Katz v. United states, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). * Although foreshadowed 
by the decision in Burger, the Court expressly held in Katz that "the 
underpinning of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the no trespass doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling." 389 U.S. at 353. The 
interception in question has been accomplished in a public telephone 
booth in an interstate gambling~ investigation. 
*Prior to Katz, the Court in Burger v. New York, supra, had held 
that the New York Six statute violated the Fourth Amendment. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
Dear Chief: 
~upremt <!Jcurt cf t4t 'P trittb ~tatt.a 
Jlrurlrmgtcn. w. <q. 20,?J1~ / 
In No.( 70-153, • s. v. U. S. D. C., I would like to make 
a suggestion. ~ · 
I think the assignment to Byron (much as I love my friend) 
is not an appropriate one for the reason that he and two others 
including yourself voted to affirm on the statute, , while there were 
five who voted to affirm on the Constitution. Those five were 
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, myself, and Powell. 
You will recall that Lewis Powell said that to handle the 
government's problem of searching the country over for an appropriate 
magistrate to issue a warrant, an opinion should be written suggesting 
that the court here in the District of Columbia should handle all 
of the cases, which I thought was a splendid idea. 
With all respect, I think Powell represents the consensus. 
I have not canvassed everybody, but I am sure that Byron, who goes on 
the statute, will not get a court. 
To save time, may I suggest you have a huddle and see to it that 
Powell gets the opinion to write? 
Or if you want me to suggest an assignment, that would be mine. 
WI 0. D. 
~-
The Chief Justice 
- .. 
~r-nttt <q"tttttt cf t4t 'J!ittittlt .;%tatts 
~asJringictt, l8. <q. 2.(]',5)1.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS March eighth 
1972 
Dear Lewis: 
Re: No. 70-153 - U. s. v. 
U. S. Dist. Ct. 
As you know, the Chief and I have had 
an exchange of correspondence on the above 
case. 
The vote at Conference was to affirm 
but there were five of us who could not do 
it on the statute but went on the Consti-
tution. And according to my notes, you 
were one of the five. Byron, however, was 
explicit. He could not go on the Constitution 
but would have to go on the statute. 
Traditionally an opinion would therefore 
be in the province of the senior Justice to 
assign. That was not done in this case and 
the matter is of no consequence to me as a 
matter of pride and privilege -- but I think 
it makes a tremendous difference in the result. 
I am writing you this note hoping you 
will put on paper the ideas you expressed in 
Conference and I am sure you will get a 
majority. I gather from the Chief's memo 
that he is not at all averse to that being 
done. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copy to Mr. Justice Brennan 
,j~tmt <ijcu:d of flrt 'Jifuittb ,jtatts 
Jras4i:ughtn. ~. <q. 2ll~'!-~ 
CH ... MI!I!:RS 01" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
March 6, 1972 
Re: No. 70-153 - U. S. v. U. S. Dist. Ct., East District, Michigan, 
Southern Division 
Dear Bill: 
I have your memo of March 6 and see no reason why Lewis should 
not undertake to write and see what support his position achieves. 
I am not as clear on Lewis' position as your memo suggests but I 
would be happy if his view could command a majority. 
I believe there may be much likelihood of Byron's securing substantial 
support and I am not sure Byron's and Lewis' views are not rather 
close. 
In all events this, like several other of our current cases, will not 
clarify until we have something in writing. 
I adhere to my request that Byron proceed to write. We cannot evaluate 
the views until we see them. They may not 11write 11 as they were ex-
pressed at Conference and of necessity few were very precise -- or 
could be. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: The Conference 
uran 1cc Jf'<Jf ·t~ 
Re: No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. Distrist Court 
")4.c &1 (A,epft,.. ' , , M ._, +o : 
~jj~f!mi: ~.t ~1-~- .. > This refers to your notes as to the drafting of"' opinions in 
the above case. 
As it seemed: te Ri8 th~ views were fractionated (and in some 
instances, tentative) at the ronference, I am not at all sure that any 
opinion will command a majority. My own views, subject - as always -
to more carefully study and mature consideration, may be outlined 
briefly as follows: 
There are Plf!IW three types of situations in which the government 
0 
is emplying electronic surveillance: 
1. Specified types of crime. Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Act authorizes the use of surveillance in cases involving specified 
crimes or types of crimes. This authority is subject to prior court 
order, and to complying with the rather detailed and specific standards 
specified in the Act. The Act was drawn to meet the requirements 
of Katz. 
2. National security. Section 2511(3) of Title III contains 
a disclaimer that: 
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit 
the constitutional power of the President to take 
such measures as he deems necessary to protect 
the nation against actual or potential attack or 
other hostile acts of a fnreign power, to obtain 
foreign intelligence information deemed essential 
to the security of the United states, or to protect 
national security information against foreign 
intelligence activities. " 
This recognizes the jmpo~aRoo ~ aati.Qaal ~aoonPUy a.ui ihe special 
2. 
1-w ~ ;UIC·~~ .. -~.y. 
responsibility of the Presiden~ It is in conformity with the uniform 
practice of Presidents since President Roosevelt's memorandum on 
this subject in World War II. The inclusion of this section in Title 
III recognizes, implicitly if not explicitly, that the system of judicial 
supervision and public disclosure required by Title III with respect . 
;tt:;:t;l'la• u 
to +fte specified crimes is notd in national security cases. ,. 
3. Domestic subversion . Section 2511(3) also provides 
(immediately following the language quoted above): 
"Nor shall anything ~ contained in this chapter 
be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measure:;xx as he deems necessary 
to protect the United states against the overthrow of the 
government by force or other unlawful means, or against 
any other clear and present danger to the structure or 
existence of the government."* 
*The final sentence in § 2511(3) provides that any communication 
intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of these 
powers "may be received in evidence" only where such interception 
was "reasonable". 
This language, to the same extent perhaps as that quoted in 2 above, 
indicates a ~ongressional intent t to exclude such Presidential 
action from the judicial supervision and other standards prescribed 
J+-d~ 
in Title III, and u e li!JoO 8letu ly suggests a 1m Congressional judgment 
that the President's extraordinary power in this respect is not limited 
L H-... ·~4.d-t( ~ 
exclusively to national security involving foreign powers. BulA.-....,  
not n clear from the language ~r:_, So"~""" MMS~ 
FWesident to he tree to ?£t. 
where the President deems it necessary to protect the United State 
~ structure o existence of the government. " Although not limite 
iauhtelen atilt &f i1 *t "overthrowH" or "other clear and present 
" .._,.. 
danger" emanat~ from American citizens a.wl domestic organizations. 
I come now to the case before us. There was nc{ testimony. 
The case was submitted on the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit 
~ 
and the logs of the surveillances were presented for in camera 
" 
~inspection only.* The Attorney General's affidavit 
reads in pertinent part as follows: 
"The defendant Plamondon has participated in 
conversations which were overheard by government 
agents who were monitoring wiretaps which were 
being employed to gather intelligence information 
deemed necessary to protect the nation~ from 
attempts of domestic organizations to:.:ll:tiiok attack 
and subvert R the existing structure of the government. " 
t+-..Jt..-
The affidavit does not ~w the language of § 2511(3). The 
4. 
danger described:XH is limited to "attempts of domestic organizations 
to attack and subvert the existing :siD: structure of the governmentx: "r 
~ 
lhere is no averment of danger of overthrown by force or of a'blear 
and present danger'~ 
~ 
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit (and the 
absence of other evidence), th;tourts below considered this case 
to involve only "domestic organizations", and they drew a distinction 
between a President's power with respec~ to national security where J 
~~~~ 
foreign governments are concerned, and ,--.rely domestic organizations 
" 
*I have not yet examined the logs, but my recollection is that we were 
told during argument that they related - in this case - exclusively to 
a domestic organization. Footnote 13, Solicitor General's brief, states 
that - in addition to the sealed exhibit filed with the District Court 
below - the SG has lodged with the Clerk of:Xmx this Court for its 
in camera inspection "the same exhibit we submitted to the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Ferguson case." Tt.,.,c, S ~ 
.,..._,,_,. r ,._~ ~ l"kJ. "t4~ u..., ~ ~·4·1" ~ ~ 
··~ .-( a...oA-~ ... t ~(tJ ·11-f 
Gotr\e V.C.;Aa&.~ ~ ...... :. ' IlL- ~<J,:I 
A-•~·11-l41Mc"-''•,.·.J... ~A~&~~ 
1....--~-- ......... ~ .... Ji-tl~~ ........ ~+' v 
-
(See Judge Keith's opinion 
Circuit was as follows: 
"We hold that in dealing ·th the threat of domestic 
subversion, the Executive ranch . . . is subject 
to the limitations of the Fou h Amendment . . . " (A •' 1} 
Afj~Q:M:QlU ftiJ 
The Court of Appeals le@lwr expressly re ained from deciding whether 
there are limitations upon the President whe he acts "under his 
constitutional powers as commander-in-chief ... to defend this 
country from attack, espionage or sabotage by fo ces or agents of 
. /A-~~). 
a foreign pow~ 'j The Clay case ( 430 F. 2d 165) s distinguished 
on the ground that it involved m "foreign intelligence surveillance. " 
Thus, on the skeletonized record in this case, 
concerned only (in the language of the Attorney Genera 's affidavit) 
with "attempts of domestic organizations to attack and ubvert the 
existing structure of the government. " This specificat on probably 
does not come within the language of §~ But if" i weJ:e deemed 
~ J J-o ~ ~ 4tJ ~ f?,, ..... J, .. .t-
aiB suc.h.languag.e, I ~ue gray.e dqpfi a.s t9-wJ;uirlber tije 
"~ ~~•<vL ~ ~ • ,g{•, 'f! 
C@'f~iiiitutiQaaJ p~ ell!i~t&"'" ~lt:4Kt:W. eHiet in thQ .PP'i8i'ii.t urhere 
~44Lif • .._.. ~~ 
6. 
o physica action (as distinguished from speec . 
anguage: "overthrow . . . by force" 
...... --- It is to be borne in mind, however, that § 2511(3) is not an 
:X affirmative grant of power. Rather, it is at least an indication that 
• 
"""' .J..,.,..J. ti.o 
Congress did no~act in the specified areas. At most, the Section is 
a Congressional acknowledgment of J.X Presidential power lX in these 
areas without precise definition thereof. 
In view of the foregoing considerations, 
(i) the President (through the Attorney General) was not acting pursuant 
to any statutory authorization; (ii) no statutory provisions purported 




authority prescribing standards appropriate to the circumstances, 
the surveillance in this case violated the Fourth Amendment. 
~ )_, •'•'a! ~ 
Perhaps I should ahlfjhat in my view, the President's powers 
*The majority juil82i' in the Sixth Circuit opinion expressed the view 
that § 2518(7)(a) of Title III provided a statutory procedure appropriate 
for this case. This subsection relates to''emergencie~' and in my view 
olea:f'i.:y was not intended to encompass intelligence surveillance of the 
type here involved. Nor do I think the provisio(of § 2516(l)(a) with 
respect to ~ionage, sabotage and treason - all specific criminal 
offenses - ~applicable to this case. 
?'4-aL ~ ,t,.., L4.1 /Jc .-14~ ~ 
LM,., ~ tt-1. , -It-• ~;.f: • .t ~J· ~ 8. 
,_,_,.., ..... , .... J~~ ~d~~~ 
olowu~could be made ......,..ta specially desi#caurt <!!:..!>· 
~ 
Court of Appeals for the District of Co bia); and*"the reporting 
requirements could be design to protect adequately government • 
~l ... ...J..-1 
IAII'~Y ...., 1-e .... ··~ £,t.~ ~~A • source~ 8~~~.- -, 
draft opinion, as I am presently advised, it 
1.- .F. P. rrc. 
"national security" or "& domestic subversion". Footnote 13 of 
the SG' s brief states that this distinction cannot be drawn in this 
case. Yet, on the record before us (unless the in cameras exhibit -
materially alters the situation) the case is presented as involving 
neither national security or the participation EX: by foreign sources 
in domestic plots or subversion. I suppose the categorizing of cases.) 
where the surveillance s1::zf = degre~s of foreign contacts, 
~ 
could .KmEDB: become quite difficult. The extent and seriousness of the 




with respect to foreign affairs and as commander-in-chief are 
adequate to authorize him to act where in his judgment national 
security is endangered by activities of a foreign government. This 
~ Jt.A- ,., 
would include the" intelligence and counter-intelligence ~l'e szrtJf 
operations referred to in the statute. I think different considerations 
~d ~ 
apply where the a9RtW&t emanates solely from domestic sources. 
~~~ ~t/..c~ 
This is not to say that precisely the same standards prescribed by 
" " 
Title III (based on Katz) with respect to specified crimes are 
~ 
ft88'ifDII'? iP'My required where the govern ment deems it HRKRRKXX 
necessary tn conduct intelligence gathering operations against 
domestic subversion. The gathering of in lligence ~ot !fte 
du ~ 
r<>boioas i'l'!ae""" is usually long fge and inv lves the interrelation ( 
7kc. ., :c..,.t&c;f ~-k &,.ec., ,.,., ..... ~.._ t(. ~1c.• .. ...,.. ~ 
of various sources and types of information. hus, standards""Wlrtelf 
t is test in domestic surveillance cases. But some standards are 
equired -to IW.otecL.Fourth Amendment right I suggested in the 
~~ 
Conference, for example, that the application, and probable cause 
J\ 
Thus, standards which are different from those detailed in 
Title III may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they 
are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government 
for information and the protected rights of citizens. ( Cf. Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523). Drawing a fair line may not 
be easy but it should not be impossible. 
lfp/ss 3/13~/72 
CONFIDENTIAL 
70-153 U. S.v. U.S. District Court (Michigan) 
In Camera Exhibit Filed in District Court 
I have examined the above exhibit, obtaining it from the Chief 
Justice. 
It contains rather fragmentary exchanges between Plamondon, 
who is a member of the White Panther Party, with several members 
of the Black Panther Party. 
These conversations occurred on six separate occasions extending 
over a five months period. 
They relate to possible cooperation between the two organizations 
on relatively minor matters, ~· ~· , printing of certain propaganda; a 
meeting in Cleveland; and a bogus chapter of one of the organizations. 
I could detect no foreign involvement nor any evidence of planned 
violence. 
My guess is that, as the Government's brief suggests, the 
interception of Plamondon's conversations was fortuitous; did not 
relate to the crime for which he is being prosecuted; and, in fact 
contain information of no real consequence to anyone. 
* * * * * 
I also examined some of the material referred to in Note 13, 
p. 30, of the SG' s brief. As the brief states, this material - which 
' . 2. 
apparently was submitted to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but not 
in the instant case - does involve many telephone calls to foreign and 
overseas installations. The data which I reviewed - which was primarily 
in Volume VI - reflects a great deal of activity by individuals and certain 
organizations, both domestic and foreign, but there appears to be no 
obvious and direct involvement by foreign governments. One cannot 
tell, however, to what extent individuals and organizations in other 
countries (particularly) are fronting for - or acting as agents of -
either the governments or the ruling parties ~· g. CP) of foreign powers. 
All of this material was returned to the Chief Justice today. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
lfp/ss lee 3/13/72 
' ' 
U. S. v. U. S. Dist Court 70-153 
The Alderman Decision 
For a discussion of the Alderman decision, and:JL limitations 
imposed upon its use by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, 
see the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on that Act (being 
Report No. 91-617 of the 91st Congress dated December 18, 1969). 
The Alderman decision is discussed at pp. 64-70, and provides 
helpful background. 
.. 
~ttprttttt (!}c-url of tip• 'Jlttrittb .:§taftg 
'Jllh:t$ftittgton, lfl. (!}. 211.?'1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
March 9, 1972 
Re: No. 70-153 U. S. v. U. S. District Court 
Dear Chief and Bill: 
In view of the exchange of notes as to how we proceed with 
the opinion writing in the above case, I thought it might be well 
for me to outline my present thinking on this case. I have no very 
clear idea as to whether the substance of these views is shared by 
other members of the Court. I suspect each of us differs in 
certain respects. 
Byron (to whom I am sending a copy of the memorandum) is 
clearly better qualified than I am to write, and I assume that he will 
do so. But I will undertake to enlarge this memorandum into a 
draft if this seems desirable. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr. Justice White 
Sincerely, 
March 9, 1972 
No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. District Court 
Memorandum to: 
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas 
This refers to your notes as to the drafting of opinions in 
the above case. 
As views were fractionated (and in some instances, tentative) 
at the Conference,. I am not at all sure that any opinion will command 
a majority. My own views, subject - as always - to more careful study 
and mature consideration, may be outlined briefly as follows: 
I. 
There are three types of situations in which the government 
is employing electronic surveillance: 
1. Specified types of crime. Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Act authorizes the use of surveillance in cases involving specified 
crimes or types of crimes. This authority is subject to prior court 
order, and to complying with the rather detailed and specific standards 
specified in· the Act. The Act was drawn to meet the requirements 
of Katz. 
.1 
i 2 I o 
. 2. National security. Section 2511(3) of Title III contains 
a disclaimer that: 
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit 
the constitutional power of the President to take 
such measures as he deems necessary to protect 
the nation against actual or potential attack or 
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain 
foreign intelligence information deemed essential 
to the security of the United states, . or to protect 
national security information against foreign 
intelligence activities. " 
This recognizes the special responsibility of the President for national 
security. It is in conformity with the uniform practice of Presidents 
since President Roosevelt's memorandum on this subject in World 
War II. The inclusion of this section in Title III recognizes, implicitly 
if not explicitly, that the system of judicial supervision and public 
disclosure required by Title III with respect to specified crimes is 
not appropriate in national securities' cases. 
3. Domestic subversion. Section 2511(3) also provides 
(immediately following the language quoted above): 
"Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed 
to limit the constitutional power of the President to 
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect 
the United states against the overthrow of the government 
by force or other unlawful means, or against any other 
clear and present danger to the structure or existence 
of the gave rnment. "* 
*The final sentence in § 2511(3) provides that any communication 
intercepted by author ity of the President in the exercise of these 
powers "may be received in evidence" only where such interception 
was "reasonable". 
3. 
This language, to the same extent perhaps as that quoted in 2 above, 
indicates a Congressional intent to exclude such Presidential action 
from the judicial supervision and other standards prescribed in Title 
ill. It also suggests a Congressional judgment that the President's 
extraordinary power in this respect is not limited exclusively to 
national security involving foreign powers. But the extent of this power 
is not clear from the language quoted. It does contemplate, however, 
situations where foreign powers are not involved and where the threat 
of "overthrow" or "other clear and present danger" emanates from 
American citizens or domesttc organizations. 
II. 
I come now to the case before us. There was no testimony. 
The case was submitted on the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit 
and the logs of the surveillance which were presented for in camera 
inspection only.* The Attorney General's affidavit reads in pertinent 
part as follows: 
*I have not yet examined the logs, but my recollection is that we were 
told during argument that they related - in this case - exclusively to 
a domestic organization. Footnote 13, SG's brief, states that - in 
addition to the sealed exhibit filed with the District Court below - the 
SG has lodged with the Clerk of this Court for its in camera inspection 
"the same exhibit we submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in the Ferguson case. " The SG further states that the Ninth 
Circuit exhibit "consists of additional record(s) of conversations 
overheard during this surveillance, " and that these show foreign 
involvement. 
·"The defendant Plamondon has participaed in con-
versations which were overheard by government 
agents who were monitoring wiretaps which were 
being employed to gather intelligence information 
deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts 
of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the 
existing structure of the government. " 
The affidavit does not track the language of § 2511(3). The 
danger described is limited to "attempts of domestic organizations 
to attack and subvert the ex~sting structure of the government. " 
There is no averment of danger of overthrow by force or of a "clear 
and present danger. " 
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit (and in the 
absence of other evidence), the courts below considered this case 
to involve only "domestic organizations", and they drew a distinction 
between a President's power with respect to national security where 
foreign governments are concerned, and his power where only 
domestic organizations are involved. (See Judge Keith's opinion 
A-30). The holding by the Sixth Circuit was as follows: 
"We hold that in dealing with the threat of domestic 
subversion, the Executive Branch •.. is subject to 
the limitations of the Fourth Amendment . " 
(A-63) 
4. 
The Court of Appeals expressly refrained from deciding whether there 
are limitations upon the President when he acts "under his constitu-
tional powers as commander-in-chief ... to defend this country 
5. 
from attack, espionage or sabotage by forces or agents of a foreign 
power" (A-63). The Clay case ( 430 F. 2d 165) was distinguished on 
the ground that it involved "foreign intelligence surveillance. " 
Thus, on the skeletonized record in this case, we are con-
cerned only (in the language of the Attorney General's affidavit) with 
"attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing 
structure of the government. " This specification probably does not 
come within the language of § 2511(3). It is to be borne in mind, 
however, that § 2511(3) is not an affirmative grant of power. Rather, 
it is at least an indication that Congress did not intend to act in the 
specified areas. At the most, the section is a Congressional 
acknowledgment of Presidential power in these areas without precise 
definition thereof. But if the Attorney General had stated a case 
within a general statutory grant of authority, I question whether the 
President has the same freedom to act against domestic threats as 
exists by virtue of his responsibility in foreign affairs and as 
commander-in-chief. 
In view of the foregoing considerations, it is my tentative 
opinion that (i) the President (through the Attorney General) was 
not acting pursuant to any statutory authorization; ( ii) no statutory 
provisions purported to authorize the action taken;* and (iii) in the 
absence of statutory authority prescribing standards appropriate to 
the circumstances, the surveillance in this case violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Perhaps I should add that in my view, the President's powers 
6. 
with respect to foreign affairs and as commander-in-chief are adequate 
to authorize him to act where in his judgment national security is 
endangered by activities of a foreign government. This wruld include 
the type of intelligence and counter-intelligence oper~tions referred 
to in the statute. I think different considerations apply where the 
threat emanates solely from domestic · sources. ** 
*The majority in the Sixth Circuit opinion expressed the view that 
§ 2518(7)(a) of Title III provided a statutory procedure appropriate for 
this case. This subsection relates to "emergencies" and in my view 
was not intended to encompass intelligence surveillance of the type 
here invo1ved. Nor do I think the provisions of § 2515(1)(a) with respect 
to espionage, sabotage and treason - all specific criminal offenses - are 
applicable to this case. 
· **There will no doubt be cases which are difficult to label as either 
"national security" or "domestic subversion. " Footnote 13 of the 
SG' s brief states that this distinction cannot be drawn in this case. 
Yet, on the record before us (unless the in camera exhibit materially 
alters the situation) the case is presentedas involving neither national 
securityror the participation by foreign sources in domestic plots or 
subversion. I suppose the categorizing of cases, where the 
surveillance logs show varying degrees of foreign contacts, could 
become quite difficult. The extent and seriousness of the foreign 
involvement would, I suppose, be the controlling consideration. 
7. 
This is not to say, however, that precisely the same protective 
standards prescribed by Title III (based on Katz) with respect to 
specified crimes are required where the government deems it neces-
sary to conduct intelligence gathering operations against domestic 
subversion. The gathering of intelligence is usually long range and 
involves the interrelation of the various sources and types of informa-
tion. The exact targets also are more difficult to identify than in 
surveillance operations against crime. Thus, standards which are 
different irom those detailed in Title III may be compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the 
legitimate need of government for information and the protected rights 
of citizens. (Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523). Drawing 
a fair line may not be easy but it should not be impossible. 
I suggested in the Conference, for example, that the applica-
tion and affidavit showing probable cause need not be as particularized 
as in cases of specified crimes; that the request for prior court 
authorization could be made to any member of a designated court 
(e. g. the District Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); -
that the time limitation need not be as strict; and that the reporting 
requirements could be designed to protect adequately government 
sources as well as to assure Executive compliance. 
,, 
8. 
If I write a draft opinion, as I am presently advised, it would 
be along the foregoing lines. 
L. F.P., Jr. 
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No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
The issue before us is an important one for the people 
of our country and their national government. It involves the 
delicate question of the Attorney General's power to authorize 
electronic surveillances in internal security matters without 
prior judicial approval. Resolving this question requires sensitivity 
both to the government's rights to protect itself from unlawful 
to 
subversion and attack and;the citizen's need for privacy! i;, .:.,··)J ,'~.-:::.,J.:/1. 
The case arises from a criminal proceeding in the 
United states District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, in which the United States charged three defendants 
with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of 
18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the defend~nts, "Pun" Plamondon, 
was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of the 





During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to 
compel the United states to disclose certain electronic surveillance 
iaformation and to conduct a hearing to determine whether this 
information "tainted" the evidence on which the indictment was 
based ~which the government intended to offer at trial. In 
response, the government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, 
acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in 
which Plamondon had participated. The affidavit also stated that 
the Attorney General approved the wiretaps "to gather intelligence 
information rummd: deemed necessary to protect the nation from 
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the 
1 
existing structure of the government. " The affidavit, together 
with the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit 
for in c amera inspection by the district court. 
On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and 
the sealed exhibit, the government asserted that the surveillances 
were lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval, 
3. 
as a reasonable exercise of the President's power (exercised 
through the Attorney General) to protect the national security. 
The District Court held that the surveillance violated the 
Fourth Amendment, and ordered the government to make full 
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations. 
F. Supp. ---
The government then filed in the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus to set aside 
the District Court order, which was stayed pending final 
'2-
disposition of the case. After concluding that it had jurisdiction, 
that court held that the surveillances were unlawful and that 
the District Court had properly required disclosure of the 
overheard conversations 444 F . . 2d 651 (1971). We granted 
, certiorari. 
I 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe streets 
Act, 18 U.S. C. §§ 2510-2520, authorizes e;:te the use of 
4. 
electronic surveillance for classes of crimes carefully specified 
in 18 U.S. C. 2516. Such surveillance is subject to prior court 
3 
order. Section 2518 sets forth the rather detailed and 
4 
particularized application necessary to obtain such an order 
as well as carefully circumscribed conditions for its use. The 
Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote 
the more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy 
of ~ individual thought and expression. Much of Title III 
was drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic 
I 
surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger v. New York, 
I 
388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United states, 389 U. S. 347 
(1967). 
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements 
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. s. C. § 2 511( 3 ): 
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat. 
1103; 47 U.S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitutional 
power of the President to take such measures as 
he deems necessary to protect the Nation against 
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of 
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence 
/ 
information deemed essential to the security of the 
United States, or to protect national security 
information against foreign intelligence activities. 
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be 
deemed to limit the consititional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems 
necessary to protect the United States against 
overthrow of the Government by force or other 
unlawful means or against any other clear and 
present danger to the structure or existence of 
the Government. The contents of any wire or 
oral communication intercepted by authority of 
the President in the exercise of the foregoing 
powers may be received in evidence in any trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding only where such 
interception was reasonable, and shall not be 
otherwise used or disclosed except as is neces-
sary to implement that power. " (emphasis 
supplied). 
5. 
The language in § 2511(3) has ~xmdat proved fundamentally 
troublesome. This section, including the second sentence which 
pertains to what might be termed the area of "national security" 
~:i_~. b t~~!( s; lijv j 
or "domestic ", has provoked conflicting interpretations as to 
~ . 
its effect and the Congressionalxtwx intent behind it. The 
government regards this section as an affirmative grant of power 
where Congress intended to exempt "from the requirement that 
a warrant be obtained for electronic surveillance;certain categories 




(Brief, pp. 20 and 28 ). My brother White, on the other 'thand, 
views the section as an "exception" to the general proscription 
against warrantless wiretapping in Title III and as a congressional 
attempt to set forth an area outside of which all warrantless 
wiretaps would be void, pp. 3-4. (He would thus affirm the 
Court of Appeals solely on the statutory ground that the wording 
of the Attorney General 's affidavit was insufficient to bring the 
surveillance ~ within the specified exception to court-ordered 
wiretaps in § 2511 (3)). The Court of Appeals sees the language 
of this section as "clearly designed to place Congress in a 
completely neutral position in the very controversy with which 
this case is concerned. " 444 F. 2d at 664. 
"-TI-. e.. .. !a. s -~  · . 
";~;'~ interpretation is the most plausible. For 
A 
reasons to be stat~d forthwith, Congress did not intend § 2511(3) 
as an affirmative grant of warrantless surveillance power to the 
government in the area of national security. The words "overthrow 
of the Government by force or other unlawful means . 
.; 
7. 
clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the 
Government" to which my brother WHITE attaches significance • 
.) 
operate rather as a general and abbreviated means Congress 
used to describe an area to which it did not wish this statute to 
address itself. 
Given the general context of Title ill and the legislative 
history of the Act, this Court should be wary of investing the 
wording of § 2511(3) with excess significance. It would be 
incongruous for Congress to employ such refinement and 
specificity in delineating classes of crimes and requirements 
I • ' 
~> _..,~, F ~/C :--;'<,/'?! ~ ..-
for surveillance in § 2516 and § 2518 wfiUe :S:Jfewptiag <*'-
cle /-:;: c' 
-4eiiftiJl.g the~ equally important area of national security 
in a single brief and nebulous sentence. Section 2511(3) is a 
short congressional disclaimer that it did not intend the Act 
( a.f"/'' l~f ~) 
to opeJ?ate ill the areas of foreign and domestic intelligence 
~ 
c_§ h-I! (3)_; 
and security. Seeing it as something more simply does not 
/1 






or/the extraordinary care Congress exercised in drafting other 
A. 
sections of the Act. 
The legislative history of § 2511(3) supports this 
interpretation. Most relevant in this regard is the colloquy 
between Senators Hart, Holland and McClellan on the Senate 
floor: 
Mr. Holland ... The section [2511(c)] from 
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively 
give any power . . . . We are not affirmatively 
conferring any power upon the President. We are 
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such 
power as the President has under the Constitution . 
• We certainly do not grant him a thing. 
There is nothing~ affirmative in 
this statement. 
Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it 
understood that we are not trying to take anything 
away from him. 
Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct. 
Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention 
here to expand by this language a constitutional powe:r: 
Clearly we could not do so. 
Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we 
could not do so. 
Mr. Hart . . . . However, we are agreed that 
this language should not be regarded as intending to 
grant any authority, including authority to put a 
bug on, that the President does not have now. 
In addition, Mr. President, as I think our 
exchange makes clear, nothing in Section 2511(3) 
even attempts to define the limits of the President's 
national security power under present law, which 
I have always found extremely vague. . . . Section 
2511(3) merely says that. if the president has such 
a power,5 then its exercise is in no way affected by title III. 
9. 
The Senators explicitly state in the above exchange that 
nothing in § 2 511( 3) attempts to expand or to contract or to 
define the surveillance powers of the President in matters 
affecting national s 'ecurity. We could not expect a stronger 
expression of congressional neutrality in this area. The debates 
I 
make clear that the entire subject of national security wiretaps 
i 6 
was fraught with political emotion , and one which many members 
of Congress did not wish to open up or pass judgment on for fear 
it would delay and jeopardize passage of the entire Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe streets Act. As the above exchange 
indicates, § 2511(3) represented political compromise and 
congressional neutrality. 
Thus interpreting § 2511(3) as a congressional disclaimer 
I 
and expression of neutrality, we cannot utilize it as a grounds 
/ 
10. 
for decision in the way either the government or my brother 
White suggest. We do not lightly brush aside the xmc wise 
XJhrxix'ri: admonition that courts should avoid constitutional 
determinations except where necessary to decide the case before 
them. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 279 U.S. 288, 
346-7 (1936) (concurring opinion). But we cannot accept a 
statutory ground of decision where Congress intended no statutory 
instruction. Clearly Ashwander does not teach the avoidance 
of constitutional issues which squarely front this Court. Section 
2511(3) says only that nothing inthe Act shall ''be deemed to 
limit the constitutional power of the President" in the surveillance 
of foreign and domestic attack and subversion. Given a proper 
controversy before us, the scope of that constitutional power 







In view of the intense public controversy over electronic 
surveillance, we think it important to emphasize the limited nature 
of the question before the Court. This case raises no constitutional 
challenge either to the general practice of electronic surveillances 
specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe streets Act of 1968. Nor, on the other hand, is there 
any question or doubt as to the necessity of obtaining a warrant 
in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national security 
interest, Katz v. United states, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Further, the instant case requires 
no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance power 
over the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country. 
Though characterization of an activity as "domestic" or "foreign" 
may, on occasion, involve difficult distinctions, the Attorney 
General's affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were 
12. 
"deemed necessary to protect the national from attempts of 
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure 
7 
of government" (emphasis supplied). 
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore a 
narrow one. It addresses the very question left open by Katz, 
supra, p. 358 n. 23: 
WdtkX Whether safeguards other than prior 
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the 
national security . . . 
the 
The determination of this question require&! essential Fourth 
Amendment inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the search and 
seizure in question, and the way in which that "reasonableness" derives 
content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-484 (1971). 
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the 
United States has the fundamental duty, under our Constitution, 
Art. II Section 2, "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution 
13. 
of the United States. " Implicit in that duty is the power to protect 
our government against those who would subvert and immobilize 
it. Electronic surveillance enables the President, through the 
Attorney General to gather information on the plans of those who 
would disable the functions of Government and, hopefully, to 
prevent those plans from reaching fruition. Such surveillance 
8 
has a recognized place in the fight against organized crime; 
and its use in internal security cases has been more or less 
continuously sanctioned by various Presidents and Attorneys 
9 
General since July 1946. Herbert Brownell, Attorny General 
under President Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic 
surveillance both in internal and international security matters 
on the grounds that those acting against the government 
turn to the telephone to carry on their :.iiodxix: intrigue. 
The success of their plans frequently rests upon 
piecing together shreds of information received 
from many sources and many nests. The participants 
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed 
in various strategic ~positions 9_<fovernment 
and industry throughout the cmmtry. 
14. 
Though the government and respondents debate their 
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage against 
11 
the government exist in sufficient number to justify presidential 
investigative powers with respect to them. The covertness and 
complexity of many schemes against the government and the 
necessary dependency of conspirators upon the telephone make 
electronic surveillance an important investigatory instrument. 
Moreover, the general acceleration in this country's technological 
sophistication has, quite understandably, left its imprint on 
techniques of crime commission and crime prevention. Effective 
control of complex criminal activity, including that directed 
against the government, may perforce involve applications of 
contemporary technology that jar our traditional notions of 
12 
personal privacy. 
But viewing the foregoing as a necessary development 
cannot make it a welcome one. Together with our aspirations to 
15. 
live and circulate in a society free from the fear of violence 
and crime is the concept fundamental to our freedoms that proper 
limits govern official surveillance of private thought and speech. 
The framers of the Bill of Rights inscribed this value in the 
First and Fourth Amendments. Though physical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the latter is directed, . 
its broader spirit shields from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion man's now private words and speech as well. Katz v. 
I 
United States, supra; Berger v. New Yor}) supra; Silverman v. 
I 
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz refused 
to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances of actual physical 
trespass. Rather, the Amendment governs "n_ot only the seizure 
of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral 
statements 'without any technical trespass under . . . local 




recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions 
13 
into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails 
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards. 
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a 
confluence of First and Fourth Amendment . values in cases of 
"ordinary" crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive 
may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy 
to constitutionally protected speech. "Historically, the struggle 
for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the 
issue of the scope of the search and seizure power," Marcus v. 
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961). It is in the nature 
of government to suspect those who most fervently dispute its 
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary 
when the targets of official surveillance may be those "suspected 
14 
of unorthodoxy in matters of political belief and conscience. " 




attempts to act under so vague a concept as the "national security 
power" or the broad and indefinite language of § 2511(3). Given 
the difficulty of defining the "natural security" interest, the 
14-1/2 
danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent. 
Senator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511(3): 
As I read it - and this is my fear - we are 
saying that the President, on his motion, could 
declare - name your favorite poison - draft 
dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or 
civil rights activists to be a clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the 
Government. 15 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection 
to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of 
unauthorized official eavesdropping chill vigorous citizen dissent 
and discussion of government action in private conversation. For 
private dissent, no less thanopen public discourse, is essential 










The Attorney General's affidavit reads as follows: 
JOHN N. 1\fiTCHELL being duly sworn deposes 
and says: 
1. I am the Attorney General of the U nitcd 
States. 
2. This affidavit is submitted in connection 
with the Government's opposition to the dis-
closure to the defendant Plamondon of infor-
mation concerning the overhearing of l1is con-
versations which occurred during the course of 
electronic surveillances which the Government 
contends were legal. 
_: t . 3. The defendant Plamondon has partici-
pated in conversations which were overheard 
by Government agents who were monitoring 
wiretaps which were being employed to gather 
intelligence information deemed necessary to 
protect the nation from attempts of domestic 
organizations to attack and subvert the exist-
ing structure of the Government. The records 
of the Department of Justice reflect the instal-
lation of these wiretaps had been expressly ap-
proved by the Attorney General. 
4. Submitted with this affidavit is a sealed 
exhibit containing the records of the inter-
cepted conversations, a description of the prem-
ises that were the subjects of the surveil-
laners, and copies of the mcmor:t11da reflt•<·t-
ing the Atto1·ney Gcntral't; nxprcss approvnl of 
the instaJJati.on of the surveillances. 
, 5. I certify that jt would prejudic~e the na-
tional interm;t to diflclose the particular facts 
concerning these sunrcilJancos other tlwu to t!Je 
court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed ex-
hibit referred to herein is being submitted sole-
ly for tho court's in canw1·a insJwetion :mel a 
copy of tho scaled exhibit is not being fur-
nished to the d.efonclants. I would request the 
court, at the conelnsion of jts hearing on this 
matter, to place the sealed exhibit in a sealed 
envelope and return it to the Depa1·bnont of 
Justice whore it will be retained under seal 
so that it may be submitted to any apprllnte 
court that may review this matter. 
-----------
ii. 
2. Jurisdiction was challenged before the Court 
of Appeals on the ground that the District Court's order 
was interlocutory and not appealable under 28 U.S. C. § 1291. 
On this issue, the court held that it did have jurisdiction, 
relying upon the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1651 and 
cases cited in its opinion 444 F. 2d at 655-6. No attack 
is made in this Court as to the appropriateness of the 
writ of mandamus procedure. 
3. 18 U. S.C. § 2518( 7) does provide an exception 
for emergency situations but, even here, application for a 
court order must be made within forty-eight hours after the 
interception begins. 
4. 18 u.s. C. § 2518, section (1) and (2) read as 
follows: 
f¥,-t;& "§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wire or oral communica-
tions 
" ( 1) Each application for an order authorizinO" or appro,·ing the 
inter<·eption of a wire or oral communication shall~)e made in writing 
upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdidion antl shall 
state the appl icanfs authority to make such application. Ea('h applica-
tion shall inc·lnde the following information: 
"(a) the identity of the investigative orlaw rnforcenwntoffi-
<·er making the application, and the oftieer authorizing the 
application; 
''(b) a full and ('omplet<:' statement of the fads and circum-
shtJH'es reliP<lupon by the applicant, to justify his belid that an 
order should be issued, including (i) <letails as to thP parti('nlar 
ofl't•nse that has IJeen, is beillg, or is about to be c·ommittP<l, ( ii) a 
parti('ular dt>scription of the natut·e an<llo<":ttion of tlte facilitirs 
from whic·lt or the pla<"e wlwre the eotnmnnit·ation is to be illfPr-
<'PJ>ted, (iii) a particulardes('ription of tlw type of <"OJttmuni<·ations 
sought to Le inten·Pptrd, ( iv) the iclPttt ity of tht> pt>rs<m, if 
knowtt, c01nmitting the oJI'ellSC a!ld wJwsP c·OJmltuni<·ations are to 
lm intercepted; 
"(c) a full and ('Otnplete statPtnPJtt as to whether or not otlH·r· 
investigative procPdnrcs have been trit><l and failrd or why they 
rPaBonably appt>ar to be unlikely to snC"et>ed if tried or to b(• too 
uangerous j 
"(d) a statement of the period of time for wltic·h the inter-
ception is required toLe maintaineu. lf the nature of the invt\sti-
gation is such that the authorization for intcreeption should 110t 
automatically terminate \\'hen the described type of ('Otnmuniea-
tion has been first obtained, a part ic~ular dPseri pt ion of fads 
establishing probable cauBe to believ<l that additional eommu-
nications of the same ty/>e will oc:eur tlwrcafter; 
"(e) a full and comp etc statPment of the faets eoncerning nll 
previous applications known to the individual authori,.;ing and 
making the application, made to any judge for aut horizatwn to 
intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oml com-
munications involvmg any of the same persons, faeilities or 
plac ~es speeiJied in the application, and the action taken Ly the 
Judge on each Buch applwation; and 
"(f) where the applieation is for the extension of an order a 
stafPrncnt srtl ing forth the results thus far obtained from the 
inten·(•ption, ot· :treasonable explanation of the failure to obtain 
SJI(' h rPSU If S. 
iii. 
"~:::l) The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional 
testnnony or doc·unw11tary evidence in support of the application. 
GG 1 ) \ i - · _ I 1 I , , ""--::----=-- =- ~...:::....-~-,__-
iv. 
5. Cong. Rec. Vol. 114 Pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 
1968. Senator McClellan was the sponsor of the bill. The 
above exchange constitutes the only time that § 2511(3) was 
expressly debated on the Senate floor. 
6. Before being assured by Senators Holland and 
McClellan that § 2511(3) was nothing more than a congressional 
disclaimer, Senator Hart worried that the "clear and present 
danger" wording might afford a fertile opportunity for wiretapping 
adaxex abuse: 
"What is it that would constitute a clear and 
present danger to the structure or existence of 
the Government? As I read it - and this is my 
fear - we are saying that the President, on his 
motion, could declare - name your favorite 
poison - draft dodgers, Black Muslims, the 
Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a 
clear and present danger to the structure or 
existence or the Government. 11 Cong. Reco 
Vol. 114 Ft. 11, p. 14750, May 23, 1968. 
The subsequent assurances that § 2511(3) implied no statutory 
grant, contraction, or definition of Presidential power eased 
the Senator's misgivings. 
v. 
7. See n. 1, supra. 
8. FrankS. Hogan, District Attorney for idx New York 
County for over 25 years, described telephonic interception, 
pursuant to court-order, as "the single most valuable weapon in 
law enforcement's fight against organized crime. " Cong. Rec. 
Vol. 117, 86476, May 10, 1971. 
9. In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised 
President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases 
vitally affecting the domestic security." President Roosevelt had 
in May 1940 authorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize 
wiretapping in matters "involving the defense of the nation, " but 
it is questionable whether this language was meant to apply to 
solely domestic subversion. The nature and extent of wiretapping 
liZIIX:J[e varied somewhat under different administrations and 
Attorneys General, but except for the sharp curtailment under 
Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the latter years of the Johnson 
administration, electronic surveillance has been used both against 
vi. 
organized crime and in national security cases at least since the 
1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. fk:Hzt Gov't. Brief, 
pp. 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, 
S. 6476-7 S6477, May 10, 1971. 
10. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 
Cornell L. Q. 195, 202 (1954). See also Rogers, The Case For 
Wire Tapping, 63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954). 
11. The government argues there were 1562 bombing 
incidents in the United states from January 1, 1970 to July 1, 
1971, most of which involved government relatedi: facilities. 
Respondents dispute these statustics as incorporating many 
frivolous incidents as well as bombings against non-governmental 
facilities. The precise level of this activity, however, does not 
affect the disposition of this case. Gov't • Brief, p. 18; Resp. 
Brief, p. 26-29; Gov't Reply Brief, p. 13. 
12. Professor Alan Westin has authored an important 
book on the likely course of future conflict between the value of 
vi. 
privacy and the 'XNIDizx "new technology" of law enforcement. 
Much of the book details new techniques of physical and electronic 
surveillance and such possible threats to personal privacy as 
psychological and personality testing and electronic information 
storage and retrieval. 
13. Though the number of warrantless 'national security' 
telephone surveillances operated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has decreased in the past ten years: 1960 - 78; 
1965 - 44; 1970 - 36; the average surveillance involves interception 
of numerous different conversations. In non-national security 
wiretaps, for which figures are available, the average intercept 
in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 conversations, of which 295 
or 45 percent were incriminating. Gov't. Brief, p. 27; Cong. 
Rec. Vol. 117, 86477, May 10, 1971. It is important to point 
out, however, that the numbers of warrantless surveillances 
mentioned above reflect those in operation by the FBI at a 
vii. 
particular date, generally that of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's 
testimony. The total number of surveillances for the year is 
naturally substantially larger than the number in use on a 
particular day. ACLU, Amici Brief, 11. 16-21; Gov't Reply Brief, 
pp. 13-14. 
14o J. Landynski, ~ SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, 264-5 (1966). 
14-1/2. Martin Luther King for instance, had been under 
government surveillance, apparently to determine the extent of 
Communist influence on him. Navasky, KENNEDY JUSTICE, 
135-55 (1971); ACLU, Amici Brief, pp. 14-15. 
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The issue before us is an important one for the people 
of our country and their national government. It involves the 
delicate question of the President's power, acting through the 
Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal 
Resolving 
security matters without prior judicial approval :lllwc::tliw:ig this 
question requires sensitivity both to the government's righ to 
p~otect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's 
right to be secure in his :pxa. privacy against unreasoo.able 
government intrusion. 
This ease arises from a criminal proceeding in the 
United states District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, in which the United states charged three defendants 
with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation of 
18 U.S. C. It§ 371. One of the defendants, ~ "Pun" Plamondon, 
was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of the 
Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
Rider A, p. 5 (footnotes) 70-153 
April 29, 1972 
8. Section 2511(3) refers to "the constitutional power of 
the President" in two types at. situations: (i) where necessary to 
protect against attack, other hostile acts or intelligence activities 
of a "forei@ power"; or (11) where necessary to protect against 
the overthrow of the government or other clear and present danger 
to the structure or existence of the government. Although both 
of the spetified situations are sometimes referred to as "natbanal 
security" threats, the term national security is used ooly in the 
first sentence of § 2511(3) with respect to the activities of foreign 
powers. This case involves only the second sentence of § 2 511( 3 ), 
with the threat aa emanating .. according to the Attorney General's 
affidavit - from "domestic organizations". Although we attempt no 
precise dtfinition, we use the term "domestic organization" in this 
opinion to mean a group or organization (whether formally or 
informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United states 
and which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its 
agents or agencies. No doubt there are cases where it will be 
iJ 5A2. 
difficult to distinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful 
activities directed against the government of the United states where 
there is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups 
or organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But 




footnotes) 70-153 4/29/72 
This distinction is specifically drawn by the standards 
z3aat relating to Electronic Surveillance of the American Bar 
Association's Project on Criminal Justice, approved by the 
Association's House of Delegates in February 1971. Section 
3. 1 of the standards approve the use, without prior judicial 
authorization, of electronic surveillance to protect against 
hostile acts or intelligence activities of a foreign power. Section 
3. 2 of the Standards approves the admissibility in evidence of 
communications so overheard or recorded where this action was 
reasonable. In these respects, the standards are in accord with 
the first and third sentences of § 2511{3). The commentary 
accompanying the standards indicates that the American Bar 
Association Committee considered and rejected a proposal which 
would have extended executive power, without a warrant procedure, 
to domestic security situations. The commentary states: 
/ 
I 
"The standard (adopted) anchors the concept of 
national security to the relation between this 





considered and :ujDda:k rejected language which 
would have recogniz.ed a comparable residuary 
power in the President not subject to prior 
judicial review to deal with purely domestic 
subervise groups. This is not, of course, to say 
that there may not be domestic threats to the 
11A 2 
national security. It is to say, however, that there 
is a valid distinction in how each ought t:dx to be 
treated insofar as these techniques are concerned. 
Limitations which are proper when the internal 
affairs of the nation are solely involved become 
artificial when international rallities are considered." 
Ane rtcan Bar Association Standards relating to 
Eleetroo.ic Surveillance, Feb. 19'71, pp. 120, 121; 
!!!_also additional commentary, p. 11. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinon of the 
Court. 
The issue before us 1s an important one for the 
people of our country and their national Government. 
It involves the delicate question of the President's power, 
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize elec-
tronic surveillance in internal security matters without 
prior judicial approval. Resolving this question requires 
sensitivity both to the Government's right to pro-
tect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to 
the citizen's right to be secure in his privacy against 
unreasonable Government intrusion. 
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three 
defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government prop-
erty in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the 
defendants, "Pun" Plamondon, was charged with the 
dynamite bombing of an office of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved 
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic 
•• 
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surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether this information "tainted'' the evi-
dence on which the indictment was based or which the 
Government intended to offer at trial. In response, 
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attomey Gen-
eral, acknowledging that its agents had overheard con-
versations in w·hich Plamondon had participated. The 
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved 
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed 
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domes-
tic organizations to attack and subvert the existing struc-
ture of the Government." ' The affidavit, together with 
the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit 
for in camera inspection by the District Court. 
1 The Attorney Grncr: d '~ afficlaYit read~ as follows: 
".JoHN N. MrTCHEU, bring duly ~worn depo~es and s:1~·s: 
"1. I am the Attornp~· Geneml of the United States. 
"2. Thi,; affidrtYit is submitted in connection with the Govern-
mrnt.'s oppo,;ition to the disclo~me to the defrndant Pl:nnondon of 
information ronrrrning the o1·erhearing of his convrrsations which 
occurrrd during thr couroe of e]rctronic sun·eillancrs which the 
GoYernment rontrnd~ wrn• lrga I. 
"3. The defendant Plnmondon has participatrd in cotwersntions 
which were oYrrhrarcl h)· Gon•rnment ngents who werr monitoring 
wirrt:tps which " ·ere bring employed to gather intrlligenee infor-
mation deemed necr,~:H~· to protect the nation from nttempts of 
domrstic organizations to nt tnck nne! ~ubYert the existing strurture 
of the Gowrnmcnt. The rrcords of the Depnrtment of Justice 
rrflcct the installation of theo:e wiret:1p~ hnd bern rxpressly ap-
pro,·rcl by the Altornc~· Geneml. 
"·t Submitted with this afficlaYit is a scnled exhibit containing 
the records of the intercepted cotwcrsn tion~, a desrript ion of the 
prem~es that were the subjrcts of the sun·eillnnces , nne! copies of 
the memoranda reflecting the Attorney Genet-.~!'~ expre~~ nppro1·al 
of thr in~tallation of the sun·eillnncrs. 
"5. I rerlif~· that il would prejudirr the nation:d intrrest to· 
cli~clm•e the partieubr facts concerning these sun·cillancr.-; other tkm 
to the court in camem. According]~·, the scaled exhibit referred 
to here.in i8 being submi1trd ~olci)· for thr court'~ in came1'a inspcc-
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On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and 
the sealed exhibit, the Government asserted that the 
surveillances \\'ere la \\'ful, though concl ucted \\'ithout 
prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the 
President 's po\\'er (exercised through the Attorney Gen-
eral) to protect the national security. The District 
Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and ordered the Govemment to make full 
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations. 
- F.Supp.-. 
The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a \\'rit of mandamus 
to set af'icle the District Court order, ,,·hich " ·as stayed 
pending final disposition of the case. After conclud-
ing that it had jurisdiction/ that court held that the 
surveillances were unlawful and that the District Court 
had properly required disclosure of the overheard con-
versations, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). We granted certiorari. 
I 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act. 18 U. S. C. ~§ 2510- 2520, authorizes the 
use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes care-
fully sprcified in 18 U. S. C. § 2516. Such surveillance 
tion nnd a copy of the sPalrd exhibit iH not brin!!: furni~lwcl to the 
clrfrndants . I would rrqur>:t thr comt, at the conclusion of its 
hraring on thi~ mattrr , to pbre thr "rnlrd rxhibit in a ~ralrcl envelope 
and rrturn it to the Dep:utmrnt of .Tu >: tice whrre it will be rrtn.ined 
under ·r:ll ~o that it ma~· br submiltrd to an~· apprllatr court that 
m:ty rcYirw this matter." 
2 .TnriHclirtion \Yn~ ch:11lenged beforr the Court of Appeals on the 
ground that the District Court's order \\'f\S interlocutory and not 
appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. On this i~"ur . the court held 
that it. did ha,·e jmi~diction, relying upon the All Writs St:ttute, 
28 LT. S. C. § 1651 , and cnsr~ ritrcl in it s opinion, 444 F. 2d, at 65.5-
G56. No altac·k is mad!' in this Court as to the nppropriatcnrss of 
the writ of mand:1mus proeeclurr. 
' . 
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is subject to prior court orcler. 3 Section 2518 sets forth 
the detailed and particularized application necessary to 
obtain such an order as \Yell as carefully circumscribed 
conditions for its use. The Act represents a compre-
hensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective 
control of crime \Yhile protecting the privacy of indi-
vidual thought and expression. Much of Title III was 
drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for elec-
tronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger 
v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. U11ited 
Slates, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). 
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements 
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. S. C. 
~ 2511 (3): 
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat. 
1103; 47 U. S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President to take such measures 
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against 
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of 
a foreign povYer, to obtain foreign inte1ligence in-
formation deemed essential to the security of 
the United States, or to protect national security 
information against foreign intelligence activities. 
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be 
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems neces-
sary to protect the United States against the over-
throw of the Government by force or other unlawful 
means, or against any other clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the Gov-
ernment. The contents of any wire or oral com-
3 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (7) dors provide an exrrpt ion for certain 
emergency situations but, even herr, application for a court order 
must be made within 48 hours after the interception begins. 
' . 
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munication intercepted by authority of the 
President in the exercise of the foregoing po\vers 
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, 
or other proceeding only where such interception 
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or 
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that 
power." (Emphasis wpplied.) 
The Government relies on § 2511 (3). It argues that 
"in excepting national security surveillances from the 
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the 
President's authority to conduct such surveillances with-
out prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28. 
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance 
of a constitutional authority in the President to con-
duct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as 
that involved in this case. 
We think the language of § 2511 ( 3), as well as the 
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpreta-
tion. The relevant language is that: 
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit 
the constitutional power of the President to take 
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... " 
against the dangers specified. At most, this is an im-
plicit recognition that the President does have certain 
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this, 
as the section refers-among other things-to protec-
tion "against actual or potential attack or other hostile 
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the 
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned, 
the language is essentially neutral. 
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the 
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose. 
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted 
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have 
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left 
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presidential powers where it found them. This view 
is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Sec-
tion 2;)11 (1) broadly prohibits the use of electronic 
surveillance "except as otherwise specifically provided 
in this chapter." Subsection 2 thereof contains four 
specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions, 
the statutory language is as follows: 
"It shall not be unlawful ... to intercept" the 
particular type of communication described.' 
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to 
be contrasted with the language of the exceptions set 
forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than statiug 
that \varrantless presidential uses of electronic surveil-
lance "shall not be unla"·ful" and thus employing the 
standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely 
disclaims any intention to "limit the constitutional power 
of the President." 
The express grant of authority to conduct surveil-
lances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney 
General to make application to a federal judge ''"hen 
surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses. 
These offenses are described with meticulous care and 
specificity. 
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure 
to be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection ( 1) 
thereof requires application to a judge of competent 
jurisdiction for a prior order of approval. and states 
in detail the information required in such application., 
4 These exceptions rrlatr to rrrtain :-~ctiYities of communication 
rommon carriers and the Federal Communirntions Commi~~ion, and 
to specified situations where n p~n·t~· to the communication has 
consented to the interception. 
" 18 U.S. C. §2518, subsection (1) reads as follows : 
"§ 2ii18. Procedure for interception of wire or oral communications 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the 
inlerrrption of a wire or ornl communication shall be made in writ-
' . 
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Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary clements of prob-
able cause which the judge must find before issuing 
an order authorizing an interception. Subsection ( 4) 
set forth the required contents of "UCh an order. 
Subsection (5) sets strict time limits on an order. Pro-
ing upon o:1th or affirmntion to a judgr of comprtrnt jurisdiction 
n nd ~hnll Rt a to Ow n pplira nt's nut hority to mnkr such n pplication. 
Enrh n pplirlat ion shall inrlude t hr following information: 
"(::t) thr identity of the im·r~ ti,ga tJ,·r or h\\' rnforrrmrnt officer 
making lhr :1ppli('at ion, and thr officer nulhorizing thr application; 
"(h) a. fuLl :mel rompletr slntrmrnt of thr fnrtH nnd rirrum~t::~nccs 
relied upon b~· tlw npplirant, to jw,tif~· hi,.; hrlid that an ordrr 
should hr i~~twd. including (i) drtnils n ~ to thr p:ntirular offrnsr 
that. hrt' bern, iH bring. or iH about to br rommittrd, (ii) a par-
tirulnr drHr ription of the natmr :1nd !oration of thr farilitirs from 
which or thr pbrr whrrr thr communication i ~ to be intrrceptrd , 
(iii) a pnrliculnr drs(' ription of thr t~·pr of communications sought 
to hr intrrrf'ptrd . (iv) the idrnlit~· of thr prr~on, if known , rom-
milling the offrn~c nnd who~r rommunicntions nrr to hr intrrrrptrrl ; 
"(e) n full nne! romplrtr statrm rnt n.~ to whrthcr or not othrr 
im·r~tignti,·r prorrrlmrs haH lwrn tried and failed or wh~· thr~· 
rr:1son.nbl~· npprnr to be unlike !~ · to ,.;ucrrrd if tried or to be too 
dang;f'rous; 
"(d ) a Ht.'l. trmrnl of the pr riod of timr for whirh the intrrception 
iH required to be m:1intnincd. If the nature of thr im·rstigation iR 
~urh that thr au!horizntion for intrrcrption ~hould not nutom.1ticall~· 
tcrminnl<· whrn the dr~cribrd t~·pr of rommunication hns brrn first 
obtninrd, a pnrtirulnr description of fact s rstablishing probablr rau~e 
to bclir\·e that ndditional communications of thr ~amr t~ · pe will 
occur thrrrn ftrr ; 
" (P) a full and complete stntrmrnt of the fact s concerning; :dl 
pre\· iou~ npplicat ions known to t hr incliYiclu:ll nuthorizing nne! mak-
ing the application, madf' to any judge for nuthorir.:tlion to intercPpt , 
or for approYal of interception~ of, wire or oral communications 
im·oh·ing an~· of thr ~amc prrsonH, fncilitirs or placrs speeifird in 
the application. and the nrtion tnkcn by thr judg;r on cnch such 
:1pplication ; and 
"(f) where the applicntion i~ for the extension of an order, a 
statrmcnt setting forth thr rr:.:ult s thuH far obtainc•d from the inter-
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vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency 
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or 
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with 
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the na-
tional security interest." In such a situation, emergency 
surveillance may be conducted ''if an application for 
an order approving the interception is made ... within 
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the 
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed 
to be a violation of the Act. 
In view of these and other carefully interrelated pro-
visions delineating permissible interceptions of particu-
lar criminal acitvity upon carefully specified conditions, 
it "·ould have been incongruous for Congress to have 
legislated with respect to the important and complex 
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous 
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity 
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care 
Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the 
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that 
Congress only in tended to make clear that the Act 
simply did not legislate with respect to national security 
surveillances.6 
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this 
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between 
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate 
floor: 
"Mr. Holland .... The section [2511 (3)] from 
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirma-
tively give any po,ver. . . . We are not affirmatively 
0 The final sentPnce of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an 
interception "by authority of the PresidPnt in the exprcise of the 
foregoing powers may be received in evidence ... only where such 
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended 
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillanco-
pursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is 
admissible. 
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conferring any power upon the President. \Ve are 
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such 
power as the President has under the Constitu-
tion. . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing. 
"There is nothing affirmative in this statement. 
"Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it un-
derstood that we are not trying to take anything 
away from him. 
"Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct. 
"Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention 
here to expand by this language a constitutional 
power. Clearly we could not do so. 
"Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we 
could not do so. 
"Mr. Hart .... However, we are agreed that 
this language should not be regarded as intending 
to grant any authority, including authority to put a 
bug on, that the President does not have now. 
"In addition, Mr. President, as I think our ex-
change makes clear, nothing in Section 2511 (3) 
even attempts to define the limits of the Presi-
dent's national security power under present law, 
which I have always found extremely vague. . . . 
Section 2511 ( 3) merely says that if the President 
has such a power, then its exercise is in no iway 
affected by title III. (Emphasis supplied.) 7 
7 Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 1968. Senator 
McClellan wns the spon~or of the bill. The above exchange con-
stitutes the only time that § 2511 (3) was expressly debated on the 
Senate or Hou~e floor. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee is not so explicit as the exchange on the floor, but it appears 
to recognize that under § 2511 (3) the national security power of 
the Pre~ident-whatever it may bc--"is not to be deemed dis-
turbed." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2cl Se~s., 94 (1968). See 
also The "N ation[tl Security Wiretap": Prc~idential Prerogative or 
Judicial Reoponsibility where the nulhor concludes that in§ 2511 (3) 
"Congress took whnl amounted to a position of neutral noninter-
' . 
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One could hardly except a clearer expression of con-
gressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly in-
dicates that nothing in ~ 2511 ( 3) was intended to 
expand or to contract or to define whatever presidential 
surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the na-
tional security. If we could accept the Govemment's 
characterization of § 2511 (3) as a congressionally pre-
scribed exception to the general requirement of a war-
rant, it would be necessary to consider the question of 
whether the surveillance in this rase came 'vithin the 
exception. But viewing § 2511 (3) as a congressional 
disclaimer and expression of neutrality, we hold that 
the statute is not the measure of the executive authority 
asserted in this case. Rather, we must look to the con-
stitutional powers of the Presiclen t. 
II 
It is important at the outset to emphasize the lim-
ited nature of the question before the Court. This case 
raises no constitutional challenge to electronic stuTeil-
lance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Xor 
is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of 
obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes un-
related to the national security interest. Katz Y. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347 (Hl67); Berger V. New rork, 388 
U. S. 41 (1967). Further, the instant case requires 
no judgment on the scope of the President's smveillance 
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, 
within or ·without this country. The Attorney General's 
affidavit in this case states that the surveillances m"re 
"deemed necessary to protect the na.tion from attempts 
of domestic orgrmizations to attack and subvert the ex-
isting structure of Government" (emphasis supplied). 
ferenre on the qu<'stion of lhe cons1 it ul ionalily of \ntrrantlr8~ n:1lional 
security wiretaps authorized h.v the Pre~idcnt." 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
- (1972). 
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There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or 
indirectly, of a foreign power.8 
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore 
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by 
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23: 
"Whether safeguards other than prior authoriza-
tion by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security .... " 
The determination of this question requires the essen-
tial Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonable-
ness" of the search and seizure in question, and the 'vay 
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and mean-
ing through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971). 
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President 
of the United States has the fundamental duty, under 
8 Section 2511 (3) refers to "the constitutionrrl power of the 
President" in two types of siturrtions : (i) whrre nrcrssnry to pro-
trct ngainst attrrck. other hostilr acts or intrlligrnce nctiYities of a 
"foreign power"; or (ii) wherr nr<·es8nry to protect ngninst th<> 
oYerthrow of thr GoYernmcnt or othrr elear nnd prr.;;cnt danger 
to the structure or rxistrnre of thr GoYernmrnt. Although both 
of the specified situation~ are sometimrs rrfrrrrd to as "nn.tional 
A<:>curity" threats. thr trrm "nationnl security" iR used on]~· in thf' 
first sentrnre of § 2511 (3) with respect to the activities of forrign 
powers. This case im·olws only the srcond scntrncc of § 2511 (3), 
with the thrrat. em:mnting-arcording to the Attorney General's 
affidaYit-from "domrstic organizn t ions." Although we attempt no 
prcri~c definition, we usc the term "domr,;;tir organization" in this 
opinion to mrnn a group or orllanizntion (whrthcr formally or in-
formrrlly constituted) composrd of citizens of the United States and 
which has no signifiennt connection with a foreign power, its agrnts 
or ngrnries . No doubt thrre arr crt~rs whrrc it will be difficult 
to distinguiHh between "domrstic" and "forei!ln" unlawful actiYities 
dirertrd agninst the Gon:~rnmrnt of the United Statrs where then~ 
is collabomtion in Yarying drgrers between domr~lic groups or 
orgnnizations and agents or agrnries of foreign powers. But this 
is not such a case. 
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Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, "to preserve. protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Im-
plicit in that duty is the power to protect our Govem-
ment against those '"ho would subvert or overthrow 
it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this 
duty, the President-through the Attorney General-
may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance 
to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those 
'"ho contemplate unlawful acts against the Government. 
Enactment of Title III reflects congressional recogni-
tion of the importance of such surveillance in combat-
ting various types of crime; 9 and its use in internal 
security cases has been sanctioned more or less con-
tinuously by various Presidents and Attorneys General 
since July 1946.10 Herbert Brownell, Attorney General 
"Frank S. Hog:m, District Attorney for N' ew York County for 
OYer 25 years, dr:;cribed telephonic interception, punmant to court 
order, as "the single mo~t Yaluable "·eaJ)On in law enforrrmrnt's fight 
against organized crimr." Cong. Roc. Vol. 117, S G47G,l\Iay 10, 1971. 
The "Crime" Commi~sion appointrd by Presidont John on noted 
that "the great majority of law enforcement officiab belie\·e that the 
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently 
on the higher echelonH of organizrd crime will not be obtained with-
out the aid of electronic surYeillance techniquos. They maintain 
these techniques arr indi~prn~able to develop adpqunte strategic 
intelligence concerning organizrd crime, to set up SJ)ecific ingostiga-
tions, to develop witne~ses, to corroborate their testimony, and to 
i"erve as substitutrs for them-each a necessary step in the evidence-
gathering process in organized crime investigations nnd prosecutions." 
Report by the Pre~ident's Commission on Law Enforcement nnd 
Administration of Ju ticP, The Challenge of Crime in a Frre Society, 
p. 201 (1967). 
10 In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President 
Truman of the necessity of u:;ing wiretaps "in cnsrs Yitally affecting-
the domestic security." In May 1940 Presidont RooseYclt had au-
thorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters 
"involving the clefon~c of the nation," but it is questionable whether 
this language wa~ meant to apply to solely domestic subyersion. 
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under dif-
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under President Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic 
surveillance both in internal and international security 
matters on the grounds that those acting against the 
Government 
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue. 
The success of their plans frequently rests upon 
piecing together shreds of information received from 
many sources and many nests. The participants 
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed 
in various strategic positions in government and 
industry throughout the country." 11 
Though the Government and respondents debate their 
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage 
against the Government exist in sufficen t number to 
justify investigative powers with respect to them.1~ The 
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful con-
duct against the Government and the necessary depend-
ency of conspirators upon the telephone make electronic 
surveillance an essential investigatory instrument m 
ferent administrations and Attorneys General, but except for the· 
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the 
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance 
has been used both ap;ainst organized crime and in domestic security 
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. 
Govt. Brief, PI). 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. VoL 
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971. 
11 Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell 
L. Q. 195,202 (1954). See abo Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping, 
63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954). 
1 ~ The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing inci-
dents in the United States from January 1, 1971, to July 1, 1971, 
most of which invoh·ed Go\'Crnment related facilities. Rc.<pondents 
dispute these stat icitics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as 
well as bombings against nongovernmental facilities. The precise 
le\'cl of this arti1·ity, however, is not rele1·anL to the dispo~ition of 
this case. GoYt. Brief, p. 18; Resp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govl. Reply 
Brief, p. 13. 
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certain circumstances. The marked acceleration in tech-
nological developments and sophistication in their use 
have resulted in nev,· techniques for the planning. 
commission and concealment of criminal activities. It 
would be irrational and contrary to the public interest 
for Government to deny to itself the employment of 
those very techniques which arc employed against the 
Government and its law abiding citi?:ons. 
It is \\·ell to remember that "the most basic function 
of any government is to provide for the security of 
the individual and of his property." Miranda Y. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 53!) (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). And 
unless Government safeguards its own capacity to func-
tion and to preserve tho security of its people. society 
itself could become so cl isordered that all rights and 
liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes 
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 
574 (1940): 
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. imply the existence of an organized society 
maintaining public order without which liberty itself 
·would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." 
But a recognition of these elementary truths docs not 
make the employment by Government of electronic 
surveillance a welcome development-even when em-
ployed with restraint and under judicial supervision. 
There is. understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and 
apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude 
upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citi7.ens.13 We 
1 ~ Professor Alnn 'V0stin hn.~ [1\lthorrd an importnnt book on the 
likrly rour.•e of fnturr conflict betwrrn the Ya lue of priYar~· and the 
"new trrhnolo!!:~' " of l:1\\" cnforcrment. ::\[uch of the book detail:; 
teehniqucs of physicnl :md rlrdronic smTrillance and such possible 
ihrrat~ to personnl priYac~' as psyeholop;ic::il and prr~on:ility te:;ting 
and electronic information stornp;r nnd retrieval. Not all of tho 
contemporary thrrats to priyac·~· rmanatc directly from the pressures 
of crime control. A. Westin, Pri\·acy and Freedom (196i). 
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look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy. 
Though physical entry of the home is the chief eYil 
against which the " ·ording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed, its broader spirit no"· shields private speech 
from unreasonable smvcillancc. Katz v. United States, 
supra; Berger v. 1\"ew York, supra; Silverman v. United 
Slates, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Kalz 
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances 
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment 
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements \vith-
out any technical trespass under ... local property law.' " 
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recog-
nized that the broad and unc;;:uspectecl governmental 
incursions into conversational privacy "·hich electronic 
surveillance entails 11 necessitate the application of 
Fourth Amendment safeguards. 
Xational security cases. moreover, often reflect a con-
vergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not 
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the in-
vestigative duty of the executive may be stronger in 
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to consti-
tutionally protected speech. "Historically the struggle 
for freedom of speech and press in England \vas bound 
up with the issue of the scope of the search and ~eizure 
power." Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724 
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of 
Government-however benevolent and benign its mo-
tiYes-to view with suspicion those who most fervently 
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections be-
H Though the total numbrr of intcrcrpts authorizrd by state 
nne! frdrral .iudgr~ pur~unnt to Tit. III of the HHl~ Omnibus Crimr 
Control :mel Safe St rcctH Act \\":IS 59i in l9i0, cnch ~uiTcillance may 
inYolve intcrcrpt ion of hundrrds of diffrrrnt con\"C'r~n tion~. The 
a.verage intercept in 19i0 im·oh-cd 44 people :wd 655 conversationH, 
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rcc. Yol. 117, 
S 6477, Ma.y 10, 1971. 
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come the more necessary when the targets of official sur-
veillance may be those "suspected of unorthodoxy in 
matters of political belief and conscience." lr. The danger 
to political dissent is acute where the Government at-
tempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to 
protect "domestic security." Given the difficulty of de-
fining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse 
in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent. Sen-
ator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate 
on § 2511 (3): 
"As I read it-and this is my fear- we are say-
ing that the President, on his motion, could declare-
name your favorite poison-draft dodgers, Black 
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists 
to be a clear and present danger to the structure 
or existence of the Government." lfl 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread 
of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor 
must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping 
deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Govern-
ment action in private conversation. For private dis-
sent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to 
our free society. 
III 
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its 
terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic 
values at stake in this case: the duty of Government 
to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger 
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy 
and free expression. If the legitimate need of Govern-
1 " J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A 
Study in Constitn t ional Interprrtation, 264-265 ( 1966) . 
JG Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14750, May 23, 1968. The sub-
sequent assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511 (3) 
implied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential 
power eased the Senator's misgiving~. 
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ment to safeguard domestic security requires the use of 
electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs 
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be 
better protected by requiring a warrant before such 
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether 
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts 
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion 
and overthrow directed against it. 
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of 
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition or 
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more 
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have 
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was 
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether 
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).17 This view, however, over-
looks the second clause of the Amendment. The war-
rant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead 
language. Rather it has been 
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, 
and it has determined the result in scores and 
scores of cases in the courts all over this country. 
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed'' 
against the claims of police efficiency. It is. or should 
be, an important working part of our machinery 
of government, operating as a matter of course to 
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over-
17 Thi.> view has not been accepted. In Chime/ v. California, 395-
U. S. 752 (1969) , the Court considered the Government's contention 
that the search be judged on a general "reasonableness" standard 
without reference to the '"arrant rlause. The Court concluded that 
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regard-
ing the acceptability of rrrtain sorts of police conduct, and not on 
considrration~ rrlrYant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under 
such an unconfined analy~is, Fourth Amcndmrnt J1rotcction in this 
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zealous executive officers' who are a part of any 
system oflaw enforcement.'' Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, supra, at 4tll. 
See also United States v. Rabhwuritz, 339 U. S. 57. 68 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., disl"cnting); Davis v. United 
Slates, 328 U. S. 582, 604 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
OYer t"·o centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that 
common law principles prohibited warrants that ordered 
the arrest of unnamed individuals whom the officer might 
conclude were guilty of seditious libel. "It is not fit," 
said Mansfield, "that the receiving or judging of the 
information ought to be left to the discretion of the 
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should 
give certain directions to the officer." Leach v. Three 
of the King's Messengers, How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765). 
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart 
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where prac-
tical, a governmental search and seizure should repre-
sent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence 
of m·ongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate 
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify inva-
sion of a man's private premises or conversation. In-
herent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a 
"neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, supra, at 453; Katz v. United States, supra, 
at 356. The further requirement of "probable cause" 
instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not 
proceed. 
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly 
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillaJJces may 
be conducted solely within the discretion of the execu-
tive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not con-
template the executive officers of Government as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi-
bility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prose-
cute. Katz v. United States, supra, at 359-360 
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(Dot-GLAS, J., concurring). But those charged with this 
investigative and prosccutorial duty should not be the 
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive 
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, 
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewecl 
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures 
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential 
invasions of privacy and protected speech.18 
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Govern-
ment's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a 
reasonable one "·hich readily would have gained prior 
judicial approval. But this Court "has never sustained 
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably 
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and 
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intru-
sive means consistent "·ith that encl." Katz, supra, 
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a 
prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive dis-
cretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role 
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that in-
dividual freedoms will best be preserved through a 
separation of powers and division of functions among 
the different branches and levels of Government. John 
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the 
Judicial Function in Balance. 49 A. B. A. J. 943-044 
(1963). The judicial check upon executive discretion 
is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by "extremely 
limited" post-surveillance judicial review.1n Indeed, 
18 Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United Stale:; Constitution, 79-105 (1937). 
10 The GoYernment :1 rgnes that dome;; tic security wiretaps should 
be upheld by eolll'b in post :;:mnillnnce n·,·iew "nnlf'~" il nppear~ 
that the Attorney General'H dctPrmination that the proposed sur-
veillance relates to a national security matter i~ arbitrary and capri-
cious, i. e., thnt it constitutes n dear abuse of the broad discretion 
that the Attorney General hns lo obtain all information that will be 
helpful to the Pre~idcnt in protecting the Gon•rnmrnt . .. .'' agnin~t 
the various unlawful acts in § 2511 (3). Govt. Brief, p. 22. 
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post-surveillance review ''"ould never reach the surveil-
lances which failed to result in prosecutions. Prior re-
view by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time 
tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights. 
B eck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964). 
It is true that there have been some exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. Chirnel v. Califomia, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969); Terry Y. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But those excep-
tions are few in number and carefully delineated, Katz, 
supra, at 357; in general they serve the legitimate needs 
of la"· enforcement officers to protect their own well-
being and preserve evidence from destruction. Even 
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has re-
affirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 
and seizures through the warrant procedure," Terry v. 
Ohio , supra., at 20; Chimel Y. California, supra, at 762. 
The Government argues that the special circumstances 
applicable to domestic security surveillances nece~sitate 
a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is 
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would 
obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitu-
tional duty to protect domestic security. We are told 
further that these surveillances are directed primarily 
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with 
respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt 
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It 
is said that this type of surveillance should not be sub-
ject to traditional warrant requirements \Yhich ''"ere 
established to govern investigation of criminal activity, 
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp. 
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Heply Brief, pp. 2-3. 
The Government further insists that courts "as a 
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor 
.. 
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the techniques necessary to determine whether there 
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was nec-
essary to protect national security." These security 
]Woblems, the Government contends, involve "a large 
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the com-
petence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4. 
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant re-
quirement, the Government believes that disclosure to 
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion o£ the 
information involved in domestic security surveillances 
"v,·ould create serious potential dangers to the national 
security and to the lives of informants and agents .... 
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gather-
ing; requmng prior judicial authorization would 
create a greater 'danger of leaks ... , because in addi-
tion to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer 
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff 
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance." 
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25. 
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemp-
tion from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf 
of the President and the national security in its domestic 
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We 
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time 
when civil disorders arc more prevalent than in the less 
turbulent periods of our history. There is, no doubt, 
pragmatic force to the Government's position. 
But we do not think a case has been made for the 
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards. 
The circumstances described do not justify complete 
exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior 
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its pur-
pose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence 
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy of speech. Security surveillances arc 
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness 
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of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad 
and continuing nature of intelligence gatheri11g, and the 
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee polit-
ical dissent. \Ve recognize, as we have before, the con-
stitutional basis of the President's domestic security 
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case 
we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant 
procedure. 
\Ve cannot accept the Government's argument that 
intema1 security matters are too subtle and complex 
for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal 'vith the 
most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason 
to believe that federal j uclges will be insensitive to or 
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic 
security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that do-
mestic security surveillance invoh·es dift'crent considera-
tions from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the 
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law en-
forcement officers to convey its significa.nce to a court, 
one may question whether there is probable came for 
sun·e.illa.nce. 
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will frac-
ture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gather-
ing. The investigation of criminal activity has long 
involved imparting sensitive information to judicial of-
ficers '\'ho have respected the confidentialities involved. 
Judges may be counted upon to be especially conscious 
of security requirements in national security cases. Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary 
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage 
and treason, ~ 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may in-
vol\·e domestic as well as foreign security threats. More-
over, a. warrant application involves no public or 
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a 
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magistrate or judge. \Vhatever security dangers cler-
ical and secretarial personnel may pose can be mini-
mized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the 
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the 
necessary clerical assistancr. 
Thus, we conclude that the Go,·ernment's concerns 
do not justify departure in this case from the customary 
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval 
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although 
some added burden \\'ill be imposed upon the Attorney 
General. this inconvenience is justified in a frer society 
to protect constitutional values. Nor do we think the 
Government's domestic surveillance powers \Vill be im-
paired to any significa.nt degree. A prior warrant estab-
lishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will 
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance 
judicial review. By no means of least importuner, will 
be the reassura.nce of the public generally that indis-
criminate wiretapping and bugging of la\v-abicling citizens 
cannot occur. 
IV 
We emphasize before concluding this opnuon, the 
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this 
case involves only the domestic aspects of national se-
curity. \Ve have not addressed, and express no opinion 
with respect to, the issues which may be involved with 
respect to activities of foreign powers or their agrn ts. "0 
~0 See n. R, sup.1·a. At lenst one fedrrfll judge hfls ~ugge~ted that 
"it might ver~· wrll be that warrantle~~ Rurwillrmcc ... , while 
unronst itutiorwl in thr domr~t ir ~it u:d ion, would br ron::-;1 it ut ion a I 
in the area of forrign affairs. This posRihlr diRtinction is largrly 
dur to thr Prr>:idr11t '8 long-rerog:nizcd. inhrrrnt power with rri'JWct 
to forrign rcla1 ion~." U ll'ilrd Slates v. Smith, - F. Supp. -
(19il). This diRtinrtion is spcrifi<"all~· drawn hy the Standards re-
lating to Electronir Sun·rillanrc of the Amrriran Bflr AsRociation's 
Project on Criminal Justice, approved by the Association's House of 
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K ot· do we hold that the standards and procedures of 
Title III are necessarily applicable to this case. We 
recognize that domestic security surveillance may in-
volve different policy and practical considerations 
from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." The gather-
ing of security intelligence is often long range and in-
volves the interrelation of various sources and types 
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance 
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance 
operations against many types of crime specified in 
Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelli-
gence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity 
Delegates in February 1971. Section 3.1 of the Stnndarcb approves 
the u~e, without prior juclirinl nuthorization, of electronir surveil-
bnre to protert ngainst hostile arts or intelligence ncti,·ities of a 
foreign power. Section 3.2 of the Stnndards approws the admis-
Ribility in evidence of communications so overhenrd or recorded 
where this artion was rmRonable. The commentnry arrompanying 
the Standards indicates that the American Bar Association Com-
mittee considered and rejrcted a proposal which would have extended 
executive power, "·ithout a warrant procedure. to domestir security 
:;ituntions. The rommentnry l"tatcs: 
"The standard (adopted) anrhors the concept of national security 
to the relation between this rountr~· nnd foreign nation~. . . . The 
Committee considered and rejected language which would have 
recognized a comparable re~iduary power in tho President not sub-
ject to prior judicial review to deal with purely domestir subversive 
groups. This is not, of rour:;c, to say that there may not be 
donwstio threats to tho nationnl security. It is to i"ay, however, 
that there is a valid distinction in how each ought to be treated 
insofar as these techniques arc concerned. Limitations which are 
proper when the internal affnirs of the nation are solely involved 
become artifirial whrn international realities are considered." 
Amrricnn Bar As~ociation Standards Relating to Elect ronir Sur\'eil-
lance, Feb. 1971, pp. 120, 121; sec also nclditional commentary, p. 11.. 
The Court of Appeals for tho Fifth Circuit also rerently held a 
warrant would not be reqnirccl for SliiYrillaJICe invoh·ing foreign in-
telligence operations, United States Y. Clay, 430 F. 2d 165 (1970), 
certiorari granted and ronr:;rcl on another issue. 
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or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness 
for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the 
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than 
that directed against more conventional types of crime. 
Given these potential distinctions between Title III 
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic 
security, Congress may wish to consider protective 
standards for the latter which differ from those already 
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different 
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amend-
ment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legiti-
mate need of Government for intelligence information 
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant 
application may vary according to the governmental in-
terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights 
deserving protection. As the Court said in Canwra v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967): 
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires 
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable 
cause' is the standard by which a particular de-
cision to search is tested against the constitutional 
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining 
whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and 
thus in determining whether there is probable cause 
to issue a warrant for that inspection- the need for 
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these 
reasonable goals of law enforcement." 
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that 
the application and affidavit showing probable cause 
need not be as particularized as in cases of specified 
crimes; that the request for prior court authorization 
could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a 
specially designated court (e. g., the District Court or 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); and that 
the time and reporting requirements need not be so strict 
as those in § 2518. 
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The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to 
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate 
the present scope of our own opinion. We do not at-
tempt to detail the precise standards for "domestic secur-
ity" warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought 
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal 
surveillances ,..,.hich now constitute Title III. We do 
hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for 
the type of domestic security surveillance involved in 
this case and that such approval may be made in ac-
cm·dance with such reasonable standards as the Congress 
may prescribe. 
v 
As the surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was 
unlawful, because conducted without prior judicial ap-
proval, the courts below correctly held that Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 168 (1969), is controlling and 
that it requires disclosure to the accused of his own im-
permissibly intercepted conversations. As stated in 
Alderman, "the trial court can and should, where ap-
propriate, place a defendant and his counsel under en-
forceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the 
materials which they may be entitled to inspect.'' 394 
U.S. 185.~1 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby 
Affirmed. 
21 ''re think it unnecessary at this time and on the facts of this 
case to consider the arguments advanced by the Government for a 
re-examination of the bai"is and scope of the Court's decision in 
Alderman. 
May 3, 1972 
PERSONAL 
Re: No. 70-153 u.S. v. U.S. District Court 
Dear Chief: 
Here is my draft opinion in the domestic security wiretap 
ease. I could not conclude, after further eoosideration, that this 
ease is controlled by Title UL 
Nor do I believe that it would be in the public interest - in 
the long run -if Title m were deemed eootrolling. Under that view, 
this particUlar ease would still be affirmed - as the Attorney 
General !.s affidavit did not bring the ease within the language of 
§ 2511(3). 
But let us assume that the next ease which reaches the Court 
involves an affidavit....whieh does track the exact language of the seeood 
sentence of § 2511(3). We could not then avoid the constitutional 
issue, which woold include net ooly (i) the Fourth Amendment question 
but llso ( ii) a question as to impermissible vagueness and overbreadth. 
For the same reasons that caused the ABA Committee to draw a 
distinction between domestic security surveillance and foreign power 
surveillance, I think it inevitable that we woold hold § 2511(3) 
unconstitutional. 
Even if we have a choice now (which I really do not see), 
there are some ecnsiderations in favor of resolving the issue. 
Concern around the country as to warrantless surveillance is 
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genuine. There is uncertainty among the lower court, and in govern-
ment itself as to the applicable constitutional standards. Moreover, 
an opinion along the lines I have drafted may prompt the Congress to 
address this issue at this session of Congress in a constructive way. 
I am sure that all of these thoughts have occurred to you. 
Of course, if Byron is correct that the statute does control, the 
policy coosiderations I have mentioned are irrelevant. I have been 
unable to c oovinee myself, however, that Byron's view can be 
supported. 
One final comment: We did not discuss the government's 
request with respect to Alderman in the Conference. If and wlten we 
reconsider Alderman, I may well vote to overrule it for the reasons 
stated in the dissenting opinicn. Certainly, I would limit its scope. 
I have discussed this with Byron and I do not think he is ready for 
a reccnsideration. Accordingly, I concluded that it was best under 
the narrow facts in this ease to follow Alderman but - by the last 
footnote - indicate that the story may not be finally written. 
Sincerely, 




j;lt}tutttt a;(l"U:ft of t~t ~ttittb j;tntts 
Jlas!p:ttgtcn 2~, ~.Qt. 
"'-.,; CHAMBER S O F 




I a.m happy to join your fine 
opinion in No. 70-153 - United States v . 
U. S. District Court . 
I may possibly file a. separate 
opinion, not in derogation of what you 
have written , but in further support of 
it . 
Mr . Justice Powell 
CC : The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u.p-renu <!Jourt of tqt ~nittb ~bt,tts 
'Jifasfrittgton. ~. <!J. 21lgtJ!.~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS May 4, 1972 
Dear Lewis: 
Re: No. 70-153 - U. S. v. U. S. D. C. 
As you know, Bill Brennan is considerably disturbed 
by footnote 20 in your opinion. 
You state in the text: "We have not addressed, and 
express no opinion with respect to, the issues which may be 
involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their 
agents." 
I thought as I read that that it was a very proper 
reservation, and I still think it is. 
Bill Brennan apparently thinks that footnote 20 
squints toward a position that is in support of the American 
Bar position. It is a question which, as you know, is highly 
controversial, and Bill Brennan and I expressed our views on it 
in the Katz case. 
The Court has never spoken on it, and this certainly 
is not the time to do so. 
But I was hoping that you could find some way to satisfy 
Bill Brennan so as to bring him into the opinion. It would be fine 
if this could be wholly unanimous. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j)u.vumt <qourl cf f4t JtniU~ j)taftil 
'Jlllru;frin:gfcn. ~. <q. 2.0gtJ.1~ 
May 4, 1972 
70-153, U. S. v. U. S. District Court 
Dear Lewis, 
I think you have done a fine job in this case, and 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
P. S. - I have one minor suggestion -- that something along 
the fall owing l ines be added after the word "exception" 
in the 11th l ine on page 10: ", and, if so, whether 
the statutory exception was itself constitutionally valid." 
CHAMBERS OF 
i'ttprtmt Q}tturl cf t4t 'J!lttitt~ .it:\tftg 
'IJagJringhm.lfl. <!}. 2!lp'!!~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 4, 1972 
Re: No. 70-153- U. s. v.U. s. District Court, 
Eastern District of Michigan 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,~:: 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Conference 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, UI DATE: May 13, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-153 Wiretapping Case 
Over the weekend, I reviewed the second draft of our opinion 
with the following result: 
1. I have added a rld.dr A on page 1. This is designed primarily 
to meet the suggestion that the present draft does not show with 
sufficient clarity the long standing nature of the problem, and the fact 
that no one - Presidents or otherwise - has known the ground rules. 
This rider will require a renumbering of some footnotes. Rather 
than renumber all of them, I suggest that present footnote No. 3 can 
be eliminated entirely, as we later refer to § 2518(7). If you agree, 
we -could drop footnote 3 and simply renumber present notes 1 and 2. 
2. As I reread our draft, it occurs to me that we may have 
emphasized the necessity for prior "judicial" authorization in a way 
that might circumscribe future decisions as to who may constitute 
a "neutral and detllched magistrate" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. I have in mind, for example, our Tampa, Florida case 
in which we must write an opinion, where the question is whether a 





Mr. Justicd Marshall argues that the Fourth Amendment requires 
a "judicial officer". But prevailing view o6the Court is that only a 
neutral and detached magistrate is necessary, who need not be a licensed 
lawyer or judge. He must, however, meet the basic specifications of 
being neutral and disinterested, which means he must be separate and 
apart from the prosecutorial arm of government. 
My suggestion is that you add a footnote at some appropriate 
point (possibly p. 19) which indicates that we use the word judicial 
to connote a neutral and detached magistrate. In Title m the Congress 
specifically required that a judge perform this function. In other 
circumstances, this Court has not held that only a judge can meet the 
standards of detachment and disinterest which are required. 
3. Please note the other quite minor changes which I have 
suggested. In general, I found very little I wished to change, as I 
think the opinion is sound and well written. 
4. As soon as we have agreed on these changes, let's print 
a third draft. I will then try to clear it with the Justices concerned 
L. F. P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W M. ,J BRENNAN. ,JR. 
.iu:p-rtutt <!feud cf tqt ~tb .itatts 
Jfttsftinghm. ~. Of. 2!lp'l-~ 
May 18, 1972 
RE: No. 70-153 - United States v. United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan, etc. 
Dear Lewis: 
The changes you have made meet completely my concerns. 
I very much appreciate your bearing with meo 
I therefore make bold to offer one more suggestion. This 
concerns the last full paragraph on page 13 through the quote from 
Chief Justice Hughes in Cox v. New Hampshire. Am I correct in 
believing that those paragraphs are a summary of the Government•s 
justification for the asserted authority? If I am, could something 
like the additions I've noted in the margins at pages 13 and 14 be 
mocle to make that clear? My recollection is that Ramsey Clark's 
attitude was in part explained by his disagreement with these prop-
ositions and I make the suggestions to avoid any misunderstanding 
that the Court is resolving the controversy. 
s;;re 
Mr. Justice Powell 
,j~tmt Qfourl at tJrt ~ttittb .i9tattg 
Jfns!p:ttgtcn, ~. <!f. 2ll.;i~.;l 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. May 19, 1972 
RE: Noo 70-153 - United States v. U.S. 
District Court of the Eastern District 
of Michigan, etc. 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you very much for your con-
sideration of my suggestions in the above. 
Your proposed accommodation is entirely 
satisfactory. Thank you again for bear-
ing with me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
May 19, 1972 
Re: 70-153 U.s. v. U.S. District Court 
Dear BUl: 
Thank you for yours of May 18. I am glad that my changes 
met your cmcerns. 
I also appreciate your editing suggestims oo pp. 13 and 14. 
The two sentences you mentioo in the paragraph beginning in the 
middle of p. 13 were based primarily upoo studies which I commenced 
as a member of the President's Crime Commissim and the Task 
Foree thereof which coosidered organized crime problems and 
whether legalized wiretapping was necessary. In the course of that 
study I reviewed the testimooy of former Attomeys General going 
back to Robert Jacksoo and extending through Robert Kennedy, all 
of whom agreed essentJally that coo.trolled surveUlance is in the 
public interest. 
You are quite right in saying that Ramsey CJark disagrees, 
and be so stated to the Crime Commission. I believe, however, that 
the annual reports to the Congress as to the effectiveness of wire-
tapping under Title m (you are familiar with some of it in New Jersey) 
demmstrate its utility. 
However, I have made a couple of changes in these sentences 
which make them re1at1vely neutral I believe that even Ramsey 
would agree that electronic surveillance is "effective" in many 
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situations. He questions whether its effectiveness is worth the 
financial cost and the incrimental intrusion upon privacy. The last 
sentence in the paragraph leaves us all perfectly free because of 
my having added the word "lawful". I hope these changes are 
satisfactory. 
With my thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m DATE: May 2, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. District Court 
Here is a revised Part V of our opinion, dealing with the difficult 
and delicate Alderman issue. 
The last sentence in my draft is an important one, as it is 
intended to leave open the issues raised by the government's arguments 
in all cases other than those that come within the narrow factual 
context of this ease. 
In addition to situations where foreign powers or their agents 
may be involved, there may well be a case arising under Title m 
where it would be appropriate to coosider more carefully the govern-
ment's arguments. As the facts in our case do not present a situation 
controlled by Title m, we deed not consider, for example, whether 
Alderman is based on constitutional grounds or is an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's authority with respect to practice in the federal 
sys.tem. 
In short, I have triedd to leave all of these questions open. 
If tou think I have been successful, it is unnecessary to add footnote 
Z'5 which you have drafted. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
~. I, ,. 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m 
No. 70-153 
United States, Petitioner, 
v. 
United States District Court 
for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, Southern 
Division, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
rMay -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinon of the 
Court. 
The issue before us is an important one for the 
people of our country and their Government. It in-
volves the delicate question of the President's power, 
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize elec-
tronic surveillance in internal security matters without 
prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more 
than one-quarter of a century have authorized such sur-
veillance in varying degrees/ without guidance from the 
Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This 
case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolu-
tion is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity 
both to the Government's right to protect itself from 
unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's 
right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable 
Government intrusion. 
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three 
defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government prop-
erty in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the 
1 See n. 10, infra. 
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defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite 
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency 
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved 
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic 
surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether this information "tainted" the evi-
dence on which the indictment was based or which the 
Government intended to offer at trial. In response, 
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney Gen-
eral, acknowledging that its agents had overheard con-
versations in which Plamondon had participated. The 
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved 
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed 
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domes-
tic organizations to attack and subvert the existing struc-
ture of the Government." ~ The affidavit, together with 
the logs of the surveillance. were filed in a sealed exhibit 
for in camem inspection by the District Court. 
2 The Attorney General's affidnYit reads as follows: 
"JoHN N. MITCHELL being duly sworn drposes and says: 
"1. I am the Attornry General of the United States. 
"2. This affidavit is submitted in connection with the Govern-
ment's oppo~ition to the disclosure to the defendant Plamondon of 
information concerning the owrhearing of his conYersations which 
occurred during the course of electronic sun·eillances which the· 
Government contrmb were legal. 
"3. The defendant Plamondon has participated in conversntions 
which were oYcrheard by Government agents who were monitoring· 
wiretaps whirh were being rmployed to gather intelligence infor-
mation deemed nece~sary to 11rotect the nation from attempts of 
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure-
of the Government. The records of the Department of Justice· 
reflect the installation of these wiretap:> had been expressly ap-
proved by the Attorney General. 
"4. Submitted with this affidrwit is a sealed exhibit containing 
the records of the intercepted conversations, a description of the 
premises that were the subjects of the surveillances, and copies of 
70-153-0PINION 
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On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and 
the sealed exhibit, the Government asserted that the 
surveillances were lawful, though conducted without 
prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the 
President's pO\ver (exercised through the Attorney Gen-
eral) to protect the national security. The District 
Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and ordered the Government to make full 
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations. 
-F.Supp.-. 
The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus 
to set aside the District Court order, which was stayed 
pending final disposition of the case. After conclud-
ing that it had jurisdiction." that court held that the 
surveillances were unlawful and that the District Court 
had properly required disclosure of the overheard con-
versations, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). We granted certiora.ri. 
the memoranda reflcrting the Attorney General's express approval 
of the installation of the suryeillanccs. 
"5. I rerlify that it would prejudire the national interest to 
di~rlose the partirular facts concerning the.se surveillances other than 
to the court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed exhibit referred 
to herein is being submittrd solely for the court's in camera inspec-
tion and a cop~r of thr Healed exhibit i~ not being furnished to the 
defendants. I would request the court, at the conrlusion of its 
hearing on this matter, to place the scaled exhibit in a sraled envelope 
and return it to the Departmrnt of JuRtice where it will be retained 
under seal so that it ma,y be submitted to any appellate court that 
may review this matter." 
3 Jurisdiction was rhallenged beforr the Court of Appeals on the 
ground that the Di~trirt Court's order was interlocutory and not 
appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. On thi;; iHsue, the Court cor- \ 
rectly held that it did ha\·e juri~diction, relying upon the All Writs 
Statute, 28 U.S. C.§ Hi51, and rases cited in its opinion, 444 F. 2d, 
at 655-656. No attack was made in this Court as to the appropriate-
ness of the writ of mandamus proredure. 
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I 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act, 18 U. S. C. § § 2510-2520, authorizes the 
use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes care-
fully specified in 18 U. S. C. § 2516. Such surveillance 
is subject to prior court order. Section 2518 sets forth 
the detailed and particularized application necessary to 
obtain such an order as ·well as carefully circumscribed 
conditions for its use. The Act represents a compre-
hensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective 
control of crime while protecting the privacy of indi-
vidual thought and expression. Much of Title III was. 
drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for elec-
tronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger 
v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967) , and Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). 
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements 
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2511 (3): 
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat. 
1103; 47 U. S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President to take such measures 
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against 
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of 
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation deemed essential to the security of 
the United States, or to protect national security 
information against foreign intelligence activities. 
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be 
.deemed to limit the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems neces-
sary to protect the United States against the over-
throw of the Government by force or other unlawful 
means, or against any other clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the Gov-
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ernment. The contents of any wire or oral com-
munication intercepted by authority of the 
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers 
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, 
or other proceeding only where such interception 
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or 
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that 
power." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Government relies on § 2511 (3). It argues that 
"in excepting national security surveillances from the 
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the 
President's authority to conduct such surveillances with-
out prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28 .. 
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance 
of a constitutional authority in the President to con-
duct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as 
that involved in this case. 
We think the language of § 2511 (3), as well as the 
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpreta-
tion. The relevant language is that: 
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit 
the constitutional power of the President to take 
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... " 
against the dangers specified. At most, this is an im-
plicit recognition that the President does have certain 
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this, 
as the section refers-among other things-to protec--
tion "against actual or potential attack or other hostile 
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the 
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned, 
the language is essentially neutral. 
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the· 
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose. 
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted 
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have 
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left 
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presidential powers where it found them. This view 
is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Sec-
tion 2511 (1) broadly prohibits the use of electronic 
surveillance "except as otherwise specifically provided 
in this chapter." Subsection (2) thereof contains four 
specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions, 
the statutory language is as follows: 
"lt shall not be unlawful . . . to intercept" the 
particular type of communication clescribed.4 
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to 
be contrasted with the language of the exceptions set 
forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than stating 
that "·arrantless presidential uses of electronic surveil-
lance "shall not bC' unlawful" and thus employing the 
standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely 
disclaims any intention to "limit the constitutional power 
of the President." 
The express grant of authority to conduct surveil-
lances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney 
General to make application to a federal judge when 
surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses. 
These offenses are described with meticulous care and 
specificity. 
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure 
to be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection (1) 
thereof requires application to a judge of competent 
jurisdiction for a prior order of approval, and states 
in detail the information required in such application."' 
4 These exception~ relatr to rrrtain activitirs of communication 
common c:uriers and the Frdrral Communirntions Commi~sion, and 
to sperified situations where a pnrty to the rommuniration has 
ronsrnted to the interception. 
5 18 U. S. C. § 2518. subsection (1) rrnds as folJows: 
"§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wirr or ora.] rommunirations 
"(1) Each appliration for an order authorizing or appro\'ing the 
interc·eption of a wire or oral communiration shall be made in writ-
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Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary elements of prob-
able cause which the judge must find before issuing 
an order authorizing an interception. Subsection ( 4) 
sets forth the required contents of such an order. 
Subsection ( 5) sets strict time limits on an order. Pro-
ing upon oath or affirmntion to a jud~r of competent jurisdiction 
and shall state thr applirant's authority to make such application. 
Each appliclation shall include the following information: 
"(a) the identit~· of the im·e~tigahve or Jaw enforcement officer 
making the appliration, nnd the officer authorizing thr application; 
"(b) a full and complete statement of the faets and circumstanees 
relied upon by the applirant, to juRtify his belief that an order 
should be i~sued, including (i) details as to the particular offense 
that has been, is brin~. or is about to be committed, (ii) a par-
ticular description of the nature and !oration of the facilities from 
which or the place where the rommunicntion is to be intercepted, 
(iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought 
to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, com-
mitting the offen r nnd whose communication~ .ue to be intercepted; 
"(c) n full and complete stntement as to whether or not other 
invcstigativr procedures ha\·c been tried and fniled or why they 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
"(d) a statement of thr period of time for which tho interception 
is required to be maintained. If the nature of the inYCstigation is 
such that the authorization for interception ~hould not automntically 
terminate when the described type of communication has been first 
obtained, a particulnr description of facts establishing probable cause 
to bclie\·c that additional eommunications of the Ramc type will 
occur theren ftcr; 
"(c) a full and complete stntement of the faets concerning aU 
previous applications known to the individual authorizing and mak-
ing the applicai ion, made to any judge for authorization to intercept, 
or for approYal of interceptions of, wire or oral communications 
involving any of thr same persons, facilities or places specified in 
the application, and the action takrn by the judge on each such 
application; and 
"(f) where the npplication iH for tho extension of an order, a 
statement ·ctting forth the results thus fnr obtained from the inter-
ception, or a rensonablc explanation of the failure to obtain such 
results." 
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vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency 
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or 
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with 
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the na-
tional security interest." In such a situation, emergency 
surveillance may be conducted ''if an application for 
an order approving the interception is made ... within 
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the 
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed 
to be a violation of the Act. 
In view of these and other interrelated provisions 
delineating permissible interceptions of particular crim-
inal activity upon carefully specified conditions, it 
would have been incongruous for Congre~s to have 
legislated with respect to the important and complex 
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous 
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity 
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care 
Congress exerci~ed in drafting other sections of the 
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that 
Congress only intended to make clear that the Act 
simply did not legislate with respect to national security 
surveillances. a 
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this 
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between 
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate 
floor: 
"Mr. Holland .... The section [2511 (3)] from 
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirma-
tively give any power. . . . We are not affirmatively 
6 Tho final sentence of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an 
interception "by authority of the President in the exercise of tho 
foregoing powers may be received in evidence ... only where such 
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended 
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillance-
pursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is 
admissible. 
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conferring any power upon the President. We are· 
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such 
power as the President has under the Constitu-
tion. . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing .. 
"There is nothing affirmative in this statement. 
"Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it un-
derstood that we are not trying to take anything· 
away from him. 
"Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct. 
"Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention 
here to expand by this language a constitutional 
power. Clearly we could not do so. 
"Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we 
could not do so. 
"Mr. Hart .... However, we are agreed that 
this language should not be regarded as intending 
to grant any authority, including authority to put a 
bug on, that the President does not have now. 
"In addition, Mr. President, as I think our ex-
change makes clear, nothing in Section 2511 ( 3) 
even attempts to define the limits of the Presi-
dent's national security power under present law, 
which I have always found extremely vague. . . . 
Section 2511 ( 3) merely says that if the President 
has such a power, then its exercise is in no 'way 
affected by title III. (Emphasis supplied.) 7 
7 Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 1968. Senator 
McClellan was the sponsor of the bill. The above exchange con-
stitutes the only time that § 2511 (3) was expressly debated on the 
Senate or House floor. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee is not so explicit as the exchange on the floor, but it appears 
to recognize that under § 2511 (3) the national security power of 
the President-whatever it may be--"is not to be deemed dis-
turbed." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2cl Sess., 94 (1968). See 
also The "National Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or 
Judicial Responsibility where the author concludes that in § 2511 (3) 
"Congress took what amounted to a position of neutral noninter-
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One could hardly except a clearer expression of con-
gressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly in-
dicates that nothing in § 2511 (3) was intended to 
expand or to contract or to .define whatever presidential 
surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the na-
tional security. If we could accept the Government's 
characterization of § 2511 (3) as a congressionally pre-
scribed exception to the general requirement of a war-
rant, it would be necessary to consider the question of 
whether the surveillance in this case came within the 
exception and , if so, whether the statutory exception was 
itself constitutionally valid. But viewing § 2511 (3) as 
a congressional disclaimer and expression of neutrality, 
we hold that the statute is not the measure of the execu-
tive authority asserted in this case. Rather, we must 
look to the constitutional powers of the President. 
II 
It is important at the outset to emphasize the lim-
ited nature of the question before the Court. This case 
raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveil-
lance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Nor 
is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of 
obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes un-
related to the national security interest. Katz v. Un'ited 
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388. 
U. S. 41 ( 1967). Further, the instant case requires 
no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance 
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, 
within or without this country. The Attorney General's 
affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were 
"deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts 
ference on the qucf'tion of the constitutionality of warrantless national 
security wiretaps authorized by the President." 45 S. Cal. L. Rev . 
- (1972). 
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of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the ex-
isting structure of Government" (emphasis supplied). 
There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or 
indirectly, of a foreign pow~r.s 
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore 
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by 
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23: 
"Whether safeguards other than prior authoriza-
tion by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security .... " 
The determina.tion of this question requires the essen-
tial Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonable-
ness" of the search and seizure in question, and the way 
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and mean-
ing through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971). 
8 Section 2511 (3) refers to "the conRtitutionnl power of the 
Prc.~ident" in two t~·pcs of situntiom;: (i) wh!:'re necrssnry to pro-
tect against attark, other hostile acts or intelligence ncti\"ities of a 
"foreign power"; or (ii) where neceRl'ary to protect against the 
overthrow of the Government or other clear and preRent danger 
to the structure or existence of the Government. Although both 
of the specified situation.- are sometimes refrrred to us "national 
security" threats, the term "nationnl srC'urity" is used only in the 
first sentence of § 2511 (3) with rc.<;pect to the n,rtivitics of foreign 
powers. This rase involves only the second Rrntcnce of § 2511 (3), 
with the threat emanating-nccording to the Attorney General's 
affidavit-from "dome<>tic orgnnizations." Although we attempt no 
precise definition, we use the term "domestic organization" in this 
opinion to mean a group or organization (whrther formally or in-
formally constituted) compo~ed of citizens of the United States and 
which hns no signific:mt connection with a forrign power, its agents 
or agencies. No doubt then' arc casrs wherr it will be difficult 
to distinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities 
directed again;;t the GoYernment of the United State.:; where there 
is collaboration m Yar~·ing drgrers between domestic groups or 
organizations and agrnts or agPncics of foreign power". But this· 
is not such a case. 
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We begin the inquiry by noting that the President 
of the United States has the fundamental duty, under-
Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, "to preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Im-
plicit in that duty is the power to protect our Govern-
ment against those who would subvert or overthrow 
it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this 
duty, the President-through the Attorney General-
may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance 
to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those 
who plot unlawful acts against the Government.0 The 
use of such surveillance in internal security cases has 
been sanctioned more or less continuously by various 
Presidents and Attorneys General since July 1946.10 
u Enactmrnt of Titlr III rdlrct~ congrr~~imtnl l'P<'ognition of thl" 
importamr of ~uch ~nrvcillaucc' in combatting vnriom; tnw~ of crime. 
Fmnk S. Hogan, Di~trict Attomey for I\r\\' York County for 
over 25 years, described telephonic interception, pursuant to court 
order, as "the single most valuable weapon in law cnforcrment's fight 
against organized crime." Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, S 6476, May 10, 1971. 
Tho "Crime" Commission appointed by President Johnson noted 
that "the great majority of law enforcement officials believe that the 
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently 
on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained with-
out the aid of electronic ~urveillancc techniques. They maintain 
thrse techniques arc indispensable to develop adequate strategic 
intrlligence concerning organized crime, to set up specific ingestiga-
tions, to develop witnessrs, to corroborate thrir testimony, and to 
serve as substitutes for them-each a necessary step in the evidence-
gathering process in organized crime investigations and prosecutions." 
Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 
p. 201 (1967). 
10 In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President 
Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases \'itally affecting 
the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had au-
thorized Attorney General Jack~on to utilize wiretapping in matters 
"involving the defense of the nation," but it is questionable whether 
this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion. 
' . 
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Harbert Brownell, Attorney General under President 
Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both 
in internal and international security matters on the 
grounds that those acting against the Government 
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue. 
The success of their plans frequently rests upon 
piecing together shreds of information received from 
many sources and many nests. The participants 
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed 
in various strategic positions in government and 
industry throughout the country." 11 
Though the Government and respondents debate their 
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage 
against the Government exist in sufficent number to 
justify investigative powers with respect to them. 1 ~ [The 
covertness and complexity of potential unlawfuf' con-
duct against the Government and the necessary depend-
ency of many conspirators u on the tele hone make elec-
tronic surveillance an essentia mvest1gatory ms rument 
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under dif-
ferent administrations and Attorneys General, but except for the· 
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the 
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance 
has been used both against organized crime and in domestic security 
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. 
Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rcc. Vol. 
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971. 
11 Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell 
L. Q. 195,202 (1954). Sec also Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping,. 
63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954). 
12 The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing inci-
dents in the United States from January 1, 1971, to July 1, 1971, 
most of which involved Government related facilities. Respondents 
dispute these stati~tics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as 
well as bombings again~t nongovernmental facilities. The precise 
level of this activity, however, is not relevant to the disposition of 
this case. Govt. Brief, p. 18; Rcsp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govt. Reply 
Brief, p. 13. 
./_ fu Gn-<Qruv»UJ(,(...i 
tt'AfuPJ.. fk + 
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in certain circumstances. The marked a celeration in 
technological developments and sophisticat· n in their use 
have resulted in new techniques for he planning,_ [../..J.u, t !..4_ f 
commission and concealment of crimin activities.~ 1 • 1.1 . ..L 
wou d be · · · contrary to t public interest I~~ u.r·· . A. 
for Government to deny to itself th wful employment A--U~ u .. A:z-)b. ttY 
of those very techniques which are employed against the · 
Government and its law abiding citizens. 
' ( · 1a 1e mos as1c function I 
~ of any government is to provide for the security of Jf .J...,..~ b ,......_, 
~ the individual and of his property." Miranda Y. Arizona., ... ~...,_ 
cJ/ ) I ' 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). And 
~ IUA 4AJ.O I(.. 4. !Ud unless Government safeguards its own capacity to func-
tion and to preserve the security of its people, society 
itself could become so disordered that all rights and 
liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes 
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 
574 (1940): 
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, imply the existence of an organized society 
maintaining public order without which liberty itself 
would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." 
But a recognition of these elementary truths does not 
make the employment by Government of electronic 
SUI'Yeillance a welcome development-even when em-
ployed with restraint and under judicial supervision. 
There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and 
apprehension that this capability wi1l be used to intrude 
upon cherished privacy of la,Y-abiding citizens. 1 ~ We 
1 ~ Professor Alan 'Westin has written on the likrly rourse of 
future ronf!irt brtween thr v::llue of prin1r~· and the "nrw terh-
nology" of law rnforcrmrnt. l\1urh of the book details techniques 
of physical and electronir sun·cill:mce nnd such possible threats 
to personal privacy as p~yrhologirnl nnd pcr:;onality trsting and 
electronic information storngc nnd retrieval. Not all of the con-
temporary thrrat~ to privacy emanate directly from the pressures 
of crime control. A. We:;tin, Privacy n.nd Freedom (19G7). 
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look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy. 
Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech 
from unreasonable surveillance. Katz v. United Stales, • supra; Berger v. New York, supra; Silvennan Y. United 
Slates, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz 
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances 
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment 
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements 'with-
out any technical trespass under ... local property law.' " 
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recog-
nized that the broad and unsuspected governmental 
incursiolls into conversational privacy which electronic 
surveillance entails 1 '' necessitate the application of 
Fourth Amendment safeguards. 
National security cases. moreover. often reflect a con-
vergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not 
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the in-
vestigative duty of the executive may be .stronger in 
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to consti-
tutionally protected speech. "Historically the struggle 
for freedom of speech and press in England was bound 
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure 
power," Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724 
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of 
Government-however brnevolent and benign its mo-
tives--to view with suspicion those who most fervently 
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections be-
14 Though the total number of intt?rrepts authorized by state 
and federal judges J1Ur~uant to Tit. III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Stret?t~ Art wa~ 597 in 1970, each surveillance may 
involve interception of hundrrd~ of different eonverHations. The 
average intercept in 1970 i.Jn·oh·rd 44 people and 655 conversations, 
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, 
S 6.477, May 10, 1971. 
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come the more necessary when the targets of official sur-
veillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their 
political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute 
where the Government attempts to act under so vague 
a concept as the power to protect "domestic security." 
Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security 
interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that 
interest becomes apparent. Senator Hart addressed this 
dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511 (3): 
"As I read it-and this is my fear-we are say-
ing that the President, on his motion, could declare--
name your favorite poison-draft dodgers, Black 
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists 
to be a clear and present danger to the structure 
or existence of the Government." 1 5 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread 
of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor 
must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping 
deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Govern-
ment action in private conversation. For private dis-
sent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to 
our free society. 
III 
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its 
terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic 
values at stake in this case: the duty of Government 
to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger 
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy 
and free expression. If the legitimate need of Govern-
ment to safeguard domestic security requires the use of 
1 5 Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt . 11, p. 14750, May 23, 196R The sub-
sequent assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511 (3) 
implied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential 
power eased the Senator's misgivings. 
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electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs 
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be 
better protected by requiring a warrant before such 
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether 
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts 
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion 
and overthrow directed against it. 
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of 
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition of 
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more 
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have 
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was 
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether 
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).16 This view, however, over-
looks the second clause of the Amendment. The war-
rant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead 
language. Rather it has been 
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, 
and it has determined the result in scores and 
scores of cases in the courts all over this country_ 
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' 
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should 
be, an important working part of our machinery 
of government, operating as a matter of course to• 
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over-
10 This view has not been accep1ed. In Chime/ v. California, 395 
U. S. 752 (1969), the Court considered the Government's contention· 
that the search be judged on a general "reasonableness" standard 
without reference to the warrant clause. The Court concluded that 
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regard-
ing the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on 
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under · 
such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this 
area would approach the evapomtion point." Chimel, supm, at 
764-765. 
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zealous executive officers' who arc a part of any 
system of law enforcement." Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, supra, at 491. 
See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 57, 68 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. U11ited 
Sta.tes, 328 U. S. 582, 604 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that 
common law principles prohibited warrants that ordered 
the arrest of unnamed individuals whom the officer might 
conclude were guilty of seditious libel. "It is not fit," 
said Mansfield, "that the receiving or judging of the 
information ought to be left to the discretion of the 
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should 
give certain directions to the officer." Leach Y. Three 
of the King's Messengers, How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765). 
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart 
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where prac-
tical, a governmental search and seizure should repre-
sent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence 
of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate 
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify inva-
sion of a citizen's private premises or conversation. In-
herent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a 
"neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, supra, at 453; Katz v. United States, supra, 
at 356. The further requirement of "probable cause" 
instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not 
proceed. 
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly 
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may 
be conducted solely within the discretion of the execu-
tive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not con-
template the executive officers of Government as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi-
bility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prose-
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cute. Katz Y. United States, supra, at 359-360 
(DouGLAS. J., concurring). But those charged with this 
investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the 
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive 
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, 
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed 
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures 
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential 
invasions of privacy and protected speech." 
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Govern-
ment's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a 
reasonable one which readily would have gained prior 
judicial approval But this Court "has never sustained 
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably 
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and 
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intru-
sive means consistent with that encl." Katz, supra, 
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a 
prior judicial juclgment,' 8 not the risk that executive dis~ 
cretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role 
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that in-
dividual freedoms will best be preserved through a 
separation of powers and division of functions among 
the different branches and levels of Government. John 
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the 
Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943-944 
( 1963). The independent check upon executive discre-
tion is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by 
"extremely limited" post-surveillance judicial review.1l} 
17 La~~on, The Hi~tor~· a11d Developnwnt of tlw Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, 79-105 (1937). 
IR We u"e the \\'ord "judicial" to counote the traditionnl Fourth 
Amendment requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate. 
10 The Government argues that domestic security wiretaps should 
he upheld by comts in post surwillanr(' revirw "unlei<i< it appe~tr~ 
that the Attorney General's determination that the proposed sur-
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Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach the 
surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions. 
Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the 
time tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment 
rights. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 (1964). 
It is true that there have been some exceptions t(} 
the warrant requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McDon--
ald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But those excep-
tions are few in number and carefully delineated, Katz, 
supra, at 357; in general they serve the legitimate needs 
of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-
being and preserve evidence from destruction. Even 
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has re-
affirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 
and seizures through the warrant procedure," Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, at 20; Chimel v. California, supra, at 762. 
The Government argues that the special circumstances 
applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate 
a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is 
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would 
obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitu-
tional duty to protect domestic security. We are told 
further that these surveillances are directed primarily 
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with 
respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt 
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It 
is said that this type of surveillance should not be sub-
ject to traditional warrant requirements which were 
veilla.nce relates to a national security matter is arbitrary and capri-
cious, i. e., that it constitutes a clear abuse of the broad discretion 
that the Attorney General has to obtain all information that will be 
helpful to the President in protecting the Government . .. " against 
the various unlawful acts in § 2511 (3). Govt. Brief, p. 22 . 
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established to govern investigation of criminal activity, 
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp. 
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Reply Brief, pp. 2-3. 
The Government further insists that courts "as a. 
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor 
the techniques necessary to determine whether there 
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was nec-
essary to protect national security." These security 
problems, the Government contends, involve "a large 
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the com-
petence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4. 
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant re-
quirement, the Government believes that disclosure to 
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion of the 
information involved in domestic security surveillances 
"would create serious potential dangers to the national 
security and to the lives of informants and agents ... _ 
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gather-
ing; requmng prior judicial authorization would 
create a greater 'danger of leaks . . . , because in addi-
tion to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer 
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff 
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance."' 
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25. 
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemp-
tion from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf 
of the President and the national security in its domestic· 
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We 
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time 
of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this 
country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent 
periods of our history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic 
force to the Government's position. 
But we do not think a case has been made for the 
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards. 
The circumstances described do not justify complete .. 
' . 
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exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior 
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its pur-
pose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence 
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are 
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness 
of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad 
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the 
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee polit-
ical dissent. We recognize, as we have before, the con-
stitutional basis of the President's domestic security 
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner· 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case 
we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant 
procedure. 
We cannot accept the Government's argument that 
internal security matters are too subtle and complex 
for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the 
most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason 
to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or 
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic 
security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that do-
mestic security surveillance involves different considera-
tions from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the 
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law en-
forcement officers to convey its significance to a court, 
one may question whether there is probable cause for 
surveillance. 
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will frac-
ture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gather-
ing. The investigation of criminal activity has long 
involved imparting sensitive information to judicial of-. 
ficers who have respected the confidentialities involved. 
Judges may be counted upon to be especially conscious 
of security requirements in national security cases. Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
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already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary 
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage 
and treason. § 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may in-
volve domestic as well as foreign security threats. More-
over, a warrant application involves no public or 
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a 
magistrate or judge. Whatever security dangers cler-
ical and secretarial personnel may pose can be mini-
mized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the 
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the 
necessary clerical assistance. 
Thus, we conclude that the Government's concerns 
do not justify departure in this case from the customary 
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval 
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although 
some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney 
General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society 
to protect constitutional values. Nor do '"e think the 
Government's domestic surveillance powers will be im-
paired to any significant degree. A prior warrant estab-
lishes presumptive va.lidity of the surveillance and will 
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance 
judicial review. By no means of least importance will 
be the reassurance of the public generally that indis-
criminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens 
cannot occur. 
IV 
We emphasize. before concluding this opinion, the 
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this 
case involves only the domestic aspects of national se-
curity. We have not addressed, and express no opinion 
as to, the issues which may be involved with respect 
to activities of foreign powers or their agents.20 Nor 
~0 Sec n. 8, supra. For the virw that warrantlr~s surveillance, 
though impermissible in domestir security cases, rna~· be eon:::titn-
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does our decision rest on the language of § 2511 (3} 
or any other section of Title III of the Omnibus Crime· 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does 
not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the· 
President to meet domestic threats to the national 
security. 
Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of stand-
ards and procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily 
applicable to this case. We recognize that domestic secur-
ity surveillance may involve different policy and practical 
considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." 
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range 
and involves the interrelation of various sources and types 
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance 
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance 
operations against many types of crime specified in 
Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelli- · 
gence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity 
or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness 
for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the 
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than 
that directed against more conventional types of crime. 
Given these potential distinctions between Title III 
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic 
security, Congress may wish to consider protective 
standards for the latter which differ from those already 
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different 
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amend-
ment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legiti-
mate need of Government for intelligence information 
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant 
application may vary according to the governmental in-
- F. Supp. - (1971); and American Bar A~::;ociatiou Criminal ) 
Justice Project, Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance, Feb. 
1971, pp. 11, 120, 121. See also United States v. Clay, 430 F. 2cl 
165 (1970). 
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terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights. 
deserving protection. As the Court said in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967): 
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires. 
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable-
cause' is the standard by which a particular de-
cision to search is tested against the constitutional 
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining· 
whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and 
thus in determining whether there is probable cause-
to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for 
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these-
reasonable goals of law enforcement." 
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that 
the application and affidavit showing probable cause-
need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but 
should allege other circumstances more appropriate to-
domestic security cases; that the request for prior court 
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any 
member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District 
Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); 
and that the time and reporting requirements need not 
be so strict as those in § 2518. 
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to 
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate-
the present scope of our own opinion. We do not at-
tempt to detail the precise standards for domestic secur-
ity warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought 
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal 
surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do-
hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for 
the type of domestic security surveillance involved in 
this case and that such approval may be made in ac-
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v 
As the surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was 
unlawful, because conducted without prior judicial ap-
proval, the courts below correctly held that Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 168 (1969), is controlling and 
that it requires disclosure to the accused of his own im-
permissibly intercepted conversations. As stated· in 
Alderman, "the trial court can and should, where ap-
propriate, place a defendant and his counsel under en-
forceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the 
materials which they may be entitled to inspect." 394 
U.S. 185.21 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby 
Affirmed. 
21 We think it unnecessary at this time and on the facts of this 
case to coMider the arguments advanced by the Government for a 
re-examiMtion of the basis and scope of the Court's decision in 
Aldemw.n. 
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TO: Mr. J. Harvie Willdnson, m DATE: May 22, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-153 U.s. v. U.s. District Court 
Did you have an opportunity to look at the annual report by the 
Justice Department on electronic surveUlance, with the view to seeing 
whether- in light of Justice Douglas' use of statistics -we should 
amplify our note on this subject? 
L. F. P., Jr. 
c~ . .,. 
tr;~~ 
~ 9H;.'"" "lll.ltJ C\lallges Throughfl LE C c) py 
EL~AS£ RETURN /-}' t 2 -.. 
sr:/'tlR~O FILE 812 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES' 
No. 70-153 
United States, Petitioner, 
v. 
United States District Court 
for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, Southern 
Division, et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
[May -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinon of the· 
Court. 
The issue before us is an important one for the · 
people of our country and their Government. It in-
volves the delicate question of the President's power, 
acting through the Attorney General, to authorize elec-
tronic surveillance in internal security matters without 
prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more. 
than one-quarter of a century have authorized such sur-
veillance in varying degrees/ without guidance from the . 
Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This 
case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolu-
tion is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity 
both to the Government's right to protect itself from 
unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen's 
right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable 
Government intrusion. 
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, in which the United States charged three 
defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government prop-
erty in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371. One of the 
1 See n. 10, infra. 
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defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite 
bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency 
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved 
to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic 
surveillance information and to conduct a. hearing to 
determine whether this information "tainted" the evi-
dence on which the indictment was based or which the 
Government intended to offer at trial. In response, 
the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney Gen-
eral, acknowledging that its agents had overheard con-
versations in which Plamondon had participated. The 
affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved 
the wiretaps "to gather intelligence information deemed 
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domes-
tic organizations to attack and subvert the existing struc-
ture of the Government." ~ The affidavit, together with 
the logs of the surveillance, were filed in a sealed exhibit 
for in cam..em inspection by the District Court. 
~The Attornr~· Grnrr:1l's a.!Tid:l\"it rracls :1s follows: 
".JoHN N. MITCJIEJ.T. bring duly sworn clrposrs and says: 
"1. I am the Attornry Genrral of the United States. 
"2. This affidaYit i~ submittrcl in connection with the Govcrn-
ment.'s opposition to thr cliselosure to the clrfrndant Pbmondon of 
information concerning the O\'rrhenring of his rmwersations which 
occurred during 1 he <'our~r of electronic sun·rillnnres which the 
Govcrnmrnt conlPncl~ were lrg:d. 
"3. The defendant Pl:lmonc!on has participated in conversations 
which were ovcrhcnrd by Go,·prnment ngrnt~ who were monitoring 
wiretaps which werr being employed to gat h!'r intelligence infor-
mation deemed nerr~:-<ary to protect til<' n:1tion from :1ttrmpts of 
domestic organizations to att:wk and subvert the existing structure 
of the Government. The record~ of the Department of .Justice 
reflect the installation of these wiretaps had been expressly ap-
proved by the Attorney General. 
"4. Submitted with this aflidnYit is a scaled exhibit containing 
the records of the intercepted rom·er.•mtion~, a description of the 
premises that were the subjects of the smTrillnnccs, and copies of 
' . 
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On the basis of the Attorney General's affidavit and 
the scaled exhibit, the Government asserted that the 
surveillances were lawful, though conducted without 
prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the 
President's power (exercised through the Attorney Gen-
eral) to protect the national security. The District 
Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth 
Amendment, and ordered the Government to make full 
disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations. 
-F.Supp.-. 
The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus 
to set aside the District Court order, which was stayed 
pending final disposition of the case. After conclud-
ing that it had jurisdiction.~ that court held that the 
surveillances were unlawful and that the District Court 
had properly required disclosure of the overheard con-
versations, 444 F. 2d 651 (1971). We granted certiorari. 
the memoranda rdleding the Attorney Oenernl's express approval 
of the installation of the sur\'Cillances. 
"5. I certify that it would prejudire the national interest to 
disclose the particular fncts concerning these surveillances other than 
to the court in camera. Accordingly, the sealed exhibit referred 
to herein is being snbmittrd solrly for the court's in camera inspec-
tion and a ropy of the sralcd exhibit is not being furnished to the 
defendants. I would requr~t the court, at the conclusion of its 
hearing on this matter, to place the sen led exhibit in a scaled envelope 
and return it to the Department of Justice where it will be retained 
under seal so that it may be submitted to an~' nppellate court that 
may review this matter." 
3 Jurisdiction was rhnlkngrd beforr the Court of Appeals on the 
ground that the District, Court's order was interlocutory and not 
appealable undrr 28 U. S. C. § 1291. On this issue, the Court cor-
rectly held that it did ha,·e jurisdiction, relying upon the All Writs 
Statute, 28 U.S. C. § 1G51, nncl rases cited in its opinion, 444 F. 2d, 
nt 655-656. No attack was mnde in this Court a. · to the appropriate-
ne.ss of the writ of mandamus procedure. 
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I 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act, 18 U. S. C. §§ 2510-2520, authorizes the 
use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes care-
fully specified in 18 U. S. C. § 2516. Such surveillance 
is subject to prior court order. Section 2518 sets forth 
the detailed and particularized application necessary to 
obtain such an order as well as carefully circumscribed 
conditions for its use. The Act represents a compre-
hensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective 
control of crime while protecting the privacy of indi-
vidual thought and expression. Much of Title III was 
drawn to meet the constitutional requirements for elec-
tronic surveillance enunciated by this Court in Berger 
v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United 
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). 
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements. 
in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 2511 (3): 
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 ( 48 Stat. 
1103; 47 U. S. C. § 605) shall limit the constitu-
tional power of the President to take such measures 
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against 
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of 
a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation deemed essential to the security of 
the United States, or to protect national security 
information against foreign intelligence activities. 
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be 
.deemed to limit the constitutional power of the 
President to take such measures as he deems neces-
sary to protect the United States against the over-
throw of the Government by force or othe1· unlawful 
means, or against any other clear and present 
danger to the structure or existence of the Gov-
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ernment. The contents of any wire or oral com-
munication intercepted by authority of the 
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers 
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, 
or other proceeding only where such interception 
was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or 
disclosed except as is necessary to implement that 
power." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Government relies on § 2511 (3). It argues that 
"in excepting national security surveillances from the 
Act's warrant requirement Congress recognized the 
President's authority to conduct such surveillances with-
out prior judicial approval." Govt. Brief, pp. 7, 28 .. 
The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance 
of a constitutional authority in the President to con-
duct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as 
that involved in this case. 
We think the language of § 2511 (3), as well as the 
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpreta-
tion. The relevant language is that: 
"Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit 
the constitutional power of the President to take 
such measures as he deems necessary to protect ... " 
against the dangers specified. At most, this is an im-
plicit recognition that the President does have certain 
powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this, 
as the section refers- among other things-to protec-
tion "against actual or potential attack or other hostile 
acts of a foreign power." But so far as the use of the· 
President's electronic surveillance power is concerned, 
the language is essentially neutral. 
Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the· 
language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose .. 
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted 
to limit or disturb such power as the President may have 
under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left 
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presidential powers where it found them. This view 
is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Sec-
tion 2511 ( 1) broadly prohibits the usc of electronic 
surveillance "except as otherwise :specifically provided 
in this chapter." Subsection (2) thereof contains four 
specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions, 
the statutory language is as follows: 
"It shall not be unlawful ... to intercept" the 
particular type of communication described.• 
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to 
be contrasted with the language of the exceptions :set 
forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than stating 
that warrantless presidential uses of electronic surveil-
lance "shall not be unlawful" and thus employing the 
standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely 
disclaims any intention to "limit the constitutional power 
of the President." 
The express grant of authority to conduct surveil-
lances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attomey 
General to make application to a federal judge when 
surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses. 
These offenses are described with meticulous care and 
specificity. 
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure 
to be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection (1) 
thereof requires application to a judge of competent 
jurisdiction for a prior order of approval, and states 
in detail the information required in such application." 
4 These exceptions relate to certain activities of communication 
common carriers and the Frdrml Communications Commission, and 
to specified situations where a party to the communirntion has 
consented to the interception. 
5 18 U.S. C. §2518, subsection (1) reads as follows: 
"§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wire or oral communications 
"(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the· 
interception of a wire or oral cornrnnnic:1tion shall be made in writ-
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Subsection (3) prescribes the necessary clements of prob-
able cause which the judge must find before issuing 
an order authorizing an .interception. Subsection ( 4) 
sets forth the required contents of such an order. 
Subsection ( 5) sets strict time limits on an order. Pro-
ing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction 
and shall state thr applicant's authority to make such application. 
Each applichtion shall includr the following information: 
"(a) the idrntit~· of the im·e~tig:ati\'e or law enforcement officer 
makinl!: the application, and thr officer authorizing the application; 
"(b) a full and complete statrmrnt of the facts and circumstances 
rdied upon by the applirant, to ju~t ify his belief that an order 
should be is~ued, including (i) details ns to the particular offense 
that has been. is being, or is about to be commitlrd, (ii) a par-
ticular description of the nature and location of the facilities from 
which or the place where the communiration is to be intercepted, 
(iii) a particular description of the t~·pr of communications sought 
to be interccptrd, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, com-
mitting the offense :md whose communications nrc to be intercepted; 
"(c) a full and complrle stntrment as to whether or not other 
investigntivr prorrdnres have hren tried and failed or why they 
rrnsonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous; 
" (d) a stntement of the 11eriod of time for which tho interception 
is required to be maintained. If the nnture of the investigation is 
such that the author.ization for intercrption should not automatically 
terminate when the drscribcd type of communication has been first 
obtained, a particular description of fads establishin~ probable cause 
to belie\·e that 11dditional communications of the same type will 
occur thereafter; 
"(e) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all 
previous applications known to the individual nuthorizing and mak-
ing the application. made to any judge for authorization to intercept, 
or for approval of interceptions of, wire or oral communications 
involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in 
the application, a.nd the aetion taken by the judge on each such 
application; and 
"(f) where the application is for thr extension of an order, a 
statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from tho inter-
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vision is made in subsection (7) for "an emergency 
situation" found to exist by the Attorney General (or 
by the principal prosecuting attorney of a State) "with 
respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the na-
tional security interest." In such a situation, emergency 
surveillance may be conducted "if an application for 
an order approving the interception is made ... within 
48 hours." If such an order is not obtained, or the 
application therefor is denied, the interception is deemed 
to be a violation of the Act. 
In view of these and other interrelated provisions 
delineating permissible interceptions of particular crim-
inal activity upon carefully specified conditions, it 
would have been incongruous for Congress to have 
legislated with respect to the important and complex 
area of national security in a single brief and nebulous 
paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity 
of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care 
Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the 
Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that 
Congress only intended to make clear that the Act 
simply did not legislate with respect to national security 
surveillances. c 
The legislative history of § 2511 (3) supports this 
interpretation. Most relevant is the colloquy between 
Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate 
floor: 
"Mr. Holland .... The section [2511(3)] from 
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirma-
tively give any power. . . . We are not affirmatively 
6 The final sentence of § 2511 (3) states that the contents of an 
interception "by authority of the President in the exercise of the 
foregoing powers may be received in evidence ... only where such 
interception was reasonable. . . ." This sentence seems intended 
to assure that when the President conducts lawful surveillance--
pursuant to whatever power he may possess-the evidence is 
admissible. 
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conferring any power upon the President. We are 
simply saying that nothing herein shall limit such 
power as the President has under the Constitu-
tion. . . . We certainly do not grant him a thing. 
"There is nothing affirmative in this statement. 
"Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it un-
derstood that we are not trying to take anything-
away from him. 
"Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct. 
"Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention 
here to expand by this language a constitutional 
power. Clearly we could not do so. 
"Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we 
could not do so. 
"Mr. Hart .... However, we are agreed that 
this language should not be regarded as intending 
to grant any authority, including authority to put a 
bug on, that the President does not have now. 
"In addition, Mr. President, as I think our ex-
change makes clear, nothing in Section 2511 (3) 
even attempts to define the limits of the Presi-
dent's national security power under present law, 
which I have always found extremely vague. . .. 
Section 2511 ( 3) merely says that if the President 
has such a power, then its exercise is in no May 
affected by title III. (Emphasis supplied.) 7 
7 Cong. Rec. Vol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14751, May 23, 1968. Senator-
McClellan was the sponsor of the bill. The above exchange con-
stitutes the only time that § 2511 (3) was expressly debated on the-
Senate or House floor. The Report of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee is not so explicit as the exchange on the floor, but it appears 
to recognize that under § 2511 (3) the national security power of 
the President-whatever it may bo-"is not to be deemed dis-
turbed." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Scss., 94 (1968). See 
also The "National Security Wiretap": Presidential Prerogative or 
Judicial Responsibility where the author concludes that in § 2511 (3) 
"Congress took what amounted to a position of neutral noninter-
.. 
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One could hardly except a clearer expression of con-
gressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly in-
dicates that nothing in § 2511 (3) was intended to 
expa·nd or to contract or to define whatever presidential 
surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the na-
tional security. If we could accept the Government's 
charac~rization of § 2511 (3) as a congressionally pre-
scribed exception to the general requirement of a war-
rant, it would be necessary to consider the question of 
whether the surveillance in this case came within the 
exception and, if so, whether the statutory exception was 
itself constitutionally valid. But viewing § 2511 (3) as 
a congressional disclaimer and expression of neutrality, 
we hold that the statute is not the measure of the execu-
tive authority asserted in this case. Rather, we must 
look to the constitutional powers of the President. 
II 
It is important at the outset to emphasize the lim-
ited nature of the question before the Court. This case 
raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveil-
lance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Nor 
is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of 
obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes un-
related to the national Sf'curity interest. Katz v. Un·ited 
States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967); B erger v. New York, 388 
U. S. 41 ( 1967) . Further, the instant case requires 
no judgment on the scope of the President's surveillance 
power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, 
within or without this country. The Attorney General's 
affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were 
"deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts 
ference on the question of the ronRtitutionnlity of warrantless nntionai 
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of domest1'c organizations to attack and subvert the ex-
isting structure of Government" (emphasis supplied). 
There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or 
indirectly, of a foreign power.8 
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore 
a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by 
Katz, supra, p. 358, n. 23: 
"Whether safeguards other than prior authoriza-
tion by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment in a situation involving the national 
security .... " 
The determination of this question requires the essen-
tial Fourth Amendment inquiry into the "reasonable-
ness" of the search and seizure in question , and the way 
in which that "reasonableness" derives content and mean-
ing through reference to the warrant clause. Coolidge v. 
N ew Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 473-484 (1971). 
8 Section 2511 (3) refers to "the constitution:1l power of the 
President" in two types of situations: (i) where nece>:sary to pro-
tect against attark, other hostile arts or intelligencr :1ctivities of a 
" foreign power": or (ii) where necessa ry to protcrt against the 
overthrow of the Government or othrr clear nnd present danger 
to the stmcturc or existrncc of the Govrrnmrnt. Although both 
of the specified situations arc somctimrs rcfrrred to ns "national 
security" threats, the term "national srrurity" is used only in the 
first sentence of § 2511 (~) with respect to thr activities of foreign 
powers. This rnsc involves only the second srntrncc of§ 2511 (3), 
with the threat emana1ing-:wrording to the Attorney General's 
affidavit-from "domest ie organizntions." Although we attempt no 
precise definition , we usc the term "domestic organizfltion" in this 
opinion to mean a group or organizntion (whether formally or in-
formally constituted) composed of citizens of thr United States and 
which has no significnnt connection with a foreign power, its agents 
or agencies. No doubt there arc rases where it will be difficult 
1o didtinguish between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities 
directed against the Government of the United States where there 
is collaboration in \'::trying drgrees between domestic groups or 
organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But this· 
is not such a case. 
' . 
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We begin the inquiry by noting that the President 
of the United States has the fundamental duty, under 
Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, "to preserve, protect~ 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." Im-
plicit in that duty is the power to protect our Govern-· 
ment against those who would subvert or overthrow 
it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this 
duty, the President-through the Attorney General-
may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance 
to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those 
who plot unlawful acts against the Government.~ The 
use of such surveillance in internal security cases has 
been sanctioned more or less continuously by various 
Presidents and Attorneys General since July 1946.10 
9 Enactment of Title III reflects congressional recognition of the ( 
importance of such SUITeillnncr in combatting vnrious types of erime. 
Frank S. Hogan, Distriet Attorney for New York County for 
over 25 years, described telephonic interception, pursuant to court 
order, as "the sin11:le most valuable weapon in law enforcement's fight 
against organized crime." Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, S 6476, May 10, 1971. 
The "Crime" Commission appointed by President Johnson noted 
that "the gre..'lt majority of law enforcement officials believe that the 
evidence necessary to bring criminal sanctions to bear consistently 
on the higher echelons of organized crime will not be obtained with-
out the aid of electronic surveillance techniques. They maintain 
these techniques arc indispen~able to develop adequate strategic 
intelligence concerning organized crime, to set up specific ingestiga-
tions, to develop witne ·ses, to corroborate their testimony, and to 
serve as substitutes for them-each a necessary step in the evidence-
gathering process in organized crime investigations and prosecutions." 
Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 
p.201 (1967). 
10 In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised President 
Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in cases vitally affecting 
the domestic security." In May 1940 President Roosevelt had au-
thorized Attorney General Jackson to utilize wiretapping in matters 
"involving the defense of the nation," but it is questionable whether 
this language was meant to apply to solely domestic subversion. 
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Harbert Brownell, Attorney General under President 
Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both 
in internal and international security matters on the 
grounds that those acting against the Government 
"turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue .. 
The success of their plans frequently rests upon 
piecing together shreds of information received from 
many sources and many nests. The participants 
in the conspiracy are often dispersed and stationed 
in various strategic positions in government and 
industry throughout the country." 11 
Though the Government and respondents debate their 
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage· 
against the Government exist in sufficent number to 
justify investigative powers with respect to them.12 The 
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful con-
duct against the Government and the necessary depend-
ency of many conspirators upon the telephone make elec- { 
tronic surveillance an effective investigatory instrument 
The nature and extent of wiretapping apparently varied under dif-
ferent administrations and Attorneys General, but except for the· 
sharp curtailment under Attorney General Ramsey Clark in the 
latter years of the Johnson administration, electronic surveillance 
has been used both against organized crime and in domestic security 
cases at least since the 1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. 
Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18; Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. VoL 
117, S 6476-6477, May 10, 1971. 
11 Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Cornell 
L. Q. 195,202 (1954). See also Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping,. 
63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954). 
12 The Government asserts that there were 1,562 bombing inci-
dents in the United States from January 1, 1971, to July 1, 1971, 
most of which im·olvcd Government related facilities. Respondents 
dispute these statistics as incorporating many frivolous incidents as 
well as bombings against nongovernmental facilities. The precise 
level of this activity, however, is not relevant to the disposition of 
this case. Govt. Brief, p. 18; Rcsp. Brief, p. 26-29; Govt. Reply-
Brief, p. 13. 
0 • 
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in certain circumstances. The marked acceleration in 
technological developments and sophistication in their use 
have resulted in new techniques for the planning, 
commission and concealment of criminal activities. It I 
would be contrary to the public interest for Government 
to deny to itself the prudent and lawful employment 
of those very techniques which are employed against the 
Government and its law abiding citizens. 
It has been said that "the most basic function of / 
any government is to provide for the security of the 
individual and of his property." Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J., dissenting). And 
unless Government safeguards its own capacity to func-
tion and to preserve the security of its people, society 
itself could become so disordered that all rights and 
liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes 
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 
574 (1940): 
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, imply the existence of an organi11ed society 
maintaining public order ·without which liberty itself 
would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." 
But a recognition of these elementary truths does not 
make the employment by Government of electronic 
surveillance a welcome development-even when em-
ployed with restraint and under judicial supervision. 
There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and 
apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude 
upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens.13 We 
1 3 Professor Ahn West in ha s written on i he likely rourse of r 
future conflict between the ntluc of privnr~· nnd the "nrw tech-
nology" of law enforcement. Much of the book details techniques 
of physical and electronic sun·eillanre and such possible threats 
to personal privacy as ps~·chologiral and per~onality testing and 
electronic information storage and rctrim·al. Not all of the con-
temporary threats to pri,•ary eman:1te directly from the pressures 
of crime control. A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967). 
' . 
70-153-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 
look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy. 
Though physical entry of the hon1e is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech 
from unreasonable surveillance. Katz v. United States, 
supra; Berger v. New York, supra; Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). Our decision in Katz 
refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into instances 
of actual physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment 
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
extends as well to the recording of oral statements 'with-
out any technical trespass under ... local property law.' " 
Katz, supra, at 353. That decision implicitly recog-
nized that the broad and unsuspected governmental 
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic 
surveillance entails 14 necessitate the application of 
Fourth Amendment safeguards. 
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a con-
vergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not 
present in cases of "ordinary" crime. Though the in-
vestigative duty of the executive may be stronger in 
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to consti-
tutionally protected speech. "Historica1ly the struggle 
for freedom of speech and press in England was bound 
up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure 
power," Marcus v. Search JVarrant, 367 U. S. 717, 724 
(1961). History abundantly documents the tendency of 
Government-however benevolent and benign its mo-
tives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently 
dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment protections be-
14 Though the total number of intercepts authorized by state 
and federal judgeR pursuant to Tit. III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act was 597 in 1970, each surveillance may 
involve interception of hundreds of different conversations. The 
:werage intercept in 1970 involved 44 people and 655 conversations, 
of which 295 or 45% were incriminating. Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, 
S 6477, May 10, 1971. 
' . 
70-153-0PINION 
16 UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
come the more necessary when the targets of official sur-
veillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their 
political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute 
where the Government attempts to act under so vague 
a concept as the power to protect "domestic security." 
Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security 
interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that 
interest becomes apparent. Senator Hart addressed this 
dilemma in the floor debate on ~ 2511 (3): 
"As I read it-and this is my fear-we are say-
ing that the President, on his motion, could declare-
name your favorite poison-draft dodgers, Black 
Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists 
to be a clear and present danger to the structure 
or existence of the Government." J r> 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread 
of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor 
must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping 
deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Govern-
ment action in private conversation. For private dis-
sent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to 
our free society. 
III 
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its 
terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic 
values at stake in this case: the duty of Government 
to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger 
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy 
and free expression. If the legitimate need of Govern-
ment to safeguard domestic security requires the use of 
1 ~ Cong. Rrc . Vol. 114, pt . 11, p. 14750, l\fa~· 2:3, 196S. ThC> ~uh­
sequent assurances, quoted in part I of the opinion, that § 2511 (3) 
implied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential 
power cased the Senator's misgivings. 
0 ' 
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electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs 
of citizens for privacy and free expression may not be· 
better protected by requiring a warrant before such 
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether 
a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts 
of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion 
and overthrow directed against it. 
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of 
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the definition of 
"reasonableness" turns, at least in part, on the more 
specific commands of the warrant clause. Some have 
argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was 
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether 
the search was reasonable," United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950). 1G This view, however, over-
looks the second clause of the Amendment. The war-
rant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead 
language. Rather it has been 
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, 
and it has determined the result in scores and 
scores of cases in the courts all over this country. 
It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed,. 
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should 
be, an important working part of our machinery 
of government, operating as a matter of course to· 
check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over-
w Tbi~ YiC\1' has not been accepted . In Chimel v. California, 395 
U. S. 752 (1969), the Court considered the Government's contention· 
that the search be judged on a general "reasonableness" standard 
without reference to the warrant clause. The Court concluded that 
argument was "founded on little more than a subjective view regard-
ing the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on 
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under 
such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this 
area would approach the evaporation point." Chirnel, supra, at 
764-765. 
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zealous executive officers' who are a part of any 
system of law enforcement." Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, supra, at 491. 
See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 57, 68 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United 
States, 328 U. S. 582, 604 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that 
common law principles prohibited warrants that ordered 
the arrest of unnamed individuals whom the officer might 
conclude were guilty of seditious libel. "It is not fit," 
said Mansfield, "that the receiving or judging of the 
information ought to be left to the discretion of the 
officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should 
give certain directions to the officer." Leach v. Three 
of the King's Messengers, How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765). 
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart 
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where prac-
tical, a governmental search and seizure should repre-
sent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence 
of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate 
that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify inva-
sion of a citizen's private prcmi~Ses or conversation. In-
herent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a 
"neutral and detached magistrate." Coolidge Y. New 
Hampshire, supra, at 453; Katz Y. United States, supra, 
at 356. The further requirement of "probable cause'' 
instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not 
proceed. 
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly 
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may 
be conducted solely within the discretion of the execu-
tive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not con-
template the executive officers of Government as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi-
bility is to enforce the la,vs, to investigate and to prose-
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cute. Katz v. United States, supra, at 359-360 
(DouGLAS, J., concurring). But those charged with this 
investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the 
sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive 
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, 
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed 
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures 
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential 
invasions of privacy and protected speech." 
It may ·well be that, in the instant case, the Govern-
ment's surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was a 
reasonable one which readily would have gained prior 
judicial approval. But this Court "has never sustained 
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably 
expected to find evidence of a particula.r crime and 
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intru-
sive means consistent with that end." Katz, supra, 
at 356-357. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a 
prior .i udicial j udgment,18 not the risk that executive dis-
cretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role 
accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that in-
dividual freedoms will best be preserved through a 
separation of powers and division of functions among 
the different branches and levels of Government. John 
M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the 
Judicial Function in Balance, 40 A. B. A. J. 943-944 
(1963). The independent check upon executive discre-
tion is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by 
"extremely limited" post-surveillance .i udicial review. Jn-
17 Lasson, Thr Hi~tor.'· and Dcvrlopmrnt of thr Fomth Amrnd-
ment to the United States Constitution, 79-105 (1937). 
1s We use th<' word "judicial" to ronnot-<' tlw traditional Fomth I 
Amendment rrquirrmrnt of a nrntral and dctarh<'Cl magi~trate. 
19 The Government nr~~:ues that domestic security wiretaps should 
be upheld b~r courts in post surn~illaner re,·icw "un]p;;:s it appear" 
that the Attorney General's determination that the proposed sur- -
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Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach the 
surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions. 
Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the 
time tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment 
rights. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96 ( 1964). 
It is true that there have been some exceptions to 
the warrant requirement. Chimel v. CalijoTnia, 395 U.S. 
752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948); CarToll v. 
United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But those excep-
tions are few in number and carefully delineated, Katz, 
supra, at 357; in general they serve the legitimate needs 
of law enforcement officers to protect their own well-
being and preserve evidence from destruction. Even 
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has re-
affirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever 
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 
and seizures through the warrant procedure," Terry v. 
Ohio, supra, at 20; Chimel v. California, supra, at 762. 
The Government argues that the special circumstances 
applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate 
a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is 
urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would 
obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitu-
tional duty to protect domestic security. We are told 
further that these surveillances are directed primarily 
to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with 
respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt 
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It 
is said that this type of surveillance should not be sub-
ject to traditional warrant requirements which were 
vcillance relates to a national security matter is arbitrary and capri-
cious, i. e., that it constitutes a clear abuse of the broad discretion 
that the Attorney General has to obtain all information that will be 
hPlpful to the President in protcctiug thP GovcrmnPnt ... " aga in~t 
the various unlawful acts in § 2511 (3). Govt. Brief, p. 22. 
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established to govern investigation of criminal activity, 
not on-going intelligence gathering. Govt. Brief, pp. 
15-16, 23-24. Govt. Reply Brief, pp. 2-3. 
The Government further insists that courts "as a 
practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor 
the techniques necessary to determine whether there 
was probable cause to believe that surveillance was nec-
essary to protect national security." These security 
problems, the Government contends, involve "a large 
number of complex and subtle factors" beyond the com-
petence of courts to evaluate. Govt. Reply Brief, p. 4. 
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant re-
quirement, the Government believes that disclosure to 
a magistrate of all or even a significant portion of the 
information involved in domestic security surveillances· 
"would create serious potential dangers to the national 
security and to the lives of informants and agents ...• 
Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gather-
mg; requiring prior judicial authorization would 
create a greater 'danger of leaks ... , because in addi-
tion to the judge, you have the clerk, the stenographer 
and some other official like a law assistant or bailiff 
who may be apprised of the nature' of the surveillance."· 
Govt. Brief, pp. 24-25. 
These contentions in behalf of a complete exemp-
tion from the warrant requirement, when urged on behalf 
of the President and the national security in its domestic 
implications, merit the most careful consideration. We 
certainly do not reject them lightly, especially at a time 
of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this 
country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent 
periods of our history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic· 
force to the Government's position. 
But we do not think a case has been made for the 
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards. 
The circumstances described do not justify complete" 
70-153-0PINION 
22 UNITED STATE~ v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior 
judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its pur-
pose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence 
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are 
especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness 
of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad 
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the 
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee polit-
ical dissent. \Ve recognize, as we have before, the con-
stitutional basis of the President's domestic security 
role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this case 
we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant 
procedure. 
We cannot accept the Government's argument that 
internal security matters are too subtle and complex 
for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the 
most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason 
to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or 
uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic 
security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that do-
mestic security surveillance involves different considera-
tions from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the 
threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law en-
forcement officers to convey its significance to a court, 
one may question whether there is probable cause for 
surveillance. 
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval ·will frac-
ture the secrecy essential to official intelligence gather-
ing. The investigation of criminal activity has long 
involved imparting sensitive information to judicial of-
ficers who have respected the confidentialities involved. 
Judges may be counted upon to be especially conscious 
of security requirements in national security cases. Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
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already has imposed this responsibility on the judiciary 
in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage 
and treason, § 2516 (l)(a)(c), each of which may in-
volve domestic as well as foreign security threats. More-
over, a warrant application involves no public or 
adversary proceedings: it is an ex parte request before a 
magistrate or judge. Whatever security dangers cler-
ical and secretarial personnel may pose can be mini-
mized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the 
point of allowing the Government itself to provide the 
necessary clerical assistance. 
Thus, we conclude that the Government's concerns 
do not justify departure in this case from the customary 
Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval 
prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. Although 
some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney 
General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society 
to protect constitutional values. Nor do v.·e think the 
Govemment's domestic surveillance powers will be im-
paired to any significant degree. A prior warrant estab-
lishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will 
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance 
judicial review. By no means of least importance will 
be the reassurance of the public generally that indis-
criminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens 
cannot occur. 
IV 
We emphasi?:e, before concluding this opinion. the 
scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this 
case involves only the domestic aspects of national se-
curity. We have not addressed, and express no opinion I 
as to. the issues which may be involved with respect 
to activities of foreign powers or their agents.~0 Nor 
~0 Sec n. R, supra. For thr Yirw thnt warran1lr~~ survrillnnrr, I 
1 hough impermissible in domr~tic security rn~cs. ma~' be ronstit u-
tioual whcro foreign powrr:; are involved, sec United States v. Smith, 
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does our decision rest on the language of § 2511 (3) 
or any other section of Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does 
not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the 
President to meet domestic threats to the national 
security. 
Moreover, ;ve do not hold that the same type of stand-
ards and procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily 
applicable to this case. Yr e recognize that domestic secur-
ity surveillance may involve different policy and practical 
considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary crime." 
The gathering of security intelligence is often long range 
and involves the interrelation of various sources and types 
of information. The exact targets of such surveillance 
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance 
operations against many types of crime specified in 
Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelli-
gence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity 
or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness 
for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the 
focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than 
that directed against more conventional types of crime. 
Given these potential distinctions between Title III 
criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic 
security, Congress may wish to consider protective 
standards for the latter which differ from those already 
prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different 
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amend-
ment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legiti-
mate need of Government for intelligence information 
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant. 
application may vary according to the governmental in-
- F. Supp. - (1971) ; and American Bar Association Criminal { 
Justice Project, Standard::; Relating to Electronic Surn~illancr , Frb. 
1971, pp. 11, 120, 121. See also United States v. Clay, 430 F . 2d 
1G5 (1970) . 
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terest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights. 
deserving protection. As the Court said in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 534-535 (1967): 
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires 
that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable 
cause' is the standard by which a particular de-
cision to search is tested against the constitutional 
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining· 
whether a particular inspection is reasonable--and 
thus in determining whether there is probable cause 
to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for 
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these 
reasonable goals of law enforcement." 
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that 
the application and affidavit showing probable cause· 
need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but 
should allege other circumstances more appropriate to 
domestic security cases; that the request for prior court 
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any 
member of a specially designated court (e. g., the District 
Court or Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); 
and that the time and reporting requirements need not 
be so strict as those in § 2518. 
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to 
guide the congressional judgment but rather to delineate· 
the present scope of our own opinion. We do not at-
tempt to detail the precise standards for domestic secur-
ity warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought 
to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal 
surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do 
hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for-
the type of domestic security surveillance involved in 
this case and that such approval may be made in ac-
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v 
As the surveillance of Plamondon's conversations was 
unlawful, because conducted without prior judicial ap-
proval, the courts below correctly held that Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U. S. 168 (1969), is controlling and 
that it requires disclosure to the accused of his own im-
permissibly intercepted conversations. As stated in 
Alderman, "the trial court can and should, where ap-
propriate, place a defendant and his counsel under en-
forceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the 
materials which they may be entitled to inspect." 394 
U.S. 185.21 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby 
Affirmed. 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the considera-/ 
tion or decision of this case. 
21 We think it uunercssary al this time and on the facts of this 
rase to consider the arguments advanrcd by the GoYernment for a 
re-examination of the basis and srope of the Court's decision in 
Alderman. 
' . . ·. 
.S1t.J1Tt:tm <!Jonri of t!rt ~b ~httts 
~~ttTJ:t:r of ~ttishttts 
'Jfaslttttgton. ~. <!J. 2!1'.;7~~ 
May 25, 1972 
Dear Mr. Justice Powell: 
Re: No. 70-153, United States v. U. S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al. 
Attached is a draft syllabus for your opinion in the above 
case which I shall appreciate your returning to me~ together 
with any suggestions that you care to make , If the line- up 
of the Court is available, please send it to me; otherwise, 
please send the line-up to the Print Shop when it becomes 
available, and send me a copy. 
This draft of the syllabu~ is based on the opinion draft 
number given in the upper right-hand corner , Please send 
me two copies of any subsequent draft of ·your opinion neces-
sitating changes in the syllabus so that app.ropriate revisions 
can be made and resubmitted to you before the syllabus and 
, opinion are issued, 
When I receive the syllabus back from you, I shall have 
t he Print Shop set it in type and shall then send you a proof, copy, 
Attachment 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
~lly~-~ 
Henry Putzel, jr , 
Reporter of Decisions 
'·' 
May 26, 1972 
Re: No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.s. District Court 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
I retum herewith your draft syllabus in the above case. 
I have suggested a few changes in subparagraphs 2(b) and 
2(c). 
You have a most remarkable capacity to summarize a decision 
accurately and briefly. I admire greatly the way you perform your 
duties. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Henry Putzel, jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju:prtmt ~curt cf tqt ~tb ,jtattg 
Jraglrhtgtcn. ~. ~· 20gtJ!.~ 
May 26, 1972 
PERSONAL 
No. 70-153 -- United States v. United States 
District Court, E. D. Michigan 
Dear Lewis: 
I have reviewed the May 22 draft in the 
above and for my part I still find too much of 
the language I cannot join. 
Will you therefore show me as joining 
only in the result. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m DATE: May 31, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Wiretap Cases 
In view of the Chief's note of May 26, saying he would join 
"only in the result", perhaps we should circulate another draft adding 
that at end as the only change. I believe that is the practice here. 
still no word from Mr. Justice Blaekmun. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
~.ttttt arMtrl 4tf tlr~ J:~b .ihdts 
-as£rittgbm. ~. ar. 2ll~J!~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 12, 1972 
Re: No. 70-153- U.S. v. U.S. DistrictCourtfor 
the Eastern District of Michigan 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
j(l. tJ. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
l 
~u.p:remt Qlamt of tltt 'Jlttriitb ~httts · 
'J)IJa:slyingtctt. !B. <!f. 2!l&i~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS June 15, 1972 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
Would you please announce my concurrence 
in the No. 70-153 - U. s. v. District Court, etc. 
case? 
W. 0. D. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
2cc 6/18/72 lfp/ss 
U. S. v. U. S. District Court 
This case involves the President's power, acting ~hrough 
the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance · a 
domestic security cas(without prior judicial approval. 
Successive Presidents /tor more than a quarter of a century 
have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees/- without 
guidance from the Congress/or a definitive decision of this Court. 
The issue is here for the first time. a:R:ii is iW!'8J!Ii81Rt "8eth 
conspiracy to destroy by bombing /a CIA offic~ in Michigan. The 
• ,> M(, G. 
government, ~A8 ipD8888t' ~" ~MMlliie &88•aaity wiretap 
A 
operation, overheard conversations in which one of the defendants 
participated. The purpose of the tap was to obtain iMellisonce 
information L ith respect to ~-i attempts of ~omestic yw ,. ~ 
organization~/to attack and subvert the government. 
The case does ~t involvej and we did not consider,) the 
authority of the government in national security casefhere 
foreign powers/ or their agents are concerned. 
We concludef, first that Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Act of 196;/does ~t apply to this type of surveillance. 
a~.~. ... ·,_.,-'1 I ,_,(-'~ .. 
....,._c=<c•-~·*f.( ~ ~ ~ 
2. 
Accordingly, it was necessary for the Court/to ia'iiiwiiliS 
~- .; .,.,.. -14. ~ ~ 
Uti l'{ttestion prOfii'iilated in tiilPIRS 8f the inherent power of the 
4 
Executive Department. 
The government clearly has a duty/to safeguard domestic 
I 
securityf/ Witd 7he Fourth Amendmeny equally clearl~protects 
citizens against unreasonable electronic surveillance. In balancing -
these basic values, ~e conclude that prior judicial approval is - . -
' I :eli necessar~ before employment of electronic surveillanc/ in 
domestic security cases. 
We think this can be accomplished der appropriate 
safeguards hich will enable the government to discharge its 
important dutf and at the same time protect the Fourth Amend-
71-J-·~-·~ ment rights of our citizens. /" C. _...__ :, ~ J. c:.J d~:t , ~ ~ "' . 
The Chief Justice concurs in the result. Mr. Justice 
Douglas has filed a separate concurring opinion. Mr. Justice 
White, in a separate opinion, concurs in the judgment. Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist did not participate~ ~~ 
-
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use of electronic surveillance for classes of crim
es care-






is subject to prior court order. 
S
ection 2518 sets forth 
th
e detailed and particularized application necessary to 
obtain such an order as w






















protecting the privacy of 
indi-































e elaborate surveillance requirem
ents 
in T
itle III, there is th
e follow


























resident to take such m
easures 
as he deem
s necessary to protect the 1\' ation against 




























































resident to take such m
easures as he deem
s neces-
sary to protect the U
nited States against the over-
throw
 of the G
overnm
ent b






























































































as reasonable, and shall n
o
t be otherw
ise used or 





















































e section thus is view
ed as a recognition or affirm
ance 
of a 







estic security surveillance such as 
th
at involved in this case. 
W
e think the language of 
§ 2511 (3), as w
ell as th
e 
legislative history of th
e statu




e relevant language is th
at: 
"N












easures as he deem
s necessary to protect ... " 
against th
e dangers specified. 
A
t m






























tion "against actual or potential attack or other hostile 









































ct shall not be interpreted 
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it or disturb such pow




















































































thereof contains four 
specific exceptions. 
In
 each of th





























e language of subsection 






e language of th
e exceptions set 
forth in th
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rocedure for interception of w
ire or oral com
m
unications 
" ( 1) 
E
ach application for an order authorizing or approving the 
interception of a w
ire or oral com
m





















































































and shall state the applicant's authority to m
ake such application. 
E








aking the application, and the officer authorizing the application; 
"(b
) 
a full and com
plete statem











should be issued, 
including 
(i) 













ticular description of the nature and location of the facilities from
 
w




to be intercepted, 
(iii) 
a particular description of the type of com
m
unications sought 
to be intercepted, 
(iv) 





itting the offense and w
hose com
m





















reasonably appear to 




ent of the period of tim
e for w
hich the interception 
is 
required to be m
aintained. 
If the nature of the investigation is 
such th




hen the described type of com
m
unication has been first 



























n to the individual authorizing and m
ak-
ing the application, m














involving any of the sam
e persons, facilities 
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expand or to contract or to define w
hatever presidential 
surveillance pow












§ 2511 (3) 
as a 
congressionally pre-
scribed exception to th
e general requirem




e necessary to consider the question of 
w
hether th
















§ 2511 (3) as 
a congressional disclaim















































constitutional challenge to electronic surveil-
lance as specifically authorized by T
















or doubt as to
 
th





e surveillance of crim
es un-
related to th

































ith respect to th






















ference on the question of the constitutionality of w
arrantless national 
security w












































estic organizations to attack
 and subvert th
e ex-








































































































at "reasonableness" derives content and m
ean-
























o types of situations: 
(i) 
w
here necessary to pro-
















































security" threats, the term
 "national security" is 
used 
only in the 
first sentence of § 2511 (3) 
w





























estic organization" in this 
opinion to m











hich has no significant connection w
ith a foreign pow


















estic" and "foreign" unlaw
ful activities 
directed against the G
overnm


















































































§ 1, of th
e C
onstitution, "to preserve, p
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tect, 
and defend the C
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it necessary to em




















































itle III reflects 
cong
ressional recogn
ition of the 
im
portance of such surveillance in com




































ol. 117, S 6476, M


























inal sanctions to bear consistently 
on the higher echelons of organized crim
e w






















intelligence concerning organized crim







ony, and to 
serve as substitutes for th
em
-each
 a necessary step in the evidence-
g atherin
g p
rocess in organized crim










































an of the necessity
 of using w













eneral Jacks0n to utilize w
iretapping in m
atters 
"involving the defense of the nation," b
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ent and respondents debate their 
seriousness and m
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 conspirators upon th
e telephone m
ake elec-
tronic surveillance an effective investigatory instrum
ent 
T
he nature and extent of w







































has been used both against organized crim
e and in dom
estic security 



























117, S 6476-6477, M









































dents in the U
nited S
tates from
 January 1, 1971







t related facilities. 
R
espondents 
dispute these statistics as incorporating m













level of this activity, how





























































































































e security of th
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ent safeguards its ow
n capacity to func-












































aintaining public order w
ithout w
hich liberty itself 
w
ould be lost in th
e excesses of unrestrained abuses.'' 
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ith suspicion those w
ho m
ost fervently 






















and federal judges pursuant to T






ontrol and Safe S
treets A
ct w








































































e targets of official sur-
veillance m











ts to act under so vague 
a concept as th
e pow


























e floor debate on § 2511 (3
): 
"A
s I read it-a
n
d




























lan, or civil rights activists 
to be a 
clear and present danger to th
e structure 








e price of law
ful public dissent m
u
st not be a dread 




















sent, no less th
an
 open public discourse, is essential to 











































estic security, and the potential danger 
posed b
y
 unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy 
and free expression. 
If the legitim
ate need of G
overn-
m
ent to safeguard dom






ol. 114, pt. 11, p. 14750, M
ay 23, 1968. 
T
he sub-
sequent assurances, quoted in p
art I of the opinion, th
at § 2511 (3) 
im
plied no statutory grant, contraction, or definition of presidential 
pow







































e question is w
hether the needs 
of citizens for 
privacy and free expression m











surveillance is undertaken. 
W
e m





ould unduly frustrate the efforts 
of G
overnm
ent to protect itself from
 acts of subversion 
and overthrow

















"unreasonable searches and seizures," 
th
e definition of 
"reasonableness" 
turns, 



























































































er it has been 
"a valued p
art of our constitutional law












scores of cases in the courts all over this country. 






s of police efficiency. 












ent, operating as a m






















. S. 752 
(1969), the C








general "reasonableness" standard 
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as "founded on little m
ore than a subjective view
 regard-




























































































nited States v. R
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itz, 339 U
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e collected evidence is sufficient to justify inva-
sion of a citizen's p
riv
ate prem






e concept of a w
arran


















pshire, supra, at 453; K
a
tz v. U





































be conducted solely w
ithin th
























e executive officers of G
overnm


































































S, J., concurring). 
B
u












sole judges of w
hen to
 utilize constitutionally sensitive 
m

























 overlook potential 

































as never sustained 
a 
search upon th
e sole ground th
























































 be reasonably exercised. 
T
h
is judicial role 
accords w
ith 





















e different branches an
d
























































































e use the w
ord 
"judicial" to 




















be upheld by courts in 
post surveillance review






































































































nited States, 335 
U













ber and carefully delineated
, K
atz, 




































practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 






hio, supra, at 20; C
him
el v. C






at the special circum
stances 
applicable to dom
estic security surveillances necessitate 
a 
















 to protect dom
estic security. 
W












































veillance relates to a national security m
atter is arbitrary and capri-
cious, i. e., th








helpful to the P
resident in protecting the G
overnm
ent .
.. " against 
the various unlaw
ful acts in § 2511 (3). 
G
ovt. B








































































































plex and subtle factors" beyond th
e com
-






















agistrate of all or even a significant portion of th
e 
inform
ation involved in dom
estic security surveillances 
"w
ould create serious potential dangers to th
e national 
security and to th
e lives of inform
ants and agents .... 
S
ecrecy is th








create a greater 'danger of leaks .
.
.
 , because in addi-
tion to th















ay be apprised of th





















hen urged on behalf 
of th
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 in the less turbulent 












































































































estic security concept, th
e necessarily broad 
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and th
e 
tem
ptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee polit-
ical dissent. 
W
e recognize, as w







































 this case 
w
e hold th























for judicial evaluation. 
C




ost difficult issues of our society. 
T

















ertainly courts can recognize th
at do-
m









reat is too subtle or com
plex for our senior law
 en-
forcem










believe prior judicial approval w
ill frac-














ation to judicial of-
ficers w
ho have respected th
e confidentialities involved. 
Judges m
ay be counted upon to be especially conscious 
of security requirem
ents in national security cases. 
T
itle 


































































































ent itself to provide th
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eneral, this inconvenience is justified in a free society 
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case involves only th
e dom
estic aspects of national se-
curity. 
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ers are involved, see U













































§ 2511 (3) 
or any other section of T














































e type of stand-
ards and procedures prescribed b
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 T
itle III are necessarily 







ay involve different policy and practical 
considerations from
 th




e gathering of security intelligence is often long range 
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1971, pp. 11, 120, 121. 
See also 
U
nited States v. 
C
lay, 430 F. 2d 
165 
(1970). 




































terest to be enforced 
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. S. 523, 534--535 
(1967): 
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cision to search is tested against th
e constitutional 
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hether there is probable cause 
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estic security cases; th
at th
e request for prior court 




















e and reporting requirem
ents need not 
be so strict as those in § 2518. 
T
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er to delineate 
th
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security surveillance involved in
 
this case and th



















































ful, because conducted w









nited States, 394 U
.S
. 168 (1969), is controlling and 
th
at it requires disclosure to th















e trial court can and should, 
w
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e think it unnecessary at this tim
e and on the facts of this 
case to consider th
e argum
ents advanced by the G
overnm
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ords in support of it. 
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e clandestine nature of electronic eaves-
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ever, are ineffective against 
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rantless devices accounted for 
an average of 78 to 209 
days of listening per device, as com
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country are being m
onitored on secret devices w
hich no 



































in his letter a chart com
paring court-ordered and departm
ent-ordered 
w
iretapping and bugging b
y
 federal agencies. 
T
his chart is repro-
duced in the A
ppendix to this opinion. 
F
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tap
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this tactic an "outrage." 
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e recurring desire of reigning 
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critics lies at th





















































































 libellants of th
e sovereign. 
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brought a successful dam
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eless w
arrant, in order to
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panish Inquisition .... " 
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nited States, 116 U
. S. 616, 626, 
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 as recently as Stanford v. T
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e validity of general search w
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eorge II and B
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chants petitioned the S
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e a leader in the m
ovem
ent for independence. 
"O
tis com
pletely electrified the large audience in the court room
 
w





























itted to the bar, w
as a spectator, and m
any years later described the 
scene in these oftquoted w
ords: 'I do







tis's oration against the W
rits of A
ssistance breathed into 









ded audience appeared to m
e to go aw
































ely in 1776, he 
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hey also reveal F
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endeavors 'to recruit inform
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as singled out for surveillance 
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ployees and other sim
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r accounts of the im
personation of journalists by police, 
F
B
I agents and soldiers in order to gain th

































r the revelation 
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further serve to get the point across 
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ind it, w
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ay
 appear unrealistic 
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th
e authors of our fundam
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If tim
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an
 
urban and industrial 
w
orld, th
e changes have m
ade th
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 th
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ent charging 
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other things, any logs and records of electronic surveil-
lance directed at them





















electronic surveillance disclosed had tainted th
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w
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onitored conversations and directed th
at a hearing be 
held to determ
ine the existence of tain
t either in th
e in-
dictm
ent or in th





ent's petition for m
andam
















prejudice the national interest to disclose 




ccordingly, the sealed exhibit referred to herein 
is being subm
itted solely for the court's in cam
era inspection and a 




request the court, at the conclusion of its hearing on this 
m
atter, to place the sealed exhibit in a sealed envelope and return 
it to the D
epartm
ent of Justice w
here it w











































































electronic surveillance of dom
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e records of overheard con-
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utory ground urged by respondent K
eith
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ct of 1968, 82 S
tat. 212, 18 U
.S
. C
. §§ 2510-2520, 
forbids under pain of crim
inal penalties and civil actions 
for dam
ages any w
iretapping or eavesdropping not under-
taken in accordance w















ater sections provide detailed 
procedures for judicial authorization of official intercep-
tions of oral com
unications; w




e interception is n
o
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s necessary to protect th
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ation against actual 
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er, to obtain foreign intelligence inform
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resident to 
take such m
easures as he deem

























 other clear and present danger to th
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 authority of the P
resident in th




ay be received in evidence in any 
trial hearing, or other proceeding only w
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this case is over, w
hatever th
e legality of th
e tap. 
Would you draft a very brief letter to counsel along the 
following lines: 
~· 
In light of the holding of the Court in No. 70-153, that the 
electronic surveillance was impermissible, the motion for review 
of the intercepted conversations is now moot. 
June 20, 1972 
;/' ,(!. 3 
I " - ./ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 71-239 F~rguson v. United states 
This case involves the same issues as those in United States 
v. United States District Court, No. 70-153 and has been held pending 
disposition in that case. Judge Ferguson has noted that the case 
involved "a wholly domestic situation. " The CA 9 had vacated sub-
mission of the case pending decision in United States v. United states 
District Court. Accordingly, I recommend that we remand the case 
to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of our decision 
in No. 70-153. 




August 9, 1972 
No. 70-153 U.S. v. U.S. Dist.Court 
Dear Mr. Putze 1: 
Thank you for your suggestions in U.S. v. U.S. 
District Court. The only ones on which I wish to comment 
are as follows: 
On page 8, you are correct in stating that no 
affidavit was filed as a sealed exhibit. The sentence should 
therefore read "The logs of the surveillance were filed. . • " 
I think it would be best to use the singular form 
of surveillance throughout the opinion. This will necessitate 
changes only on page 3. We will, of course, want to change 
the verb form from "were" to "was" in the appropriate piac:ances. 
On page 6, I wish to leave the indented portion in 
its present form for purposes of emphasis. I recognize that 
quotes of less than three lines are often "run in" but I do 
not think it appropriate here . 
• '"":J ·> 
On page 8, please leave the expression "colloquy 
between • II 
On pgge 18, I wish the sentence to remain "whom 
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Until 1967, the law with respect to electronic surveillance was 
chaotic. In Olmstead v. United states, 277 u.s. 438 (1928), the Court 
held, where the interception of a telephone line was accomplished with-
out entry upon the premises, that it was not proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. Apparently in response to this ruling, the Congress enacted 
§ 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934. * Section 605, 
covering both interstate and intrastate telephone calls applied to 
private persons as well as federal and state law enforcement officers. ** 
But in view of the ambiguous wording of the statute, it was construed 
by the Department of Justice as allowing interception so long as no 
disclosure was made outside of the Department of the fruits of the 
interception. Federal officers therefore felt free, both under the statute 
and Olmstead, to engage in wiretapping although the results could not 
be used in the federal courts.*** 
-
-:r*4'"8r-st~at~""'".-=1r'21"11rox-3 "'J"'l(1..-,c9:"&'3"7\4), 47 u.s. c. §605, 11 (1958), prohibiting the 
interception and public divulgence of the coo.tents of any wire com-
munication or its interception and use for personal benefit. 
**See Nardone v. -U.s., 302 u.s. 379 (1937); Benati v. United states, 
355 u.s. 96 (1957):--
***See Nardone v. u.S., 302 u.s. 379 (1937); Nardone v. u.s., 308 
u.s. 338 (1938). - -
See, !: I· , testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Committee on 
the Judiciary, U.s. Senate, 89th Cong. 2d session 34 (1966). 
The confusion at the federal level was compounded by that 
among the states. Most of them made no effort to regulate • 
surveillance of any kind; others had a variety of statutes of dubvious 
meaning and merit.* In addition to the lack of harmony among 
state laws, and between the federal statute and such state laws as 
did exist, there was doubt as to the degree .._ of supremacy of 
§ 605, as to who had standing to complain, and- for a time -as 
to whether the 1B fruits of an interception must be suppressed in 
state as well as federal courts. 
Not untU 1942 did a ''bugging" case reach the Court. In 
Goldman v. United states, 316 u.s. 129, it was held that a 
an office involved no physical trespass and therefore did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. ** 
**Bee also Oii Lee v. United states, 343 U.S. 747 ~ (1953). 
*The most notable exception to the inadequacy of state law was New 
York, where a court order system had been employed with notable 
success for many years. "Wiretapping was the mainstay of the 
5. 
New York attack against organized crime until federal court decisions 
intervened." The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 201 
(1967). The New York iDda statute was held invalid as being overly 
broa.d,x and violative of 4th Amendment BNybta rights in Burger v. 
New York, 388 U.s. 41 (1967). 
6. 
In Silverman v. United states, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) the Court 
found a Fourth Amendment violation wle re "the eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into 
the premises occupied by petitioners. And in Wong Sun v. United 
states, 371 u.s. 471 (1963), the Court for the first time specifically 
held that the Fourth Amendment protects "against the overhearing 
of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure 
of papers and effects". • 
It was this state of the law, both statutory and that derived 
from the cases, that the President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration found to be "intolerable": 
"It serves the interest XIS aik neither of privacy 
nor of law enforcement. One way or the other, the 
present cmtroversy with respect to electronic 
surveillance must be resolved. " 
*Wong Sun v. United states, 371 u.S. at 485. The exclusionary 
rUle was applied where the evidence was obtained through "an 
unlawful invasion" of a private area, as contrasted with the absence 
of physical invasion in Goldman. Cf. Lopes v. United states, 373 
u.s. 427 (1963) 
**The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra, 203. 
7. 
A long step toward clarification was taken a few months later 
in Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347 (1967). * Although foreshadowed 
by the decision in Burger, the Court expressly held in Katz that "the 
underpinning of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the DD: trespass doctrine there enunciated 
can no lcnger be regarded as controlling." 389 u.s. at 353. The 
interception in question has been accomplished in a public telephone 
booth in an interstate gambling:x:t}O&a4 IM•c investigation. 
*Prior to Kif.? the Court in Bur&fr v. New Yor\ supra, had held 
that the New ork :ifx statute vio ed the Fourth mendment. 
8. 
standard language of exception, subsection ( 3) merely disclaims 
any intention to "limit the constitutional power of the President." 
The express grant of authority to conduct surveillances 
is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney General to make 
application to a federal judge when surveillance may provide 
evidence of certain offenses. These offenses are described with 
meticulous care and specificity. 
Where the Act authorizes surveillance, the procedure to 
be followed is specified in § 2518. Subsection ( 1) thereof 
requires application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for a 
prior order of approval, and states in detail the information 
5 
required in such application. Subsecution (3) prescribes 
the necessary elements of probable cause which the judge must 
find before issuing an order authorizing an interception. 
Subsection (4) sets forth the required contents of such aa order. 
Subsection ( 5) sets strict time limits on an order. Provision is made 
in Subsection (7) for "an emergency situation" found to exist by the 
11. 
One could hardly expect a clearer expression of con-
gressional neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates 
that ncthing in § 2511(3) was intended to e?CJ?!nd or to contract or 
to define whatever prestdenttal surveillance powers existed in 
matters affecting the national security. It we could accept the 
Government's characterization oA § 2511(3) as a congressionally 
prescribed exception to the general requirement of a warrant, 
it would be necessary to consider the question of whether the 
surveillance in this ease came within the exception. But 
viewing § 2511(3) as a eoogressiooal disclaimer and e:xpresstoo 
·. 
of neutrality, we hold that the statute is not the measure of 
the executive authority asserted in this ease. Rather, we must 
look to the constitutional powers of the President. 
22. 
United states, npra, at 356. The further requirement of 
"probable cause" instructs the magistrate that baseless searches 
shall not proceed. 
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be 
guaranteed if domestic security survetll_ances may be conducted 
solely within the dlseretton of the executt~ branch. The Fourth 
Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of 
government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their 
* duty and respmstbtlity is to enforce the laws, to investigate and 
to prosecute. Katz v. United states, supra, at 359-60 {Douglas, J., 
c mcurrlng). But those charged with this investigative and 
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize 
cmstltuttonally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. The 
historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, 
is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to 
pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook p<tential 
18 
invasions of privacy and protected speech. 
28. 
ccmstitutional basis of the President's domestic security role, 
but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with 
the Fourth Amendment. In this case we hold that this requires 
an appropriate prior warrant procedure. 
We cannot accept the government's argument that internal 
security matters are too subtle and complex for juc:Hcial evaluation. 
Courts regularly deal with the moiBt complex issues of our society. 
There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be 
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in 
domestic security cases. Certainly courts can recognize that 
domestic security surveillance involves different considerations 
from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the threat ts too 
subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to 
convey its significance to a court, one may question whether 
there is probable cause d1x for surveillance. 
Nor do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture 
the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The 
4. 
6. The final sentence of § 2511{3) states that the cootents 
of an interception "by authority of the President in the exercise 
of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence • • • only 
where such interception was reasonable. • • " This sentence seems 
intended to assure that when the President conducts lawful 
surveillance - pursuant to whatever power he may possess .. the 
evidence is admissible. It would be nonsensical to suggest that 
the President has power to gather intelligence information and 
then to deny its use in court. 
7. Cong. Rec. Vol. 114 pt, 11, p. 14751, May 23, 
1968. Senator McClellan was the sponsor of the bUl. The 
above exchange constitutes the ooly time that S 2511(3) was 
expressly debated on the Senate or House floor. The Report of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee is not so explicit as the exchange 
on the floor, but it nonetheless recognizes that under § 2511(3) 
the national security power of the President - whatever it may be -
"is not to be deemed disturbed." s. Rept. No. 1097, 90th Coog., 
2d Sess. 94 (1968). 
5. 
8. We construe a domestic orga.ni21.tlon to mean an 
organization composed of citizens or residents of the United 
States without significant cCIUlection or collaboration with a 
foreign power or its agencies. No doubt there are cases where 
there is collaboration between domestic groups and agencies 
of foreign powers where the listinction between "domestic" and 
"foreign" unlawful activities directed against the government 
wUl be difficult to draw. But this is not such a case. 
9. Franks. Hogan, District Attorney for New York County 
for over 25 years, described telephonic interception, pursuant 
to court-order, as ''the single most valuable weapon in law 
enforcement's fight against organized crime." Cong. Rec. Vol. 
11'7, 864'76, May 10, 1971. The "Crime" Commission appointed 
by President Johnsoo noted that "the great majority of law 
enforcement officials believe that the evidence necessary to 
bring ctiminal sanctions to bear consistently on the higher 






aid of electronic surveillance techniques. They maintain these 
techniques are indispensable to develop adequate strategic 
intelligence concerning organized crime, to set up specific 
investigations, to develop witnesses, to corroborate their 
testimony, and to serve as substitutes for them -each a necessary 
step in the evidence -gathering process in organized crime investtga-
ttons and prosecutions. Report by the President's Commiss1Cil 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge 
of Crime in a Free Society, p. 201 ( 1967). 
10. In that month Attorney General Tom Clark advised 
. 
President Truman of the necessity of using wiretaps "in eases 
vitally affecting the dometltic security. " President Roosevelt had 
1n May 1940 authorized Attomey General Jackson to utilize 
wiretapping 1n matters "involving the defense of the nation, " but 
it is questionable whether this language was meant to apply to 
solely domestic subversion. The nature and extent of wiretapping 
apparently varied under different administrations and Attorneys 
7. 
General, but except for the sharp curtailment under Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark in the latter years of the Johnson 
administration, electronic surveillance has been used both a gatnst 
organized crime and in domestic security cases at least since the 
1946 memorandum from Clark to Truman. Govt. Brief, pp. 16-18; 
Resp. Brief, pp. 51-56; Cong. Rec. Vol. 117, s. 6476-7, May 10, 1971. 
11. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 
Cornell L. Q. 195, 202 (1954). See also Rogers, The Case For 
Wire TapPing, 63 Yale L. J. 792 (1954). 
12. The government asserts that there were 1562 bombing 
incidents in the United states from January 1, 1970 to July 1, \ 
'· 
1971, most of which involved government related facilities. 
Respondents dispute these statistics as incorporating many 
\ 
\ 
frivilous incidents as well as bombings against non-governmental 
facilities. The precise level of this activity, however, is not 
relevant to the disposition of this case. Gov't. Brief, p. 18; 





13. Professor Alan Westin has authored an important 
book on the likely course of future conflict between the value of 
privacy and the "new technology" of law enforcement. Much 
of the book details techniques of physical and electronic 
surveillance and such possible threats to perscmal privacy as \ 
\ 
•\ 




storage and retrieval. Many of the con temporary threats to 
privacy do not, of course, emanate directly from the pressures 
of crime controL 
( 196'1). 
14. Though the number of warrantless 'national security' 
telephone surveillances operated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has decreased over the past ten years, :tUI:di; 
1960 - '18; 1965 - 44; 1970 - 36; the average surveillance involves 
interception of hundreds of different conversations. In non-national 
security wiretaps, for which figures are available, the average 
I 
I 








which 295 or 45 percent were incriminating. Gov't. Brief, p. 27; 
Cong. Rec. VoL 117, S6477, May 10, 1971. It is important to 
point out, however, that the numbers of warrantless surveillances 
mentioned above reflect those in operation by the FBI at a particular 
date, generally that of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's testimony. 
The total number of telephone surveillances for the year is 
substantially larger than the number in use on a particular day. 
ACLU, Amici Brief, 16-21; Gov't. Reply Brief, pp. 13-14. 
15. J. Landynski, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, 264-5 (1966). 
16. Cong. Rec. VoL 114, pt, 11, p. 14750, May 23, 
1968. The subsequent assurances, quoted in section 1 of the 
opinion, that § 2511(3) implied no statutory grant, contraction, 
or definition of presidential power eased the Senator's misgivings. 
17. This view has largely been overruled. In Jlh.ii&a 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.s. 752, (1969), the Court considered 
10. 
the government's contention that the search be judged on a general 
"reasonableness" standard without reference to the warrant clause. 
The Court concluded that argument was "founded on Uttle more 
than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts 
of pollee conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth 
\ 
\ 
Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analys,ts, Fou~ 
Amendment protection ta this area would approach the -. ,, , ....... ' . 
evaporation point." Chimel, supra, at 764-5. 
18. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
79-105 (1937). 
19. The government aregues that domestic security wiretaps 
should be upheld by courts in post-surveillance review "unless it 
appears that the Attorney General's determinatloo that the 
\ \ 
' I \ 
l 1\ 
'\ 
proposed surveillance relates to a national security matter is 
arbitrary and capricious, 1. e., that it constitutes a clear abus1e 
\ 











all Information that will be helpful to the President in protecting 
the government . • • • " against the various unlawful acts in 
§ 2511(3). Gov't. Brief, p. 22. This standard. however, would 
reduce the judicial role commanded by the Fourth Amendment 
to be a virtual nullity. 
20. See n. 8 supra. At least one federal judge has 
suggested that "it might very well be that warrantless surveillance 
.•• , while uncmstituttonalin the domestic situation, would be 
be constitutional in the area o1 foreign affairs. This possible 
distinction is largely due to the President's long-recognized, 
inherent power with respect to foreign relations. " United states 
v. Smith, __ F. Supp. ( 1971 ). Commentaries to --
standards for electronic surveillance which were eventually 
adopted by the House of Delegates o1 the American Bar Association 
noted that "limitations which are proper when the internal affairs 
of the nation are solely involved become arttftctal when international 
realities are cmsidered." American Bar Association Project 
12. 
on Minimum standards of Criminal Justice, standards Relating 
to Electronic Surveillance, Tentative Draft, p. 121 (1968). We, 
:dD of course, intimate no views whatsoever on this matter in 
the instant case. 
21. This inquiry as to relevance is required by Wong Sun v. 
- \ 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963): " ••• the more Ill& a~, 
question . . • is 'whether, granting the establishment of the 
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is 
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint. '" See also Nardone v. United states, 308 U. s. 
338, 341 {1939). 
22. The Court in Alderman limited disclosure to the 
\ 
transcripts of a defendant's own conversation and of those whi~\h 
I 
\ 
took place em his premises. Alderman at 184. The latter typ~3 1 
of conversation is not involved In this case. See also the 
limitations on disclosure rights In Tagliaretti v. United States, 







23. Alderman at 181. The government does, of course, 
have the option to dismiss some prosecutions "in deference to 
national security or third party interests. But this is a choice 
the Government concededly faces with respect to material which 
tt has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge 
would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against 
the defendant. " Id. at 184. 
6. 
The Government relies on § 2511(3). It argues that "in 
excepting national security surveillances from the Act's warrant 
requirement Congress recognized the President's authority to 
cooduct such survelllances without prior judicial approval" 
( Govt. brief p. 7, 28 ). The section thus is viewed as a 'Zec:lr.lyc 
"recognition" or affirmance of the constitutional authority of the 
President to conduct such warrantless surveillances. 
We think the language of § 2511(3), as well as the 
legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation. 
The relevant language 1s that: 
''Nothing contained in this chapter ••• shall limit 
the coostltutional power of the President to take such 
measures as he deems necessary to protect" 
against the dangers specified. At most, this 1s an implicit 
recognition that the President does have certain powers in the 
areas specified. Few would doubt this, as the Section refers -
among other things - to protection "against actual or potential 
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power. " But so far as 
7. 
the use of the President's electroolc surveillance power is coo-
cerned, the language is essentially neutral. 
Section 2511{3) certainly confers no power, as the language 
is wholly inappropriate for such purpose. It merely provides that 
the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb such power as 
the President may have under the Constitution. In short, Congress 
simply left presidential powers where it found them. This view is 
reinforeed by the general coo.text of Title m. Section 2511{1) 
broadly prohibits the use of electronic surveillance "except as 
otherwise specifically provided in this chapter. " Subsectioo 2 
thereof contains four specific exceptions. In each of the specified 
exceptions, the statutory language is as follows: 
"It has not been unlawful . • • to iuDat intercept" 
the communication. 
Subsection {3), here involved, 1s to be contrasted with 
the exceptions set forth in the preceding subsection. Rather 
than stating that warrantless presidential uses of electronic 
surveillance "shall not be unlawful" and thus employing the 
8. 
standard language of exception, subsection (S) merely disclaims 
any intention to "limit the constitutional power of the President." 
The express grant of authority to intercept 1s found 1n 
§ 2516, which authorizes the Attorney General to make application 
to a federal judge when sureeillance may provide evidence of certain 
offenses. These offenses are described with meticulous care and 
specificity. 
Where the Act authorizes electronic surveillance, the 
procedure to be followed is specified in § 2518. Section t 2518(1) 
requires application to a judge of competent jurisdictiDn for an 
order approving the surveillance, and specifies in detaU the 
information required in such application. Section 2518 (S) 
prescribes the necessary elements of probable cause which the 
judge must find before issuing an order authorizing an interception. 
Section 2518 ( 4) sets forth the required cmtents of such an order. 
Section 2518( 5) sets strict time limits. Provision is made in 
§ 2518( 7) for "an emergency situation" found to exist by a the 
9. 
Attorney General (or by the principal prosecuting attorney of 
a state) ''With respect to conspiratorial activities threatening the 
national security interest. " In such a situation, emergency 
surveillance may be conducted "if an application for an order 
approving the interception is made • • • within 48 hours. " If 
such an order is not obtained, or the application therefor is 
denied, the interception is deemed to be a violation of the Act. 
In view of these and other comprehensive and carefully 
interrelated provisions delineating permissible interceptions 
of particular criminal activity upon meticulously specified 
conditions, it would have been incongruous for Congress to have 
legislated with respect to the important and complex area of 
national security in a single brief and nebulous Jii*'I*P paragraph. 
This would not comport with the sensitivity of the problem 
involved or with the .. <fl 4 • : ~ t I I t 1 • • . .. f t • . extraordinary care Congress 
exercised in drafting other sections of the Act. We therefore think 
the coo.clusion inescapable that there was no congressional 
10. 
intention to do more than make it clear that the Act simply did 
not relate to national security surveillances. The legislative 
history of § 2511(3) supports this interpretation. Most relevant 
in this regard is the colloquy between Senators Hart, Holland 
and McClellan on the Senate floor: 
"Mr. Holland •.• The section [2511(c)] from 
which the Senator [Hart] has read does not affirmatively 
give any power •••• We are nd:affimatively 
conferring any &ower u\iioo. the President. We are 
simply saylrig at noth g hereii shallltmit such 
power as the President has under the Constitution. 
. • • We certainly do not grant him a thing. 
There is nothing affirmative in this statement. 
Mr. McClellan. Mr. President, we make it 
understood that we are not trying to take anything 
away from him. 
Mr. Holland. The Senator is correct. 
Mr. Hart. Mr. President, there is no intention 
here to expand by this language a constitutional power. 
Clearly we could not do so. 
Mr. McClellan. Even though we intended, we 
could not do so. 
Mr. Hart •••• However, we are agreed that 
this language should not be regarded as intending 
to grant any authority, including authority to put a 
bug on, that the President does not have now. 
In addition, Mr. President, as I think our -
exchantfi makes clear, nothing in Section 2511(3) 
even a empts to define the limits Of the President's 
aational security power under present law, which 
I have ..always found extremely vague •••• Section 
2511(3) merely says that if the President has such 
a power '5 then its exercise is in no way affected by 
title m ( emplla.sis supplied) 
11. 
One could hardly expect a clearer expression of congressional 
neutrality. The debate above explicitly indicates that nothing in 
§ 2511(3) attempts to e~d or to contract or to define whatever 
presidential surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the 
national security. The reasons for this restraint are understandable. 
Quite apart from the intrinsic difficulty of legislation in this area 
there were strongly held divergent views with respect to the 
6 
surveillance of domestic organizations, and Congress may have 
been reluctant to address an area so fraught with political emotion. 
WJomx Were we to accept the Government's and my brother 
White's characterization of § 2511(3) as a congressionally 
recognized exception to the general requirement of a warrant, 
it might be necessary to consider the question of whether the 
surveillance in this case fitted within it. But viewing § 2511(3) 
as a congressional disclaimer and expression of neutrality we 
cannot utilize it as a ground for decision. We do not lightly brush 
aside the wise admonition that courts should avoid constitutional 
12. 
determinations except where necessary to decide the case before 
them. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 279 U. S. 288, 
346-7 (1936) (concurring opinion). But we cannot accept a 
statutory ground of decision where Congress intended no statutory 
instruction. Clearly Ashwander does not teach the avoidance 
of constitutional issues which squarely front this Court. Section 
2 511( 3) says only that nothing in the Act shall ''be deemed to 
limit the constitutional power of the President" in the surveUlance 
of foreign and domestic attack and subversion. Given a proper 
controversy before us, the scope of that constitutional power is 
for this Court to determine. 
11. 
u. 
It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited 
nature of the question before the Court. This ease raises no 
constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance as specifically 
authorized by Title m of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Aet of 1968. Nor is there any question or doutt as to 
the necessity of obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes 
unrelated to the national security interest, Katz v. United states, 
389 u.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.s. 41 (1967). 
Further, the instant ease requires no judgment on the scope of 
the President's surveillance power with respect to the activities 
of foreign powers, within or without this country. The Attorney 
General's affidavit in this ease ·states that the surveillances 
were "deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of 
domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing . 
- i 
structure of government" (emphasis supplied). There is no 




Our present inquiry, though important, ls therefore a 
narrow one. It addresses a question left open by Katz, suprp., 
p. 358, n. 23: 
Whether safeguards other than prior 
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy 
the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving 
the national security •.. 
The determination of this question requires the essential Fourth 
Amendment inquiry into the "reasmableness" of the search and 
seizure in question, and the way in which that "reasonableness" 
derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant 
clause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-484 
(1971). 
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the 
United States has the fundamental duty, under our Constitution, 
Art. n Section 1, ''to preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution of the United states." Implicit in that duty is the 
power to protect our government against those who would subvert 
or ll1ibEamd: overthrow it by unlawful means. In the discharge 
\ 
13. 
of this duty, the President -through the Attorney General -may 
find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain 
intelligence information on the plans of those who contemplate 
unlawful acts against the government. Enactment of Title m 
reflects Congressional recognition of the importance of such 
8 
surveillance in combatting various types of crime; and its 
use in internal security cases has been more or less continuously 
sanctioned by' various Presidents and Attorneys General since 
. 9 
July 1946. Herbert Brownell, Attorney General under President 
Eisenhower, urged the use of electronic surveillance both in 
internal and international security matters oo the grounds that 
those acting against the government 
turn to the telephone to carry on their intrigue. 
The success of their plans frequently rests upon 
piecing together shreds of information reqeived 
from many sources and many nests. The participants 
in the c oospiracy are often dispersed and stationed 
in various strategic positions in ftfvernment and 
industry throughout the country. 
Though the government and respondents debate their 





the government exist in sufficient number to justify 
investigative powers with respect to them. The covertness 
and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the govern-
ment and the necessary dependency of conspirators upon the 
telephone make electronic surveillance an essential investigatory 
instrument in certain circumstances. The marked acceleratiop. 
in technological developments and sophistication in their use 
have resulted in new techniques for the planning, commission 
and concealment of criminal activities. It would be irrational 
and contrary to the public interest for government to deny to 
itself the employment of those very techniques which are 
employed against the government and its law ltbiding citizens. 
It is well to remember that "the most basic function of 
any government is to provide for the security of the individual 
and of his property." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 839 
White J., dissenting (1966). And unless government safeguards 
15. 
its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its 
people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights 
and liberties would be endangered. As Chief Justice Hughes 
reminded us in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1940): 
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the :£\»wf•MxtM 
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized 
society maintaining public order without which 
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of 
unrestrained abuses. 
But a recognition d: of these elementary truths does not 
make the employment by gOvernment of electronic surveillance 
a welc orne development - even when employed with restraint 
and under judicial supervision. There is, understandably, a 
deep ... seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability 
will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law abiding 
12 
citizens. We look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this 
privacy. Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, 
its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable 
surveillance. Katz v. United States, supra; Berger v. New Yo!:!g 
16. 
!u2ra; Silverman v. United States, 365 u.S. 505 (1961). Our 
decision in Katz refused to lock the Fourth Amendment into 
instances of actull physical trespass. Rather, the Amendment 
governs "not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as 
well to the recording of oral statements 'without any technical 
trespass under ... local property law.'" Katz, supra, at 353. 
That decision implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected 
governmental incursions into conversational privacy which 
13 
electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of 
Fourth Amendment safeguards. 
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a 
convergence of First and Fourth ft.mendment values not present 
in cases of "ordinary'crime. Though the investigative duty 
of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is 
there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. 
"Historically, the struggle for freedom of speech and press in 
England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search 
17. 
and seizure power," Marcus v. Search Warrant2 367 U.S. 717, 
History abundantly documents the tendency of government ... 
however benevolent and benign its motives - to view with suspicion 
those who most fervently dispute its policies. Fourth Amendment 
protections become the more necessary when the targets of 
official surveillance may be those "suspected of unorthodoxy 
14 
in matters of political belief and conscience." The danger 
to political dissent is acute whe~e the government attempts 
to act mder so vague a concept as the power to protect 
"domestic BIDIJDC: security· " Given the difficulty of defining the 
domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to 
14-1/2 
protect that interest becomes apparent. Senator hart 
addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511(3): 
As I read it ... and this is my fear - we are 
saying that the President, on his motion, could 
declare -name your favorite poison -draft 
dodgers, Black Muslims, tjle Ku Klux Klan, or 
civil rights activists to 'bEV'Clear and present 
danger' to thf structure or existence of the 
Government. 5 
18. 
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection 
to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of 
unauthorized official eavesdropping chill vigorous citizen dissent 
and discussion of government action in private conversation. For 
private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential 
to our free society. 
m. 
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, 
our task is to examine and balance the basic values at stake in 
this case: the duty of government to protect the domestic 
security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable 
surveillancd to individual privacy and free expression. If the 
legitimate need of government to safeguard domestic security 
requires the use of electronic suneillance, the question is 
whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free expression 
may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such 
surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant 
19. 
requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of government to 
protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed 
against it. 
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of "unreasonable 
searches and seizures," the definition of "reasonableness" turns, at 
least in part, on the more specific commands of the warrant clause. 
Some have argued that "the relevant test is not whether it was 
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search 
was reasonable, " United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 66 
(1950). This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the 
Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is 
not dead language. Rather it has been 
a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, 
and it has determined the result In scores and scores 
of cases in the courts aDD. over this country. It is not 
an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against 
the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, 
an important working part of our machinery of 
government, operating as a matter of course to 
check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly over-
zealous executive officers" who are a part of any 
system of law enforcement. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, supSa, at 491. See also UnitedStates 
v. Rabinowitz,- 39 U. S. 57, 68 (1950)( Frankfurter 
J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 
582, 604 (Frankfurter J. , dissenting). 
20. 
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that common 
law principles prohibited warrants that ordered the arrest otx.E 
unnamed individuals whom the officer might conclude were guilty 
of seditious libel. "It is not fit, " said Mansfield, "that the 
receiving or judging of the information ought to be left to the 
discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and 
should give certain directions to the officer. " Leach v. Three .. 
' 
of the King's Messengers, How. st. Tr. 1001, 1027 (1765). 
Lord Mansfield's im: formulation touches the very heart 
of the Fourth Amendment directive: that where practical, a 
\ 
governmental search and seizure should represent both the 
efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and 
the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is 
sufficient to justify invasion of a man's private premises or 
conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its 
issuance by a "neutral and detached magistrate" ~ 
CoolidS'! v. New Hampshire, supra, at 453; llfa:tdx Katz v. 
21. 
United ~ates, supra, at 3 56. The further requirement of 
"probable cause" instructs the magistrate that baseless searches 
shall not proceed. 
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be 
guaranteed for domestic security surveillances within the sole 
discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Amendment does 
not contemplate the President and AttornJy General as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates in this instance. Their proper 
mission is to uncover threats to the domestic security. Katz 
v. United States2 supra, at 359-60 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
Those charged with investigation and possible prosecution should 
not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive 
means to pursue their tasks. The historical judgment, which 
the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive 
discretion may yield too readily to the pressures for incriminating 




It may well be that, in the instant case, the government's 
surveillance of Plamondon!B conversations was a reasonable one 
which would have readily gained prior judicial approval. But 
this Court ''has never sustained a search upon the sole ground 
that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular 
crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least 
intrusive means consistent with that end." Katz, supra, at 
356-7. The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior mjudicial 
judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably 
exercised. This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional 
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through 
a separation of powers and division of functions among the 
different branches and levels of government. John M. Harlan, 
Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 
49 A. B. A. J. 943-44 (1963). The judicial check upon executive 
discretion is not satisfied, as the government argues, by 
17 
"extremely limited" post-surveillance judicial review. Indeed, 
23. 
post-surveillance review would never reach the surveillances 
18 
which failed to result in prosecutions. Prior z:Jravreview by 
a neutral and detached magistrate is necessary to effectuate 
Fifth Amendment rights. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
It is true that there have been some exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); MaDonald v. United 
states, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Carroll v. United states, 267 U.S. 
132 (1925). But those exceptions are few in number and carefully 
delineated, Katz, supra, at 357; in general they serve the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to protect their 
own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction. Even 
while carving out those exceptions, the Court has reaffirmed the 
principle that the "pollee must, whenever practicable, obtain 
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the 
warrant procedure," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 20; Chimel v. 
California:, supra, at 762. 
24. 
The government agrues that the special circumstances 
applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate a 
further exception to the warrant requirement. It is urged that 
the requirement of prior judicial review would obstruct the 
President in the discharge of his constitutional duty to protect 
domestic security. We are told further that these surveillances 
are directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining of 
intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and are not an 
attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. 
It is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to 
trtlditional warrant requirements which were established to 
govern investigation of criminal activity, not on-going intelligence 
19 
gathering. 
The government further insists that courts "as a practical 
matter would have neither the knowledge nor the techniques 
necessary to determine whether there was probable cause to 









security. " These BD security problems, the government points 
out, involve "a large number of complex and subtle factors" 
20 
beyond the competence of courts to evaluate. 
As a final reason for exemption from a warrant requiremen~ 
the government believes that disclosure to a magistrate of all or 
/en a significant portion of the Information involved in domestic 
j security surveillances "would create serious potential dangers 
I 
to the national security and to the lieves of informants and agents 
... Secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering; 
requiring prior judicial authorization would create a greater danger 
of leaks • . . , because in addition to the judge, you have the 
clerk, the stenographer and some other official like a law assistant 
21 
or bailiff who may be apprised of the nature of the surveillance. " 
These cmtentions in behalf of a complete exemption from 
' 
~1; warrant requirement, when urged on behalf of the President 
i I 
/ +d the national security in its domestic implications, merit 
/ 
:1 I 





the most careful consideration. We certainly do not reject them 
lightly, especially at a time when civil disorders are more 
pxnaiaat prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our 
history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic force to the government's 
position. 
But we do not think a case has been made for the 
requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards. 
The circumstances described do not justify complete~plax 
exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial 
scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal 
investigation or on-going intelligence gathering, risks infringe .. 
ment of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security 
surveillances are especially BIIJlJdd!v sensitive because of the 
inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the 
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, 
and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee 
political dissent. We recognize as we have before, the 
27. 
cOnstitutional nature of the President's comestic security role, 
but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with 
the Fourth Amendment. In this case we hold that this requires 
an appropriate prior warrant procedure. 
We cannot accept the government's view that internal 
security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. 
Courts regularly deal with the most complex issues of our society. 
There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be 
insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in 
domestic security cases. Certainly, courts can recognize that 
domestic security surveillance involves different considerations 
from the surveillance of ordinary crime. If the threat is too 
subtle or complex for our ablest law enforcement officers to 
convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there 
is probable cause for surveillance. 
Nor, do we believe prior judicial approval will fracture 
the secrecy essential to official intelligence gathering. The 
28. 
investigation of criminal activity has long involved imparting 
liJIR1dllx senstivie information to judicial dficers who have 
respected the confidentialities involved. Judges may be counted .. ·, 
upon to be especially conscious of security requirements in 
national security cases. Title m of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act already has imposed this responsibility 
on the judiciary in connection with such crimes as espionage, 
sabotage and treason, ~ § 2516(1)(a)(c), each of ··-
which may involve domestic as well as foreign security threats. 
Moreover, a warrant application involves no public or adversary 
proceedings: it is an~ parte request before a magistrate or 
judge. Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial 
personnel may pose can be minimized by proper administrative 
measures, possible to the point of allowing the government itself 
to provide the necessary clerical assistance. 
Thus, we conclude that the government's concerns do 
not justify departure in this case from the Fourth Amendment 
29. 
m: commandment of judicial approval prior to initiation of a 
search or surveillance. Although some added burden will be 
imposed upon the Attorney General, this type of burden is 
justified in a free society to protect constitutional values. Nor 
do we think the government's domestic surveillance powers will 
be impaired to any significant degree. A o prior warrant 
establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance and will 
minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance 
judicial review. By no means of least importance, will be the 
reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wire-
tapping cannot occur. 
IV. 
We emphasize before concluding this opinion, the scope 
of this decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves mly 
the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed 
the more difficult issues which may be involved with respect to 






that the standards and procedures of Title m are necessarily 
applicable. We recognize that domestic security surveillance 
from the surveillance 
may involve different policy and practical consideration/of 
"ordinary crime. " The gathering of security intelligence is 
30. 
often long range and involves the interrelation of va~us sources 
and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance 
may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance o~ rations 
against many types of crime specified in Title m. Often, too, 
the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention 
of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the government!~:! 
preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, 
the xxx focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than 
that directed against more conventional types of crime. 
Given these potential distinctions between routine criminal 
surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress 
may wish to consider somewhat different protective standards for 
the latter than those already prescribed for specified crimes 
31. 
in Title III. Different standards may still be compatible with 
the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation 
to the legitimate need of government for intelligence information 
and the prctected rights of our citizens. For the warrant 
application may vary according to the governmental interest 
to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. 
As we said in Camara: 
In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires 
that a warrant to search be obtained, "probable 
Baase cause" is the standard by which a particular 
decision to search is tested against the constitutional 
mandate of reasonableness . . . . In determining 
whether a particular inspection is reasonable - and 
thus in determining whether there is probable cause 
to issue a warrant for that inspection -the need for 
the inspection must be weighed in terms of these 
reasonable goals of law enforcement. Camara, supra, 
at 534-5. 
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the 
application and affidavit showing probable cause need not be as 
particularized as in cases of specified crimes; that the request 
for prior court authorization could, in:as.ecwctbck sensitive cases, 
be made to any member of a specially designated court <!· !· 
the District Court ot Court of Appeals for the District of 
32. 
Columbia); and that the time or reporting requirements need not 
be so strict as those in § 2518. 
The above paragraph does not, of course, attempt to guide 
the congressional judgment but rather to delineate the present 
to 
scope of our own opinion. We do not attempt Ia detail the precise 
\ 
standards for "domestic security" warrants any more than our 
decision in Katz sought to set the refined requirements for the 
specified criminal surveillances which now constitute Title m. 
We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required 
for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this 
case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such 
reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe. 
34. 
v. 
was unlawful, because coo.ducted without prior judicial approval, 
the final question pertains to the procedures the District Court 
must follow in determining the relevance of the impermissible 
21 
interception to the Government's case. In Alderman v. United 
I> 
states, 314 U.S. 165 (1969), this Court held that once a 
surveillance had been found to be unlawful, disclosure to an 
accused of his monitored c oo.versations was required to safeguard 
his opportunity for effective assertion of Fourth Amendment 
rights. The purpose of this disclosure was to insure the 
scrutiny of the impermissibility intercepted coo.versat ions 
"which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands. " 
Alderman, suprp., at 184. Scrutiny by the accused himself, 
not solely by the trial judge, was held necessary to detect what 
the Government may have utilized in buildings its case: 
An apparently innocent phrase a chance remark, 
a reference to what appears to be a neutral person 
or revent, the identity of a caller or the individual 
on the other end of a telephone, or even the manner 
of speaking or using words may have special 
significance to one who lmows the more intimate 
facts of an accused's life. And yet that information 
may be wholly colorless and devoid of meaning to 
- 35. 
one less well acquainted with all relevant circumstances. 
Unavoidably, this is a matter of judgment, but in 
our view the task is too complex, and the margin for 
error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera 
judgment of the trial court to identify those records 
which might have contributed to the Governmenf;fs 
case. Alderman at 182. 
We have evaluated, as did the Court in Alderman, those 
considerations of security and confidentiality which underlie 
the government's request to have the relevance of :laiJpet:xicJa& 
impermissibly overheard conversations first reviewed in camera 
by the trial judge. We recognize the importance of portecting 
sensitive national security information, ever after prosectuion 
has commenced. The disclosure to a defendant must be limited 
22 
to the transcript of his own wrongly intercepted conversations. 
The availability of a strict protective order under Fed. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 16(e) and the trial judge's discretion to limit 
the number of persons to whom the transcript is exposed should 
36. 
further reduce the security risks involved. But the legitimate 
need for confidentiality of national security information must 
still accommodate itself to neighboring constitutional principles. 
The dictates of a fair trial have often required a state to divulge 
information which might otherwise remain undisclosed. In 
Alderman, the government itself acknowledged that relevant 
surveillance records must be disclosed to a defendant "even 
though attended by potential danger to the xep•ll reputation of 
23 
third parties or to the national security." 
Alderman's ctllcat disclosure requirements can henceforth 
be avoided by ••II••..., undertaking surveillances with proper 
prior judicial approval. In the instant case, however, Alderman's 
ace ommodatton of the security interests of government and the 
opportunity for effective exercise of Fourth Amendmetlt rights 
must control. We therefore affirm the lower courts' orders 
for disclosure to defendant Plamondon of tbc his monitored 
c ooversations. 
Mfirmed. 
